51–60 of 314 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because before the FBI didn't need their assistance, and now they do.
So if the FBI drops a confiscated laptop and the hard drive breaks, can they compel Seagate to recover data from the drive?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because before the FBI didn't need their assistance, and now they do.
So if the FBI drops a confiscated laptop and the hard drive breaks, can they compel Seagate to recover data from the drive?
I am only spitballing here, but does anyone else think the heat has risen for federal law enforcement to set some precedents on this stuff now that Antonin Scalia has died? My hunch is that with another liberal judge on the Supreme Court there may be a push to have some of this type of case heard at the highest court.
I think it's important to dispel this fiction that Apple will be "unlocking" anything. To use the word "unlock" seriously blurs the lines of what's going on here. They're merely asked to flash it with software that removes a delay in submitting passcodes and removes the wiping function after ten failures. That's not unlocking it. If Apple complies with the order, the FBI will still be getting an encrypted iPhone back…
This sounds exactly right. From an article I posted earlier[1]: > In interviews with BuzzFeed News Wednesday, the former officers with the FBI and NSA acknowledged that U.S. intelligence agencies have technology that has been used in past intelligence-gathering operations to break into locked phones. The question, they added, was whether it was worthwhile for the FBI to deploy that technology, rather than setting a p…
> This article seems to confirm that Law Enforcement is going to do its best to set a legal precedent. What do you think the odds are that the gov. wins?
The main difference, of course, is that adding an ability to allow someone to intrude on privacy for a service is different than adding functionality to a product that allows someone to intrude on privacy. The service provider can act as a gatekeeper to ensure that a warrant is provided. If you make a special build that anyone can load onto a device, then, of course, there is no gatekeeper for the warrant.
The key is that I am aware of no law that requires a gatekeeper. Services ask for warrants out of respect for their customers. Often they don't respect their customers and provide access without a warrant. It's not like the software we added to the telephone switches requires some kind of special key or anything. There is no oversight and there has never been any oversight.
The thing is that (as an American in US) you are under no obligation to hand over your cell phone, unless the police have a warrant. Once they have a warrant, then I don't think you have any recourse. As we have seen, you can be found in contempt of court if you do not reveal your password anyway.
So from the perspective of the law, I think it is relatively straight forward. It's going to have to go all the way up to the supreme court. I imagine that the supreme court would choose to hear this case. Essentially you will have to argue that compelling a company to create an exploit to satisfy a warrant constitutes an unreasonable search if that exploit can also be used to perform illegal searches. I think the case would be heard, but I doubt very much that the argument will succeed. If the exploit is constructed on the condition that it is only used to satisfy the warrant in question, I'm pretty sure that it will be acceptable. We all know that such a condition need not be followed since the FBI et al don't care if the evidence they gather is admissible in court. However, I doubt it will matter legally.
> The judge has indicated skepticism over the government’s demands. Initially, Apple agreed to a formal order to help the Justice Department gain access to Mr. Feng’s phone, but Judge Orenstein balked, questioning whether the All Writs Act could be used that way. He invited Apple’s lawyers to raise objections. This is curious, because I was under the impression (due to the lawyers on HN) that this is basically an ope…
It's tricky. The All Writs Act clearly must have some boundaries as to reasonableness and the due process of the defendant. What Apple is being asked to do here isn't simply to unlock a phone. They're being asked to use their engineers, money, and expertise to build a tool to defeat the very encryption they developed. It's not clear the All Writs Act enables the government to simply order a search warrant recipient t…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
So if the FBI drops a confiscated laptop and the hard drive breaks, can they compel Seagate to recover data from the drive?
Seagate has no special ability to recover data as far as I know. The case isn't comparable.
This part is interesting... " The judge has indicated skepticism over the government’s demands. Initially, Apple agreed to a formal order to help the Justice Department gain access to Mr. Feng’s phone, but Judge Orenstein balked, questioning whether the All Writs Act could be used that way. He invited Apple’s lawyers to raise objections. "