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A Message to Our Customers

apple.com

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Re: A Message to Our Customers

#261

Post by KMag »

asymmetric wrote: post #65

I see a lot of people saying they're impressed, admired, etc. at Apple for doing this. It's not about giving props: Apple is not doing this out of goodwill, or because they believe in protecting privacy. Apple has a competitive advantage against Google/Facebook in that its business model does not depend on violating their customer's privacy. They are just exploiting that competitive advantage. Cfr. https://ar.al/note…

A man went to his local parish priest and asked "Father, is it permissible to smoke while praying?" "No, my son, when praying you should show the utmost respect and attention to God" he answered. The next day, another man asked the same priest "Father, is it permissible to pray when I smoke?" "Of course, I encourage you to make your whole life one long prayer!" was the priest's answer.

So, is Apple defending rights while advertising, or advertising while defending rights?

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#262

Post by interpol_p »

ghshephard wrote: post #183
tomp wrote: post #169

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Apple making it abundantly clear, that if they comply (or are forced to comply) with the All Writs Act of 1789 to create this particular back door, then that opens the floodgate moving forward for all sorts of requests to add backdoors/decrease security. I read it differently. Apple is saying that if they make this particular backdoor, then this very backdoor can also be used in other scenarios, to crack other phon…

The Apple 5C is an older phone not even manufactured by Apple anymore, and, for the longest time, Apple had capabilities that allowed them to brute force iPhones under direction of a court order. Apple has some concern, clearly, about it's customer's security, but doesn't care as much about this particular iPhone Model's security, as it does about the general principle that, without explicit legislation such as [1]CA…

I don't understand — if the iPhone 5C is so simple to brute force, why aren't Apple simply doing this for the FBI in this particular case? Why request an entire iOS modification when Apple could do what it has done for previous court orders and just brute force the phone.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#263

Post by edraferi »

vbezhenar wrote: post #239

This is very disappointing letter for me. It means that Apple can indeed build a backdoor into existing phones, they just don't want to do it (or so they speak). I was under impression that Apple employs security hardware which protects keys and makes impossible to penetrate that defense. If it's not the case, iOS security is not as good as it could be.

Other commentary suggests this capability is targeted at the iPhone 5C, and that at least some newer models do have protections against this technique.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#264

Post by interpol_p »

ghshephard wrote: post #202
Ntrails wrote: post #167

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But how do you get the firmware updated on a locked phone? My understanding is all updates (historically) have required the phone to be unlocked and connected to the internet?

If in pursuit of an active investigation (i.e. the devices are still in active use), a police agency could invoke the All Writs act of 1789, and have Apple be instructed to introduce security vulnerabilities, with the next regular upgrade of iOS, such that after the phone is upgraded, it can be captured by the FBI, or whatever police force is involved, and the data recovered. A large percentage (and presumably the th…

But this request was made specifically for the phone in the San Bernardino case. In which the owner is dead and the phone is locked.

This implies it is possible for Apple themselves to apply an iOS update to a locked phone in order to disable the erase-on-repeated-failure feature.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#265

Post by datashaman »

jupp0r wrote: post #249
Loic wrote: post #201

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In the world of cryptography, it is always possible, because you can always be lucky and guess the right "unlock" code. In fact, social engineering is normally used to find the right "unlock" code[0]. The FBI can also unsolder the components in the phone, make a full image of the content, find the encrypted section and then brute-force. This is what is done for SSD. They do not power up the drive, unsolder, put the m…

It's kind of hard to social engineer dead people, though.

dead people were once alive. go through their pockets or their apartment.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#266

Post by interpol_p »

robbiet480 wrote: post #63
mrb wrote: post #53

Link to the FBI order: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2714001/SB-Shoote... (Edit: deleted part where I was wrong. Thanks robbiet480 for correcting me. It's 2am here and I was tired.) Also, prediction: if Apple refuses to build a brute forcer, someone else will do it and sell it to the FBI. Just wait and watch.

iPhone brute force hardware already exists [1]. The issue is that when Touch ID and/or a passcode is enabled, the device locks itself for a few seconds-a few hours every time an incorrect pin is entered. So brute forcing would take an extremely long time. In addition, there is a setting on all iPhones to erase data after 10 failed pin code entry attempts. The FBI wants Apple to provide a custom iOS build that can be…

But how can the custom iOS build be installed on the device while it is locked?

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#267

Post by lunasight »

> The San Bernardino Case

We were shocked and outraged by the deadly act of terrorism in San Bernardino last December. We mourn the loss of life and want justice for all those whose lives were affected. The FBI asked us for help in the days following the attack, and we have worked hard to support the government’s efforts to solve this horrible crime. We have no sympathy for terrorists.

When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided it. Apple complies with valid subpoenas and search warrants, as we have in the San Bernardino case. We have also made Apple engineers available to advise the FBI, and we’ve offered our best ideas on a number of investigative options at their disposal.

We have great respect for the professionals at the FBI, and we believe their intentions are good. Up to this point, we have done everything that is both within our power and within the law to help them. But now the U.S. government has asked us for something we simply do not have, and something we consider too dangerous to create. They have asked us to build a backdoor to the iPhone.

Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.

The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no an way to guarantee such control

This is just pure awful they admit to helping the fbi. how can we trust them

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#269

Post by lunasight »

nicky0 wrote: post #136
rms_returns wrote: post #21

This is quite unlike Apple. Is this the same company that insists on keeping its source proprietary and is always against FOSS? The idea that you care for your users' privacy and still like to keep control on them by not giving them the freedom to modify source-code is not what I buy.

This Apple? http://www.opensource.apple.com https://github.com/apple

yes

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#270

Post by dh997 »

Tim Cook: a really nice guy with blue whale-sized cohones.

There can be no compromise because China, Syria and Turkey would also lean on Apple to break into phones of dissidents, and pretty soon, future whistleblowers here in US too in order to prevent leaks (iPhone 7 and iCar notwithstanding).

That's the tradeoff in not giving in to faint, vague "maybes" that there were "external coordination" when in all likihood it was the ultraconservative, Saudi half leading this duo into the kookooland of violent extremism.

The security services will just have to buy exploits, develop malware, cultivate human intelligence sources and monitor everything the old-fashioned way... It's not like that kid in a YouTube video finding a jailbreak exploit for an iPhone and not releasing a tool is going to sit on it, he's going to auction it off to the shop or country with the most $$$.

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