Earlier quoted context omitted.
Those hundreds of trusted root certificates are, at least to some extent, held to operational and security standards. If your ISP used one of those certificates to MitM your traffic, there is a very real possibility of that certificate being blacklisted by browsers. Further, unlike the Kazakhstan certificate, those root certificates cannot bypass HTTPS public key pinning (HPKP).
Thanks for the info! I didn't know some of this. Two questions: 1: > there is a very real possibility of that certificate being blacklisted by browsers Why would a browser blacklist a certificate? Is it possible for a browser to detect a MITM attack when the SSL traffic is all signed by the private key of a trusted root certificate? 2: > Further, unlike the Kazakhstan certificate, those root certificates cannot bypas…
2: Browsers ignore HPKP when the server certificate is trusted through a user or administrator installed root CA. All mainstream browsers on all platforms behave in this way. This is by design specifically to allow enterprises to do the sort of traffic interception that Kazakhstan is implementing. The rationale is that if an attacker is able to get as far as installing their own CA on your system, you're screwed anyway.