Live data from Hacker News

Paul Graham's Letter to YC Companies

news.ycombinator.com

1–10 of 204 posts

Paul Graham's Letter to YC Companies

#1
Jessica and I had dinner recently with a prominent investor. He seemed sure the bad performance of the Facebook IPO will hurt the funding market for earlier stage startups. But no one knows yet how much. Possibly only a little. Possibly a lot, if it becomes a vicious circle.

What does this mean for you? If it means new startups raise their first money on worse terms than they would have a few months ago, that's not the end of the world, because by historical standards valuations had been high. Airbnb and Dropbox prove you can raise money at a fraction of recent valuations and do just fine. What I do worry about is (a) it may be harder to raise money at all, regardless of price and (b) that companies that previously raised money at high valuations will now face "down rounds," which can be damaging.

What to do?

If you haven't raised money yet, lower your expectations for fundraising. How much should you lower them? We don't know yet how hard it will be to raise money or what will happen to valuations for those who do. Which means it's more important than ever to be flexible about the valuation you expect and the amount you want to raise (which, odd as it may seem, are connected). First talk to investors about whether they want to invest at all, then negotiate price.

If you raised money on a convertible note with a high cap, you may be about to get an illustration of the difference between a valuation cap on a note and an actual valuation. I.e. when you do raise an equity round, the valuation may be below the cap. I don't think this is a problem, except for the possibility that your previous high cap will cause the round to seem to potential investors like a down one. If that's a problem, the solution is not to emphasize that number in conversations with potential investors in an equity round.

If you raised money in an equity round at a high valuation, you may find that if you need money you can only get it at a lower one. Which is bad, because "down rounds" not only dilute you horribly, but make you seem and perhaps even feel like damaged goods.

The best solution is not to need money. The less you need investor money, (a) the more investors like you, in all markets, and (b) the less you're harmed by bad markets.

I often tell startups after raising money that they should act as if it's the last they're ever going to get. In the past that has been a useful heuristic, because doing that is the best way to ensure it's easy to raise more. But if the funding market tanks, it's going to be more than a heuristic.

The startups that really get hosed are going to be the ones that have easy money built into the structure of their company: the ones that raise a lot on easy terms, and are then led thereby to spend a lot, and to pay little attention to profitability. That kind of startup gets destroyed when markets tighten up. So don't be that startup. If you've raised a lot, don't spend it; not merely for the obvious reason that you'll run out faster, but because it will turn you into the wrong sort of company to thrive in bad times.

--pg

Re: Paul Graham's Letter to YC Companies

#6

I am not sure what will cool the investment climate more. The fact that facebook's IPO was a disaster or that PG sent this letter and recommends to be cautious.

Facebook IPO disaster, coupled with Yelp and Groupon and the others, is the real death knell. PG's letter merely states the obvious.

The goal of the VC game is to get 10x+ returns. That only happens for early or mid-stage investors if there are investors down the line investing at higher valuations. Those late stage investors depend on the IPO exit. If the late-stage investors lose confidence (which is what appears to have happened), the mid-stage investors lose confidence and thus the entire market contracts.

From the other side, the entire wall street game is crashing. People, for better or for worse, are convinced that the entire equities game is a sham. Volumes (which lead to commissions and revenue for the firms) are down in all of the asset classes, and the bonds have reached near-ponzi yields (swiss bonds actually have negative yield, which means investors are actually paying interest ...), so the "retail investor" who traditionally buy into the IPOs aren't playing a significant role anymore

Re: Paul Graham's Letter to YC Companies

#7
"... But no one knows yet how much. Possibly only a little. Possibly a lot, if it becomes a vicious circle. ..."

The email is counter-intuitive because being truthful and signalling a possible crunch speeds up the observation. It also gets you trampled as the herd looks at the lead changing directions ~ http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4067278 but it also forces teams to 'adapt' quickly.

Re: Paul Graham's Letter to YC Companies

#9
Bubble 1.0 - Just have a prototype, and money will follow you.

Bubble 2.0 - Ship a product, make sure you have enough users, and money will follow you.

Post this bubble, is it going to be: "Make profits, because that is where your money is"?

I am not implying bubble as a bad thing, fwiw.

edit: grammar

Re: Paul Graham's Letter to YC Companies

#10
I read this with a heavy heart, especially after working at Facebook before my current startup.

Facebook is an amazing company with some of the best people in Silicon Valley working to make Facebook a once-in-a-generation company.

But if Google debuted at $25b, and grew into a $200b company, how can Facebook grow by a similar multiple starting at a $100b valuation?

In my opinion, opening at $38/share sucked all the oxygen out of the room, in the IPO market, especially the later stage market, and potentially downstream as well.

Instead of debuting at $50b or even $75b, the delta was the price of the collective hope of entrepreneurs and early stage startups everywhere.

Because at the end of the day many investors will ask, "If even Facebook couldn't do it, who can?"

The price of leaving a little money on the table for most retail investors would have been worth the good will and Facebook's reputation. Because Facebook really is a great company that is doing and will continue to do great things, but PG is saying the air is gone, and no one knows if more will come.

Is all this a bad thing? Perhaps more companies should be valued based on revenue in stead of API calls/month etc.

Post reply on HN