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I'd be happy to learn which governments in your opinion wouldn't abuse such power.
Europe ( perhaps excluding Hungary). Even then, the bluetooth based protocol of Apple and Google can't be used for location tracing. The governments have 0 location data in possession when based on that protocol.
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And this article written by William Gibson is still relevant all these years later: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disneyland_with_the_Death_Pena...
Singapore also has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, at only 1.16 children per woman. Living in a controlled and apartment-dominated country seems to crush the desire and ability to have many children.
If it's 'control' then why is birthrate high in many dictatorships? If it's apartments, why is birthrate decent in many ex-soviet countries full of apartments?
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> “ If they can be forced to change whatever implementation they have by the government then it helps no one.” They can’t be easily forced to change the implementation and their implementation reduces the risk of privacy problems. It’s designed explicitly to be effective without increasing that risk and without giving the government any individual’s information. It’s worth reading the doc I linked.
And it’s a solution looking for a problem. No one wanted this. Not the people and not the government. It doesn’t solve my problem because I will not use such an app, period. It doesn’t solve the government’s objective of maximum data collection so they won’t use it. The very idea of privacy conscious contact tracing is an oxymoron.
This is why I’d argue it should have been an OS update and you can’t opt-out (or at least default opt-in).
If you throw your phone in the trash so be it, everyone else will get privacy preserving exposure notifications. Paired with effective quarantine this may have stopped the spread and thousands of people who died might have lived.
You may want to throw your phone in the trash anyway since it gives away your location to the telecoms.
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Your comment is another example of dismissing what they did without understanding it. As a result of this we now have less effective, higher privacy risk implementations in place.
It looks like you’re saying that apple’s and google’s solution can’t be used for privacy abuse. Could it facilitate implementing one? E.g. could a country push for changes to how the solution works within a given location?
One thing that drives me crazy about this is that Apple and Google partnered to come up with a brilliant Bluetooth solution to contact tracing right at the beginning of the pandemic. It was privacy first, well designed, and it works. It was hamstrung by being opt-in instead of opt-out, relying on state level cooperation and misunderstood by people who didn’t even attempt to try to understand it (including here on HN)…
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And it’s a solution looking for a problem. No one wanted this. Not the people and not the government. It doesn’t solve my problem because I will not use such an app, period. It doesn’t solve the government’s objective of maximum data collection so they won’t use it. The very idea of privacy conscious contact tracing is an oxymoron.
> “ It doesn’t solve my problem because I will not use such an app, period.” This is why I’d argue it should have been an OS update and you can’t opt-out (or at least default opt-in). If you throw your phone in the trash so be it, everyone else will get privacy preserving exposure notifications. Paired with effective quarantine this may have stopped the spread and thousands of people who died might have lived. You ma…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd be happy to learn which governments in your opinion wouldn't abuse such power.
Europe ( perhaps excluding Hungary). Even then, the bluetooth based protocol of Apple and Google can't be used for location tracing. The governments have 0 location data in possession when based on that protocol.
so, if you were within range of a device scanning wireless bands at a certain time in a certain place, light forensic analysis of your phone, wearables, car, etc. could place you in the vicinity of a crime with up to dozens of times the resolution of mobile network tracking
you bought the burner phone, the burner SIM card, disposed of them by ..burning, but drat! that blasted Fitbit got you fingered
and that's just one example of open involuntary surveillance. scanners can be small, cheap and housed anywhere with minimal electrical power. in urban areas it would be trivial to track permanently and store indefinitely someone's minute-by-minute position, especially in conjunction with known CCTV blindspots
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I personally refuse to use any contact tracing because an envitible consequence of its adoption is the idea that mass surveillance is legitimate so long as it can be argued it's keeping people safe. Tech like this is always abused by governments. Just look at how governments are attacking encrypted messaging services today. It would be naive to think same thing wouldn't happen for any popular privacy-first contact tr…
Your comment is another example of dismissing what they did without understanding it. As a result of this we now have less effective, higher privacy risk implementations in place.
I wasn't fundamentally opposed, but as discussion went the way to maybe mandate usage, I thought it more prudent to abstain.
While technically there is nothing wrong with the implementation of Google or Apple, if they behave as specfified, I will not share any medical info with my smartphone as long as we do not have open systems in place.
The problem is understood and not accepted. These cases of third party ambition are a plain confirmation about the doubts many people had. You can ignore it but some people might not want to follow.
I have access to COVID tests through doctors in my family. I believe such tests would serve us better than these wellness apps. Scaling up the production would be possible within the budget that was used for tracing apps.
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Europe ( perhaps excluding Hungary). Even then, the bluetooth based protocol of Apple and Google can't be used for location tracing. The governments have 0 location data in possession when based on that protocol.
I don't think the location aspect is what is important to the government, rather it's the "who met who, and when" aspect.
1. Your phone transmits a temporary random number. 2. Your phone stores, but never uploads, list of all the numbers it has seen for a prolonged period. 3. Your phone downloads daily a list of published numbers and cross-references that with the local list.
Literally the only time you upload anything is when you report being positive.