Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nothing is wrong with DoH. When people complain about it, it's generally because they like being able to successfully perform the kind of attacks it's meant to prevent, e.g., censorship and surveillance of traffic between endpoints they own neither of, just because the traffic passes through their network.
Are you familiar with https://pi-hole.net/ ? In my house I want DNS resolution to be performed by my own DNS resolver ( https://github.com/NLnetLabs/unbound ), after I block ad domains. DoH circumvents that.
That counterargument ignores the fact that you can be the owner of an endpoint but not be permitted, by manufacturer's policy, to control the software running inside. That's what you get for purchasing a proprietary device.
So, as the network operator and owner of the endpoints in the world of DoH (and pinned certificates), you end up being left with the decision to "vote with your wallet" and simply not purchase devices that don't afford you influence on name resolution (or whatever functionality we're talking about)
The counterargument goes on to say that the manufacturers of these sealed-box devices can functionally do this today anyway simply by implementing their proprietary name resolution (content delivery, etc) protocol.
It was all fun while it lasted.