Live data from Hacker News

Encrypted Client Hello

blog.cloudflare.com

51–60 of 219 posts

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#51

I feel like this is only possible because Cloudflare is already so huge. If this becomes widely adopted, anyone who wants to offer "private" access to their site will have to move through Cloudflare. This can't be good.

That's not something Cloudflare decided, though. It's just a fundamental limitation on how the Internet works. The destination IP needs to be visible to intermediate nodes so that they know how to get it there, so the only way to get this kind of privacy is for lots of services to be hosted behind the same destination IP. And keep in mind that it's not Cloudflare exclusive. Any similar service that does large-scale name-based virtual hosting will also give you the same privacy benefit with this.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> but what happens when applications and Trojans start doing DoH lookups, skipping our system's configured DNS? Exfiltration has always been a problem. But it's not a good reason to make MITM possible. Network control should not give control over endpoints any degree more than is necessary to deliver packets from point A to B. We can't trust them with more. > [...] Now Edge doesn't let you. That's blatantly false for…

People own their networks when they're not out in public. Again, solving for a problem with public networks by forcing shortcomings on to all networks is shortsighted and ill conceived. "But it's not a good reason to make MITM possible" is disingenuous. Avoiding DoH doesn't make MITM possible, just as adding DoH doesn't save us from MITM. It does, though, save apps / Trojans from MITM, particularly when we're the one…

> People own their networks when they're not out in public.

People rent their networks from one, maybe two area options. The consumer networks want to completely control router hardware these days and these days charge extra rental fees for owned hardware instead of rented hardware. (It's fascinating that they can legally get away with that.) Some of the biggest consumer networks have already proven they are happy to use this hardware control to inject additional ads into customers' networks for a paltry amount of additional revenue.

You are correct that people should have networks that they own and trust at home. You may have missed that they don't and consumers have lost that battle. (You may also be underestimating just how much time people spend on devices "out in public". The mobile device has become the most common device for a lot of users. For some users the only device.)

> every application / Trojan writer

They've always had that power.

Applications have never been forced to use OS/network-configured DNS. DNS is an absurdly simple protocol that doesn't even have encryption by default. OS firewalls might block sockets to DNS ports by default, but there are ways to tunnel over other ports plus tools like UPnP given enough user trust.

DoH is a standardized port tunnel but that doesn't mean that unstandardized ones never existed before. Trojans/viruses have been doing weird things to avoid DNS for decades. DoH doesn't make them that much easier.

DoH isn't great and it is a shame that for privacy and control it's a big ugly trade-off/compromise from ideals. It's useful for some people. There are definitely unanswered questions in terms of which big corporation truly cares about privacy. I've seen my monopolist consumer ISP inject ads against my wishes and do change the DNS on my home (owned) routers (that I pay extra for each month despite owning my own hardware because of owning my own hardware). I don't always know what to think about Cloudflare's massive PR engine of how much they claim to value privacy, but so far I've never seen them inject an ad where one doesn't belong nor have I seen ad revenue make a splash in their quarterly reports. They don't seem to be an ad company. (Yet?)

Trust is hard and we all have different threat models. I don't blame you for distrusting Cloudflare. I have direct evidence for distrusting my current ISP and indirect evidence for distrusting most consumer ISPs I've encountered, despite being paying customers. There's no free lunch and there's no right answer, just a lot of "least wrong" answers. DoH isn't the right answer objectively. But DoH can be a "least wrong" for some users. Just as trying to be the MITM in networks you own is quite wrong from a security standpoint (once you've got one MITM it becomes harder to trust that there isn't a second one) but may be the "least wrong" answer for some users including maybe you.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#53

I see a lot of confusion here, probably Cloudflare should have included an explanation of how ECH works in TFA instead of referring to their other article[1]. The difference between ECH and SNI is that while SNI includes the hostname in the ClientHello (the first TLS record indicating connection initiation), ECH includes an encrypted section in the ClientHello called ClientHelloInner, and the hostname is moved inside…

Why is DNS required to encrypt a TLS handshake? Why are there two SNIs in a ClientHello?

ECH seems like a overengineered implementation when they could just have released TLS 1.4 which encrypts that section of the handshake.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#54
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The point of efforts like this is exactly to make selective blocking infeasible. This will force the bad guys to choose between blocking nothing and blocking everything, and with the exception of North Korea, most aren't willing to do the latter.

Nope, the bad guys don't care that much.

Who are you talking about?

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're not arguing in good faith. You're suggesting that me controlling my own network, and people controlling their own networks, is bad ("even when you are the owner of a network, you shouldn't have control of traffic on it between endpoints that you don't own either of"). You're suggesting that applications and Trojans have the "right" to be free from my control, on my network, on my machines. Wow. What a take! Yo…

> You're suggesting that me controlling my own network, and people controlling their own networks, is bad ("even when you are the owner of a network, you shouldn't have control of traffic on it between endpoints that you don't own either of"). Should your ISP be allowed to censor what you can see on the Internet? Remember they own the network that all of your traffic flows through. > You're suggesting that applicatio…

I can't tell if you're a troll or if you're really just not understanding things.

My network is not my ISP's network. My ISP can't censor me. I advocate for people to have control over their own networks and to take control from their ISPs.

I'm not sure why you want to conflate my network with what my ISP provides, but anyone thinking that clearly doesn't understand how things work (or is just trying to be a troll).

Likewise, "all legitimate" programs will allow DoH configuration? Really? Have you TRIED to do simple, common sense things in Windows like use another browser? Obviously this suggestion is ridiculous.

Please tell me how traffic would pass through my network that isn't from or to one of my machines. Guests? That's a bullshit reason to suggest I shouldn't have control over my network.

"You're always sending your DNS requests to some third parties." No, I'm not. I run my own DNSSEC recursive resolvers.

At this point, I have to believe you're a troll.

"consider that someone complaining "they took away my freedom to own slaves"" is also trolling. If you think packets and programs are equivalent to humans, you're... broken. But at this point I really have to wonder what you expect to get out of trolling. You're just making yourself look dumb at this point.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#56

I'm not seeing it. It looks contradictory what they're saying. > This means that whenever a user visits a website on Cloudflare that has ECH enabled, no one except for the user and the website will be able to determine which website was visited. But if you look at the inner/outer SNI part: > The outer SNI is a common name that, in our case, represents that a user is trying to visit an encrypted website on Cloudflare.…

You're absolutely right, Cloudflare will still see it. That doesn't make this a bad improvement though. You don't have to use Cloudflare to support it, but it helps obscure which site is being visited by the nature of Cloudflare hosting so many different sites. So what does this actually protect against? Who will this benefit? Mostly people in censored countries and companies. This removes the last piece of informati…

> You're absolutely right, Cloudflare will still see it. That doesn't make this a bad improvement though.

You can do something like ECH in a way that not even Cloudflare will see it (it being the connection contents rather than the name, since Cloudflare actually needs the name to route the connection).

The naive way to do it is to do one handshake with Cloudflare that the client uses to provide the "real" name and then another with the "real" server so Cloudflare can't see that. That is possible but then you'd need two handshakes, which is rather inefficient and probably means it wouldn't be used. The interesting question is can someone come up with a way to get that result without the inefficiency.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#57

I'm not seeing it. It looks contradictory what they're saying. > This means that whenever a user visits a website on Cloudflare that has ECH enabled, no one except for the user and the website will be able to determine which website was visited. But if you look at the inner/outer SNI part: > The outer SNI is a common name that, in our case, represents that a user is trying to visit an encrypted website on Cloudflare.…

Doesn't Cloudflare already terminate TLS anyway? As far as TLS is concerned, Cloudflare is "the website."

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

People own their networks when they're not out in public. Again, solving for a problem with public networks by forcing shortcomings on to all networks is shortsighted and ill conceived. "But it's not a good reason to make MITM possible" is disingenuous. Avoiding DoH doesn't make MITM possible, just as adding DoH doesn't save us from MITM. It does, though, save apps / Trojans from MITM, particularly when we're the one…

> People own their networks when they're not out in public. Again, solving for a problem with public networks by forcing shortcomings on to all networks is shortsighted and ill conceived. It's not just being out in public. Even when you're home, you're still at the mercy of your ISP. > Go ahead and tell me how to remove Edge, or how to have Windows open links in other browsers What does preventing use of Edge have to…

"Even when you're home, you're still at the mercy of your ISP." No, I'm not. If you think I am, then you don't understand networking.

"What does preventing use of Edge have to do with DoH?" If you can't have basic control of programs on your own computer, tell me how you're going to control programs' use of DoH.

"You've yet to convincingly point out a single bad thing that actually comes from DoH." I've named many: we lose the ability to block ads, adware, Trojan CaC, spyware, et cetera. We lose the privacy of our own DNS lookups. Your suggestion seems disingenuous.

"You can't make public Wi-Fi or your ISP's network better no matter how knowledgeable you are." No - YOU can't or don't want to, because you don't understand networking. People who want to can, though, and this is what I'd encourage, instead of enshittifying the Internet by believing companies like Cloudflare when they tell us our ISPs suck and we should just trust them instead.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It takes our control over our networks away from us Taking control away from the owner of networks is a good thing. Control is supposed to reside with the owner of endpoints . To see why, imagine if your ISP started to MITM all of your connections that went over their network. > don't know how to change our DNS servers It's not a case of "don't know how". It's a case of "can't, because even if you change the settin…

That's an incorrect oversimplification. It takes control away from the owner of networks, even when we're the owner of those networks. Should DoH start to become more common, blocking it will become a Sisyphean task. It takes control away from the owner of endpoints. Sure, you can go and change the settings in Firefox to turn off DoH after they've turned it on without asking and without telling us, but what happens w…

As jeremiads go, this is golden. I for one and persuaded and am grateful you wrote it.

I hadn't considered before that DoH effectively takes an avenue away from people who want to block advertising and trackers. This makes it a fiercely unpleasant thing working against users.

Personally, I'm switching to DNS over TLS instead.

Re: Encrypted Client Hello

#60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It takes our control over our networks away from us and gives it to random applications, to Trojans, to viruses, to adware purveyors, to advertisers. It makes the assertion that because SOME of us don't know how to change our DNS servers, they (Mozilla, Cloudflare, other proponents of DoH) need to take control away from us and need to send our DNS lookups to, usually, them. The justifications are ridiculous, but the…

> It takes our control over our networks away from us Taking control away from the owner of networks is a good thing. Control is supposed to reside with the owner of endpoints . To see why, imagine if your ISP started to MITM all of your connections that went over their network. > don't know how to change our DNS servers It's not a case of "don't know how". It's a case of "can't, because even if you change the settin…

> Taking control away from the owner of networks is a good thing. Control is supposed to reside with the owner of endpoints. To see why, imagine if your ISP started to MITM all of your connections that went over their network.

What you need for this is some kind of encrypted DNS. What you don't need is for it to be implemented in the way DoH commonly does it.

What you should have is a router, which hands itself out as the DNS server via DHCP, takes the client's plaintext DNS request and does an encrypted query -- ideally directly to the authoritative servers for that domain, but at least to something of your choosing. Or, you configure your device to do this itself for every application using the system DNS. These all work fine, because the device owner can reasonably change them -- you configure it in one place for every application or your whole LAN at once.

The problem with DoH is that it puts it into each individual application, and then its infeasible for the device owner to change it because it's a million settings in a million places and some applications don't support changing it at all. Worse, you get evil applications where the endpoint device is the thing controlled by Evil Corp and the local network is the thing the device owner is using to block spyware. At which point "the network" needs to be able to block this or malware and evil IoS garbage can operate with impunity.

The claimed workaround is that browsers try to resolve a particular name with the system DNS and then turn of DoH if it resolves in a particular way, but now you're back to this:

> It's a case of "can't, because even if you change the setting, $evil_isp will hijack the queries anyway".

Because then $evil_isp can just resolve that name in that way to go back to doing the MITM. At which point you've lost any benefit of the device doing this against a truly malicious ISP, or it becomes an excuse to remove this "feature" and then the device owner can't do it either.

This is the wrong way to do it.

Post reply on HN