This law is doomed to fail. Why? Because nobody can prove whether I simply don't want to disclose my password, or if I really forgot it.
DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
81–90 of 128 posts
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
Then how can they compel someone to unlock a laptop to enable arbitrary access? Wouldn't they be limited to requesting specific documents?
Every case is a little different, but investigators do need probable cause to search a laptop. This is a mortgage fraud case involving years of criminal activity, so I'm guessing that it's probably not too hard for the prosecution to produce witnesses who can say "yes, she sold me that crappy mortgage and used her laptop when I went to meet with her.", or direct information of her internet usage (ISP, or logs from ca…
the DOJ have laptop (like a knife in a murder case). According to Miranda, the defendant have the right to remain silent (incl. all kinds of communications, ie. oral, keyboard typing, Morse alphabet using campfire smoke, etc... ) and, in particular, can't be compelled into communicating any information in connection with her/his using of the laptop (or murder knife), while the DOJ is free to have as much witnesses as they can describing defendant's usage of the alleged crime tool.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#83Again, the best analog is a document handwritten in a made-up cipher. If someone finds a paper in a notebook that looks like it contains useful information but the actual glyphs used are unreadable to the masses, or the order of the letters are scrambled, or whatever other personal encryption scheme the defendant used when he wrote that note, can the government compel the defendant to reveal the key to his personal c…
I totally agree with you. And as I said in the other article about this, I simply don't believe it is the duty of citizens to help the government make their case.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#84Has anyone developed anything that would completely delete a disk when a decoy password is typed in, whilst displaying a fake OS instance filled with a legit looking my docs, internet history etc? In that case you give them the decoy password and they clear your machine for you
This idea sounds nice, but in practice it will only be useful when the investigators are completely incompetent.
Any competent investigator will make backups of your disk, and work only on the backup. They'll probably also use their own tools to decrypt any content on the disk, rather than booting up the suspect's OS and relying on the suspect's tools.
Also, for trying something like this, you'll probably face additional destruction of evidence and obstruction of justice charges.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#85What happens to her if she doesn't know the password?
An obstruction of justice charge, probably. Here's a pretty decent page about the charge: http://www.federalcriminallawyer.us/2011/01/12/federal-law-o... tl;dr: "18 USC 1503 is a felony offense for which the sentence can be 10 years imprisonment."
obstruction of justice or contempt? If it's contempt they can only hold you for so long.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#86This is why you must give out the password. The one that sets off the thermite, that is. You will still be imprisoned, but it will be a sentence of known length, rather than "at the king's pleasure." And be sure to compare the penalty with the one you were originally trying to escape from.
I suppose you were referring to the thermite used to burn up the documents in high-security safes rather than as a general bomb. That's not a plausible scenario with general-purpose computer parts. The lab would obviously have made backup copies of the drive first.
Yes, and yes.
Use general-purpose computer parts, with some imagination.
One simple example:
Modify the power pins (in a USB keychain drive and a dedicated USB socket, naturally) such that +5v and ground are connected backwards.
Connect a diode in such a way that should the stick ever be plugged into an ordinary USB socket, power is applied to a small piece of nichrome igniter wire (model rocket store, or cannibalize any electrical heating appliance.)
The igniter wire is wrapped around a small magnesium ribbon glued to the exposed (use nitric acid) EEPROM die.
Make sure that the package still looks like a normal USB key from the outside, and is well-sealed to avoid unsightly smoke and light (if you do not take care to do this, you may well find "endangering a law enforcement official using an illegal pyrotechnic device" or the like added to the charges against you.)
And of course none of this will help if the enemy expects it. The above is merely an example.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#87Will she need to be convicted first or can she go to the Supreme Court on what's happened so far? This seems like the perfect case to test the boundaries of electronic security.
IANAL, but from what I understand there have to be rulings from the lower courts first before a case can make it to the Supreme Court level. And even then the Supreme Court chooses which cases they want to hear and which they don't. So just because the case makes it to the Supreme Court, doesn't mean they'll decide to hear it.
What's even more frustrating is that the Supreme Court doesn't have to state any reasons for refusing to hear a case. They could just do it on a whim, or for some completely biased reasons and no one would ever know.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#88I thought this quote by the DOJ was pretty ridiculous: Public interests will be harmed absent requiring defendants to make available unencrypted contents in circumstances like these. Failing to compel Ms. Fricosu amounts to a concession to her and potential criminals (be it in child exploitation, national security, terrorism, financial crimes or drug trafficking cases) I don't like how they bring out the bogey-men of…
I can imagine that, like child pornographers, terrorists and drug traffickers, white-collar criminals leave a lot of incriminating evidence outside their own computers.
If Ms. Fricosu is so dangerous, if her crimes are so serious and widespread, sure there is evidence beyond the encrypted volumes in her computer. There is no crime without evidence. The DoJ should find the missing evidence and then, with a strong case, offer Ms. Fricosu a deal in that she gets some slack for revealing the exact extent and methods of her misdeeds.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#89What happens to her if she doesn't know the password?
From the EFF: ""Decrypting the data on the laptop can be, in and of itself, a testimonial act--revealing control over a computer and the files on it"
This suggests to me that the prosecution has failed to prove that the laptop, or the data on the laptop, is hers. In which case, as I understand it, they would be unable to make a contempt charge stick.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#90IANAL ( Edit to include a reference for my opinions[1] ) The general argument for forcing someone to turn over the key to a door once compelled by the court is that it is commonly known there are other reasonable means by which to access the content the door protects that do not require the key: 1) Locksmith 2) Break the door down 3) Use a different door if one exist These are reasonable methods as neither of them ta…
I think this was discussed here the other day (can't find the link, sorry). The thinking went something like this: a passphrase is equivalent to a combination wall safe and not to a lock with key: one requires a physical thing to open it, the other requires something within your head. The something within your head is equivalent to testimony.
The thing is, the court can compel you to open the safe. You don't have to reveal the combination but you do have to open it (or face contempt charges).
This is pretty much the same thing they are demanding from her - we don't want your password, we want access to your hard drive.