Here's hoping this case gets to a published ruling so that we can move the debate forward. :-)
DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
51–60 of 128 posts
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#52Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do you think the government should have subpoena power in order to collect evidence? Do you think they should be able to search a murderer's home for the weapon? I'm not saying they should have this power without a warrant, but nobody has the protection from a _reasonable_ search.
Do you think the government should have subpoena power in order to collect evidence? Do you think they should be able to search a murderer's home for the weapon? Of course they should. But that's no the issue here. The issue at hand is whether or not the government can compel you to give them information. Consider this. You have a box, buried in the Mojave desert, with some documents in it. You've memorized the gps c…
I don't think you understand what a subpoena is.
A subpoena is a compulsory order to produce all documents related to a matter, whether the government knows they exist or not. So yes, if you believe in subpoena power, you agree that you should have to produce that box.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nobody has the right to avoid a reasonable search in the United States. You are protected by the fourth amendment from unreasonable searches, but you aren't going to convince me that a detective has no right, with a warrant in hand, to search a suspect's home for a murder weapon. Similarly, you aren't going to convince me that a prosecutor, warrant in hand, has no right to search a computer for evidence of credit car…
You still make the assumption that the prosecuted knows the password and is implicitly guilty. Imagine for a second that I was less technically minded and didn't use encryption and I purchased a used laptop from someone who did, I then get caught up in the legal system (guilty or innocent for the charged crime, it doesn't matter, but I did not use encryption) and some prosecutor has a warrant to compel me to unlock t…
You would have explained the origin of the encrypted data on the laptop, and they would either drag the person who was the origin into the case as a defendant or have him testify. It's really quite simple; they're not just asking "what is the password?" and ignoring any answer that isn't the password, as you seem to think.
If you were to refuse to give the password under the grounds that someone you refuse to identify sold you the computer with the encrypted data already on it, then you would rightly be considered to be lying because that's the most plausible case for that behavior.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#54Prosecutors stressed that they don't actually require the passphrase itself, meaning Fricosu would be permitted to type it in and unlock the files without anyone looking over her shoulder. I wonder if anyone has thought of using more than one keys as a decryption possibility. I've always considered it, but never figured there'd be too much use. Say, have one correct key to decrypts data stored in one way, and another…
Systems like PhoneBookFS, rubberhose and StegFS exist (or used to exist). They allow you to create volumes which can provide different data for different passwords, with no way to know the number of available passwords in advance. (You can look at the volume size, but there is some variability relative to the total amount of data stored, so that you can't really be sure.)
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#55Earlier quoted context omitted.
That seems to be imply that she is lying, though. What if she actually doesn't know the password? For example if it isn't her laptop or the password was written down and lost or it is an old encrypted volume which she doesn't use anymore, etc.
Federal investigators and prosecutors aren't dumb. For all of those scenarios that you mentioned, it would be easy to tell whether or not this was a laptop that she used frequently. Where did she get it from? (or from whom? - she should be able to say.) In what condition was the laptop found, on her desk? opened? screen saver on? or powered down? in a pile, covered in dust? any fingerprints or other signs of use? Any…
None of those are reasonable or reliable indications that he/she is lying about having forgotten a password. There are fingerprints or signs of use? What if the defendant has been actively trying to remember the password, or has just done something as simple as moved the laptop's location to get it out of the way? Removable media present? What if it was left in there from when they did have use of the password and didn't have use for the media otherwise? And even if the computer is found on their desk, with the screensaver on, the defendant could have just forgotten the password, it happens and is expected especially if they tended to just barely remember the password before and just happened to forget it at that time.
The fact is, no matter how sure the prosecution is of the accused's guilt and the hard drive's content, the accused can still just have forgotten the password. That's it, just forgotten the password. and the accused could be innocent of the crime, and now facing inescapable prison time, all because they wanted to keep their personal financial documents safe and have an unreliable memory. That is not a reasonable way to carry about justice.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#56Earlier quoted context omitted.
If the government feels the information they want is on a laptop, the laptop's owner would suddenly find themselves forced to prove a negative (there are no more hidden volumes), lest they be held in contempt. I think it will still be a requirement for the gov't to show that there's cause. In the same way that the gov't can't hold you if they suspect you know where a kidnapped victim is held, unless they have evidenc…
Suppose someone uses my wifi connection to hack into, say, a Sony server and retrieve a database of credit card information. The government would have evidence and reason to believe I have that data. So, naturally, they'll get to seize my laptop and apparently can compel me to unlock it and allow them arbitrary access. It seems to me that they don't know the stolen data resides on that laptop any more than they know…
I think that's where forensics would come in: "This is a 2TB drive. All the data on the drive amounts to 1.5TB. QED, there is 500GB of data missing."
More interesting, IMO, would be how alleged steganography would be handled.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#57I thought this quote by the DOJ was pretty ridiculous:
Public interests will be harmed absent requiring defendants to make available unencrypted contents in circumstances like these. Failing to compel Ms. Fricosu amounts to a concession to her and potential criminals (be it in child exploitation, national security, terrorism, financial crimes or drug trafficking cases)
I don't like how they bring out the bogey-men of child pornography and terrorism to justify making her decrypt the drive.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#58Earlier quoted context omitted.
You still make the assumption that the prosecuted knows the password and is implicitly guilty. Imagine for a second that I was less technically minded and didn't use encryption and I purchased a used laptop from someone who did, I then get caught up in the legal system (guilty or innocent for the charged crime, it doesn't matter, but I did not use encryption) and some prosecutor has a warrant to compel me to unlock t…
But, in the hypothetical counter example where the prosecution had evidence of you using the encrypted volume (let's say, a convincing photograph or video), would you then grant the prosecution the right to compel the decrypted information?
That actually was answered by a court quite recently, and is mentioned in the OP.
A guy going through border guards control somehow let them see he had illegal images on his laptop. The court concluded he is no longer protected by Fifth Amendment because of that, and ordered him to EITHER reveal the password OR give access to the (encrypted) content in question in some other way.
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10172866-38.html?tag=mncol...
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do you think the government should have subpoena power in order to collect evidence? Do you think they should be able to search a murderer's home for the weapon? Of course they should. But that's no the issue here. The issue at hand is whether or not the government can compel you to give them information. Consider this. You have a box, buried in the Mojave desert, with some documents in it. You've memorized the gps c…
I don't think you understand what a subpoena is. A subpoena is a compulsory order to produce all documents related to a matter, whether the government knows they exist or not. So yes, if you believe in subpoena power, you agree that you should have to produce that box.
Quoting DavidSJ's http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2751333
> US v Hubbell makes clear that the government cannot compel production of documents (except under immunity to prosecution) which it does not know, ahead of time, to exist.
Dunno if that's true (as IANAL), just quoting.
Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop
#60Earlier quoted context omitted.
If the government feels the information they want is on a laptop, the laptop's owner would suddenly find themselves forced to prove a negative (there are no more hidden volumes), lest they be held in contempt. I think it will still be a requirement for the gov't to show that there's cause. In the same way that the gov't can't hold you if they suspect you know where a kidnapped victim is held, unless they have evidenc…
Suppose someone uses my wifi connection to hack into, say, a Sony server and retrieve a database of credit card information. The government would have evidence and reason to believe I have that data. So, naturally, they'll get to seize my laptop and apparently can compel me to unlock it and allow them arbitrary access. It seems to me that they don't know the stolen data resides on that laptop any more than they know…
I think what it amounts to is:
* The government 'knows' that you have a bunch of digital data, therefore it must be stored on a digital device. Therefore, all your digital devices are reasonably suspect.
* The government can't search your laptop without full access to files. If you have full-drive encryption (or even just homedir/per-user encryption), the government can reasonably claim that you haven't given then full access, with some amount of proof that there is encryption being used.
* Once you have unlocked your primary partition, the government would probably have a hard time convincing a judge that there is any reasonable way to know if you have a hidden partition, other than asking you with a polygraph... which I don't think you can be compelled to take.