Original Source, from Let's Encrypt: https://letsencrypt.org/2020/12/21/extending-android-compati... "IdenTrust has agreed to issue a 3-year cross-sign for our ISRG Root X1 from their DST Root CA X3. The new cross-sign will be somewhat novel because it extends beyond the expiration of DST Root CA X3. This solution works because Android intentionally does not enforce the expiration dates of certificates used as trust…
This "Android intentionally does not enforce the expiration dates of certificates used as trust anchors" - seems like another issue. And now LE is basically building features on an implementation flaw?
In particular, the users of the Android devices want to continue to be able to access sites protected with Let's Encrypt, the site operators want to continue to allow this, Let's Encrypt wants to continue to allow this, and the auditors and root program operators decided that they don't consider it improper either.
You're right to describe it as an implementation flaw -- among other things, it removes the lever that root programs normally have to ensure continued compliance by CAs.