I would be concerned that chaining to an expired root is going to cause some certificate verifyers to flag the chain as invalid. Similar to when the Sectigo/AddTrust root expired recently (but perhaps that was an issue because the cross-signed certificate expired).
If you support older systems, you really need to try to separate out clients to different hostnames (and sometimes different IPs, it they don't have good SNI support), so that you can provide each segment with the certificate chain it needs. Trust root issues are a lot harder than the sha1 deprecation, because at least there's a fairly well used TLS option exchanged for key support (it doesn't exactly mean support for keys in certificates, but it worked pretty well). There is a TLS option to provide trusted CA information, but it has zero mainstream use (and it doesn't seem terribly usable anyway, sending all your trusted root CAs is too much data, a digest/id would be much more reasonable).
Thankfully, browsers usually have forgiving verifiers, but if you support applications, libraries for certificate verification are all over the place; and if you support 3rd party clients good luck. x.509 is too big a spec to want to bundle it with an app, but you can bundle in trusted roots if you're targetting a sane platform.