Earlier quoted context omitted.
Still better than famine and genocide. And since we have a representative liberal democracy, the institutions and the state have recourse and are solving the problem.
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No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
71–80 of 106 posts
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#72Is there anyone who would willingly get on one of these planes, regardless of software patches and extra training, when we know they have a compromised airframe, whose design prioritized cost over safety?
I would get on and/or put my family on a -MAX flown by a US or major European carrier, where the crew training and experience requirements match my sensibilities of what should be required for airline transport operations.
That trip would no doubt be statistically safer than the flying we already do in single engine piston aircraft (itself an operation that prioritizes cost over the safety of flying a twin turboprop or twin jet that we can’t afford to own and feed).
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#73Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm going to let the pilots decide whether it's reasonable. I don't know anything about flying a 737 and I'd wager that 99% of the people posting here don't either. If the US pilots unions are okay with it, I'll be okay with it. They haven't crashed any 737 Max yet.
The US airlines all purchased some/all of the "optional" safety features that would have made it obvious to the pilots that the system was malfunctioning.
Southwest and American did, but not United:
Of the three US airlines that have Boeing 737 Max 8 and 9 jets in their fleet, only two — American and Southwest — paid for these upgrades, the Times confirmed. A United Airlines spokesperson told the Times that its jets don’t include these upgrades because its pilots use other data to fly their planes.)
https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2019/3/22/18277694/boeing-737-...
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#74Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'll need to check for relevant sources, but I'm fairly sure that the idea that boeing removed the "trim brake" is wrong. It's simply that the MCAS doesn't respect it. I think this is consistent with the Speed trim system which may be trimming opposite the pilot in normal operations.
And the reason MCAS doesn't respect it is because MCAS is designed to activate in high AoA situations. You get into a high AoA situation because you're already pulling back hard on the yoke, likely in an attempt to avoid something bad happening such as avoiding a collision. If MCAS did cutout when the yoke was pulled back hard, it would disable itself at precisely the time it is actually needed. This design decision…
And the obvious solution is "tell pilots about it" which is going to piss off the public because a procedural change (training), a new UI to make it more obvious (like IIRC Southwest implemented) and a minor code fix (comparing the AOA sensors) will not satisfy everyone who's out for blood.
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#75Do the non-American regulatory bodies have the power to effectively override anything the FAA decides is okay by simply saying, "these X remedies are also mandatory or the 737 MAX is banned from Canadian/EU/Chinese/etc. Airspace"? I imagine that effectively cripples the value of using the plane without those remedies.
Each country sets its own rules for their airspace, so they can do whatever they want. But most have historically deferred to the FAA, but then also Boeing and airlines, and all the regulatory bodies work with ICAO to try and be on the same page as much as possible. There may in fact be some obscure treaties and trade deals, among ICAO complexities, that complicate sovereignty on this issue.
I think one of the long term implications of this message is that the European aviation authorities will defer less to the FAA and another bit of US 'soft' power is eroded.
Seems to be a trend these days.
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#76> Boeing was able to gain FAA approval for the MCAS system with one angle of attack sensor and pilots as backup.
Over the years I've designed/ implemented small scale industrial systems and whenever there was an important set of data to be read in via sensors, there'd always be a backup, or ideally triple redundancy. Sensors are cheap & using multiple can simplify a whole lot of issues.
Even once, I made an uber simple 'level' sensor on a front end loader (using two slightly rotated Mercury switches). It's only time I didn't consider redundancy, because it was not important at all if it failed.
What I don't get is how the engineers at Boeing didn't use redundant sensors. Have I misunderstood something? I just assumed that working on aircraft means that something like sensor failure should be baked into all decisions and implementations because of the -ve ramifications of things going wrong: like 2 planes dropping out of the sky!
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#77Boeing's actions are absolutely mind boggling. All consumers want is _some_, _any_ evidence that they take passenger safety seriously. Pilots have to take less training to operate a proven deadly aircraft, with software patch on top, than I have to take to work in an office job... that's fucking insane. How can we make Boeing feel some pain for this? You know, actually enough for them to start taking this seriously.
Nothing mind boggling. Boeing are trying desperately to avoid new type rating. That would leave them in the same business position where they were before developing MAX and with a bad image to boot. Not saying they are right, but they just don't have many good moves. Doing the Right thing leaves them years behind. It will also limit airline expansion. Airbus cannot pick up slack and there are no other players in the…
Doing the Right Thing would put them on schedule.
This isn't some stupid race. This is making a machine that can safely be flown.
The market doesn't need a risk profile that drops plane loads out of the bloody sky Because a company pushed their people into hiding things from their customers.
I'm normally all for free market optimization when it makes sense, and all actors act in reasonably good faith concomitant with the magnitude of lives they are endangering. That didn't happen here, and the regulatory agency responsible for making it happen was powerless to do it's job to stop or raise a red flag on it either.
By no definition of sound risk assessment should this plane have flown without training. Period. Boeing failed its job at being a trustworthy corporate citizen in a high-impact infrastructural industrial vertical.
Honestly, I'm not sure how to get over this one. I don't believe some sort of fine and move on is really sufficient in terms of contrition. It won't bring those people back, and it seems a bit too "cost of doing business"-like to successfully act as a deterrent to future malfeasance.
Breaking up maybe? Clearly competition in the sector seems to have devolved into a duopoly to some degree.
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#78Earlier quoted context omitted.
Note sure about that. Only around 350 737 Max 8's had been delivered by the time of the second crash. How many models of car have a 1 in 175 total loss rate?
Why muddy the waters by comparing apples (airplanes) to oranges (cars)? The loss rate of other aircraft models is what's relevant.
I don't think it's the loss rate of 737 Max vs other models that is what's relevant either. I said safety of driving to an airport vs flying in a 737 Max. We have to get total number of passenger hours/miles for both methods of transportation and compare those with deaths. I'm not sure if those numbers specifically for the 737 Max are available.
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#79Is there anyone who would willingly get on one of these planes, regardless of software patches and extra training, when we know they have a compromised airframe, whose design prioritized cost over safety?
Claims that the airframe is fundamentally unsound have been exaggerated. I would fly on one of these airplanes, even as they are now, as I am confident that the crew will be very well aware of the issue and capable of dealing with it.
Boeing's decision not to require simulator training may backfire on it, however, if enough passengers say that's not good enough, and vote their concerns by avoiding flights on this model, or if other regulators (or even the FAA) insist on simulator training. Boeing is doubling-down on the issue.
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#80Earlier quoted context omitted.
I imagine it would still be more dangerous to drive to the airport than it would be to fly on a 737 Max.
I wonder how much of the apprehension is because dying in an airplane is more likely to come with a longer period of being terrified before impact. I suppose, for some reason, not offset by a higher likelihood of suffering after impact in a car.
Unfortunately people die all the time. Whether it's through the extremely rare passenger aicraft, the more common car crash, or through violence or poor health choices. I think most people have an irrational fear of death. I don't want to die, but it happens, and when you least expect it. I try to mitigate that by being safe, but a meteor could fall out of the sky on my head any time. It's natural and the only thing garunteed in life.