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Missile defense is NP-complete

smu160.github.io

61–70 of 446 posts

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#61
post #8

The author explains that this problem is actually adversarial, in the sense that the attacker gets to observe defenses and allocate warheads and decoys accordingly. Thinking of our current circumstances, this suggests another cost of war: our offensive capabilities, as well as our defensive capabilities become more observable. Our adversaries are studying our strengths and weaknesses in Iran, and they will have a muc…

Did I miss this ? Missing from the discussion is that Iran's cluster munitions in each single missle have absolutely overwhelmed Israels defense and would likely do the same to US military as well. Also to consider, Iran's $20,000 drones versus our $1 million dollar interceptors.

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#62
post #8

The author explains that this problem is actually adversarial, in the sense that the attacker gets to observe defenses and allocate warheads and decoys accordingly. Thinking of our current circumstances, this suggests another cost of war: our offensive capabilities, as well as our defensive capabilities become more observable. Our adversaries are studying our strengths and weaknesses in Iran, and they will have a muc…

While this is true it's also impossible to avoid.

So you could also argue that this war will help the US to gain experience it didn't have before which might be favorable in future conflicts with parties that didn't have this experience.

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#63

Two more sobering axes to introduce: cost and manufacturing capability. Numbers are hard to find for obvious security reasons, but using the numbers most optimistic to the defender[0] suggests an adversary using a Fatah type hypersonic is spending 1/3rd the cost of an Arrow interceptor, and is launching missiles that are produced at a much faster rate. Interception is deeply asymmetric in favor of the attacker. [0] h…

The best missile defense is offsense: degrading the launchers, stockpiles and defense industrial base, with cheap stand-in munitions after SEAD, leveraging air and intelligence superiority. Expensive interceptors are only a stop-gap that buys you time for the offensive degradation. Expensive stand-off munitions, likewise, are a short-term stopgap until SEAD is complete.

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#64

Two more sobering axes to introduce: cost and manufacturing capability. Numbers are hard to find for obvious security reasons, but using the numbers most optimistic to the defender[0] suggests an adversary using a Fatah type hypersonic is spending 1/3rd the cost of an Arrow interceptor, and is launching missiles that are produced at a much faster rate. Interception is deeply asymmetric in favor of the attacker. [0] h…

Calling a Fattah hypersonic is a misleading claim. It is simply a ballistic missile that reaches hypersonic speeds, which is different from a true hypersonic weapon in its flight path and ability to maneuver. This distinction is important because it makes it significantly easier to shoot down than something like a hypersonic glide vehicle or hypersonic cruise missile. But I agree with your point that it does remain d…

Depends on the school. https://www.reddit.com/r/NonCredibleDefense/comments/1at8gj4...

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#65

The sole mention of directed energy: > Directed energy has been proposed as a cost-effective alternative, but introduces its own scheduling constraints — dwell time, platform coverage, atmospheric degradation — with similar scaling issues The author is doing the thing where a writer tries to bamboozle the reader into a conclusion without having to prove it by overwhelming the reader with nouns. Life is too short for…

You are basically complaining that the article is not about a your preferred, different topic. Directed energy defense does not really compete with a system like GMD at all , because the range is extremely limited by comparison. The US might be able to justify throwing a few billion at a few dozens of ICBM interceptors stationed in a handful of sites, but protecting every potential target (city, military base) with s…

Gotta say, did not know direct energy weapons were actually leaving science fiction and entering the real world yet, but it seems they're. It's obviously not star trek level, but it's way more advanced than I expected

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#66
post #57

What is the steady state? Assume you have two competent superpowers, both researching missile offense and defense, over the next 1000 years. What are the asymptotics of the interception rate from 0 to 1000?

The steady state would look like a sinusoidal signal. This is more of a cycle than a hill climbing thing.

Are you sure there isn't a structural advantage to either offense or defense that will reveal itself with more iterations, and we won't converge to either 0% or 100%?

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#67

Two more sobering axes to introduce: cost and manufacturing capability. Numbers are hard to find for obvious security reasons, but using the numbers most optimistic to the defender[0] suggests an adversary using a Fatah type hypersonic is spending 1/3rd the cost of an Arrow interceptor, and is launching missiles that are produced at a much faster rate. Interception is deeply asymmetric in favor of the attacker. [0] h…

Calling a Fattah hypersonic is a misleading claim. It is simply a ballistic missile that reaches hypersonic speeds, which is different from a true hypersonic weapon in its flight path and ability to maneuver. This distinction is important because it makes it significantly easier to shoot down than something like a hypersonic glide vehicle or hypersonic cruise missile. But I agree with your point that it does remain d…

There's videos from Israel showing Iranian missiles performing AD evading maneuvers that western media was saying was impossible a few months ago.

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or perhaps they will learn they are outmatched, lack the resources and technological capabilities to compete, and deterrence will have been established.

You miss the fact that many adversaries will not act rationally.

Especially when they're optimizing for afterlife.

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#69
post #32

Two more sobering axes to introduce: cost and manufacturing capability. Numbers are hard to find for obvious security reasons, but using the numbers most optimistic to the defender[0] suggests an adversary using a Fatah type hypersonic is spending 1/3rd the cost of an Arrow interceptor, and is launching missiles that are produced at a much faster rate. Interception is deeply asymmetric in favor of the attacker. [0] h…

That's a false comparison. You want to compare between the actual options you have, which are either (a) firing an interceptor (or several); or (b) repairing the damage caused by a non-intercepted missile.

Your first option comes with the major caveat that each interceptor you fire comes from a limited stockpile whose replacement rate[0] today isn't sufficient for even going 1:1, let alone accepting that multiple interceptors are required.

I'd say the real options in the near term when faced with an inbound missile is a) deciding to deplete your stockpile of interceptors with an incredibly limited replenishment rate; or b) risking a hit to a lower-value target.

Could the US go to a war economy footing and scale production? _Maybe_? I'm not entirely convinced the US can stomach the costs.

[0]: again, numbers are hard to find, but https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2026/Lock... gives a flavor of just what defenders are up against.

Re: Missile defense is NP-complete

#70

could use some investigation of the ukranians techniques -- the number of interceptors the U.S. used within the first four days of the war eclipsed the total amount Ukranians have had for the war

"Lessons US and Gulf could learn from Ukraine’s air defence warriors"

https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/us...

"Ukraine’s low-cost Shahed killers draw US and Gulf interest, but a wartime ban blocks sales"

https://apnews.com/article/iran-ukraine-shahed-russia-drone-...

"Ukraine Helps U.S. Bases in the Mideast With Stopping Drones"

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/09/world/middleeast/ukraine-...

"Ukraine deploys units to five Middle East countries to intercept drones"

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-deploys-units-i...

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