Earlier quoted context omitted.
Certificates in the Web PKI (so they'd be trusted) aren't likely to be a good basis for an exploit. You aren't supposed to get to pick very much of the document in the Web PKI. Rules forbid CAs from letting you write nonsense you made up into most places - they themselves get slightly more opportunity but "Let's attack a windows zero day" doesn't feel like a good use of control over a trusted CA. The biggest contiguo…
Do we know that MS TLS implementation parses self-signed certs only after successful validation? Many implementations offer an option of showing their contents (eg to see what CA it claims to be signed by), or offer the user a choice to accept it, or log identifying fields from the cert for diagnostic purpouses. Same for the CA server offered CA chain. I'm also not convinced that the fields-allowed-by-CAs set is safe…
It would be a contradiction in terms. You can't validate the semantic content of a file before you've parsed it!