Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
krebsonsecurity.com
Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
1–10 of 96 posts
Re: Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
#2Edit: People are asking why I assume it's not an RCE. That's a good question, but I am assuming Krebs on Security wouldn't report an RCE as a potential certificate validation bug. This quote in particular:
> Equally concerning, a flaw in crypt32.dll might also be abused to spoof the digital signature tied to a specific piece of software.
If crypt32.dll has a memory bug that can be exploited by feeding it an ill-formed certificate, that is wormable and orders of magnitude more severe, not equally concerning.
We'll know more tomorrow, however.
Re: Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
#3Scary, but not an RCE so threat is limited. It would mean malicious actors could possible create spoofed signatures on malware or possibly websites (EV certificates?). Am I missing something or is there a way to turn a spoofed certificate into a single-click pwn? As I understand it, users would have to download a malicious payload or click a malicious URL to be exposed. Edit: People are asking why I assume it's not a…
This looks like it could be abused to lead to code execution.
Re: Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
#4Even if it's not a worthy successor to MS08-067.
Re: Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
#5"Finally removed all totally inactive and harmless old _NSAKEY references."
I wouldn't bet against something along those lines.
Re: Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
#6Scary, but not an RCE so threat is limited. It would mean malicious actors could possible create spoofed signatures on malware or possibly websites (EV certificates?). Am I missing something or is there a way to turn a spoofed certificate into a single-click pwn? As I understand it, users would have to download a malicious payload or click a malicious URL to be exposed. Edit: People are asking why I assume it's not a…
Re: Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
#7Scary, but not an RCE so threat is limited. It would mean malicious actors could possible create spoofed signatures on malware or possibly websites (EV certificates?). Am I missing something or is there a way to turn a spoofed certificate into a single-click pwn? As I understand it, users would have to download a malicious payload or click a malicious URL to be exposed. Edit: People are asking why I assume it's not a…
RCE in Windows Doesn't mean control over digital signature validation. But RCE in that particular API might mean both
Re: Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
#8--yes, I am attempting to disassociate myself from these people
Re: Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday
#9Scary, but not an RCE so threat is limited. It would mean malicious actors could possible create spoofed signatures on malware or possibly websites (EV certificates?). Am I missing something or is there a way to turn a spoofed certificate into a single-click pwn? As I understand it, users would have to download a malicious payload or click a malicious URL to be exposed. Edit: People are asking why I assume it's not a…
> is there a way to turn a spoofed certificate into a single-click pwn?
e.g. The victim clicks on a link to go to your website, their machine wants to validate the TLS cert you sent it, it calls into crypt32.dll to do that, it corrupts memory while handling your attacking cert, pwn?
We don't know enough (anything!) about the actual bug yet other than which DLL it's in.