Earlier quoted context omitted.
I agree they found at least some real vulnerabilities. What I think is nonsense is the claim of finding thousands of real critical vulnerabilities and claims that they've found other Linux vulnerabilities that they simply can't exploit. There are notably no SHA-3 sums for all their out-of-bound write Linux vulnerabilities, which would be the most interesting ones.
Why is that nonsense? Do you think they exhausted all their compute finding just the few big vulnerabilities they've already discussed, and don't have a budget to just keep cranking the machine to generate more? They're not publishing SHAs for things that aren't confirmed vulnerabilities. They're doing exactly the thing you'd want them to do: they claim to have vulnerabilities when they have actual vulnerabilities.
Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
511–520 of 921 posts
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#512I chuckle every time says something in line of "the model is so good that we won't release it to general public, ekhm, because safety". Because the exact same thing has been said on every single upcoming model since GPT 3.5. At this point, this must be an inside joke to do this just because.
This how Anthropic is marketing their AI releases and the reality is, they are terrified of local AI models competing against them. Almost everyone on this thread is falling for the same trick they are pulling and not asking why are their benchmarks and research after training new models not independently verified but always internal to the company. So it is just marketing wrapped around creating fear to get local AI…
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#513Earlier quoted context omitted.
You should watch this talk by Nicholas Carlini (security researcher at Anthropic). Everything in the talk was done with Opus 4.6: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sd26pWhfmg
Just a thought: The fact that the found kernel vulnerability went decades without a fix says nothing about the sophistication needed to find it. Just that nobody was looking. So it says nothing about the model’s capability. That LLMs can find vulnerabilities is a given and expected, considering they are trained on code. What worries me is the public buying the idea that it could in any way be a comprehensive security…
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#514Earlier quoted context omitted.
Good lord, why such a virulent response to something that seems like we should be considering? As someone in cybersecurity for 10+ years my immediate assumption is why not both? I don’t think considering that they could both have their uses is “cope”.
Again: LLM agents already are both . But it's also remarkable and worth digging into the fact that LLM agents haven't needed fuzzers to produce many (any? in Anthropic Red's case?) of the vulnerabilities they're discussing.
Regardless and in the spirit of my original response my answer would be to give the LLM access to a fuzzer (plus other tools etc) but also have fuzzers in the pipeline. Partially because that increases the determinism in the mix and partially because why not? Layering is almost always better than not.
But again more than anything I’m focusing on the accusations of cope. People SHOULD have measured reactions to claims about any product. People SHOULD be asking questions like this. I know that the LLM debate is often “spicy” but man let’s just try to lower the temperature a bit yeah?
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#515The system card for Claude Mythos (PDF): https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c89... Interesting to see that they will not be releasing Mythos generally. [edit: Mythos Preview generally - fair to say they may release a similar model but not this exact one] I'm still reading the system card but here's a little highlight: > Early indications in the training of Claude Mythos Preview suggested that th…
If it is that dangerous as they make it appear to be, 24h does not seem sufficient time. I cannot accept this as a serious attempt.
Do they have a honey pot infrastructure to launch the model in first and then wait to see if it destroys it? What they did in the 24h matters.
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#516Earlier quoted context omitted.
They were right, it's hit 100% at a number of large tech companies. (They missed their initial prediction of 90% 6 months ago, because the models then available publicly weren't capable enough.)
So why aren’t they laying people off and pumping the extra money towards research efforts associated with Llm’s? Lmao. They should all cut down their labour input right now if what you claim is true.
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#517Earlier quoted context omitted.
Anthropic has done plenty of cheap marketing tricks as of late, see their recent non-functional C compiler that relied on a harness using gcc's entire test suite
Not surprising given that they dont even know why claude-code works as before or doesnt work [1] ie, there is no known theory of operation. Explains why they are afraid of it. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47660925
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#518Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why is that nonsense? Do you think they exhausted all their compute finding just the few big vulnerabilities they've already discussed, and don't have a budget to just keep cranking the machine to generate more? They're not publishing SHAs for things that aren't confirmed vulnerabilities. They're doing exactly the thing you'd want them to do: they claim to have vulnerabilities when they have actual vulnerabilities.
If I understand Anthropic's statements correctly, they've been cranking for a while, and what they have now is the results of Mythos-enabled vulnerability scans on every important piece of software they could find. (I do want to acknowledge how crazy it is that "vulnerability scan all important software repos in the world" is even an operation that can be performed.)
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#519I chuckle every time says something in line of "the model is so good that we won't release it to general public, ekhm, because safety". Because the exact same thing has been said on every single upcoming model since GPT 3.5. At this point, this must be an inside joke to do this just because.
This how Anthropic is marketing their AI releases and the reality is, they are terrified of local AI models competing against them. Almost everyone on this thread is falling for the same trick they are pulling and not asking why are their benchmarks and research after training new models not independently verified but always internal to the company. So it is just marketing wrapped around creating fear to get local AI…
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#520Earlier quoted context omitted.
Again: LLM agents already are both . But it's also remarkable and worth digging into the fact that LLM agents haven't needed fuzzers to produce many (any? in Anthropic Red's case?) of the vulnerabilities they're discussing.
Are you saying that LLMs can use fuzzers or are you saying that they work like fuzzers? Because one of those is less…deterministic? Then the other. Regardless and in the spirit of my original response my answer would be to give the LLM access to a fuzzer (plus other tools etc) but also have fuzzers in the pipeline. Partially because that increases the determinism in the mix and partially because why not? Layering is…