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Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

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Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#511

Post by JanisErdmanis »

GJim wrote: post #509
giobi wrote: post #496

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can be coerced with paper and pencil too. In Sicily mafia gives you a voting paper with a predrawn X on the candidate they want, and you must come out with a clean voting paper so they are sure you did leave the pre-voted one.

In the UK, you are handed a ballot paper in the voting room by an official immediately before you go to the polling booth; the ballot paper has an official mark on it, meaning no pre-printed or duplicate ballot papers are possible. This makes the attack you described impossible (short of having every official in the voting room being corrupt).

Isn’t it still possible for the voter to not cast this ballot paper and bring it to the coercer who waits outside? Then the coercer fill this ballot and ask the next voter to cast it and bring back a blank ballot paper?

Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#512

Post by Fezzik »

WillPostForFood wrote: post #497
Fezzik wrote: post #324

Earlier quoted context omitted.

… in 1975. I have EXCELLENT, current news for you, comrade. Since then, I can point you to six States in the USA that have implemented mail-in voting that is demonstrable secure and gives far more people the ability to vote than mandatory in-person voting. Isn’t that simply wonderful to hear? And, to boot, lest you worry about volume, one of those States alone (sunny California) is nearly the same population as Franc…

There are open accusations of mail-in fraud in California, not a settled issue. France is an interesting example because there was fraud, settled issue. It seems obvious, no? 1: Vote in person, with ID 2: Mail ballots out, mail ballots in Which will have more fraud?

France isn’t that interesting of an example given the exponential changes to how mail-in ballots work that have been implemented in the last 50 years. Using France as your lone example is like citing to the Challenger launch and ignoring every subsequent success in deciding if you’re going to launch a rocket. It’s almost delusional.

Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#513

Post by mos_basik »

themafia wrote: post #436
GJim wrote: post #406

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Then my refusal to vote should be counted. Then spoil your paper. Spoiling your paper shows that you got off your arse and voted to say "I don't want any of these people". (See the number of spoilt votes in the UK Police and Crime Commissioner elections for a prime example of this; many in the UK disagreed with politicising the police and spoilt their papers in protest) By simply not voting, the assumption is you a…

> shows that you got off your arse Is that the point of democracy? > See the number of spoilt votes in the UK Police and Crime Commissioner elections The candidate was still elected with a turnout of 15.3%. This is farcical to give this person a mandate where they clearly earned none. Shouldn't the parties get off their arse and pick better people for office? I'm busy and I pay taxes. What are you hassling me for? >…

Disclaimer: I'm not Australian.

It'd be a pity to get heated up over a misunderstanding of the Australian election system.

OP said (somewhat confusingly I admit):

>[Australia has] compulsory attendance at voting booths for eligible citizens, you can spoil your paper or walk away but we enforce with a fine,

and I think you understood that to mean:

>Australian citizens must choose: drop a valid ballot in the box or be fined

but I think what OP intended was (and this is consistent with the Australia Electoral Commission website [0]):

>Australian citizens must choose: drop a ballot (spoiled is fine) in the box or be fined

(As an aside - one WILL get fined if one appears the polling place but refuses to drop a ballot in the box - see [1].)

Then, believing (incorrectly) that casting a spoiled ballot incurs the fine, you said "Then my refusal to vote should be counted [for the system to be anywhere near reasonable, given that I went to the polling place and exercised my civic duty to the extent permitted by my moral fiber, fully expecting to be fined for it]" (emphasis and context added).

And Australia does keep track of how many "informal votes" (their term for what we're calling spoiled ballots here) are cast. See [2] for an official results page breaking out informal votes by count and percent. But informal votes have no bearing on the election results; they are thrown out and only the valid votes contribute to the result.

So I think you're fundamentally asking for the "informal votes" to have a first-class mechanism for contributing to the election result (specifics TBD, maybe a threshold to meet, maybe an disqualification of the candidates for a period of time, maybe a re-do, whatever).

And that's a valid ask and an interesting discussion to have!

But given that the reason you asked for that was based on a misunderstanding, do you even still want that? Do you still think the AUS system is unreasonable as-is?

----

0. https://aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/voting/index.htm#c...

>Under the Electoral Act, the actual duty of the elector is to attend a polling place, have their name marked off the certified list, receive a ballot paper and take it to an individual voting booth, mark it, fold the ballot paper and place it in the ballot box.

>Because of the secrecy of the ballot, it is not possible to determine whether a person has completed their ballot paper prior to placing it in the ballot box. It is therefore not possible to determine whether all electors have met their legislated duty to vote. It is, however, possible to determine that an elector has attended a polling place or mobile polling team (or applied for a postal vote, pre-poll vote or absent vote) and been issued with a ballot paper.

1. https://www.aec.gov.au/about_aec/publications/backgrounders/...

in Krosch v Springell, at the polling place, Mr Springell handed the presiding officer a note saying, paraphrased, "none of these candidates deserve my vote". He was fined, because it could be proven that he didn't uphold the "duty of the elector" as defined in [0].

2. https://results.aec.gov.au/31496/Website/HouseInformalByStat...

Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#514

Post by xp84 »

deathanatos wrote: post #352
xp84 wrote: post #307

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I’d like to respectfully challenge you on this. There is no chance anyone can ever create an effortless-to-get ID. Even if it was like the census where they sent someone to your house repeatedly to try to find you, take your picture and print an ID on the spot, it wouldn’t be effortless because you might not know where your passport or birth certificate are. Some people probably are so badly organized and/or ignorant…

> By the way, a state ID costs […] $9 for “eligible people” in California. A state ID is not required to register to vote in CA[1]. (The requirement is CA ID number or last-four-of-SSN or a third complicated way, but I'm assuming ID or SSN is attainable for nigh everyone eligible.) [1]: https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voter-registration

Sure, it's not needed, but if it were needed it would be a $9 burden.

Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#515

Post by seattle_spring »

closewith wrote: post #164
seattle_spring wrote: post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're conflating "efficiency" with "disenfranchising voters." Mail-in voting enabled citizens who otherwise simply couldn't vote, to vote. Citizens who, more often than not, were from already disadvantaged backgrounds.

Many countries with far higher participation rates do not allow mail-in voting, which definitely should be banned to prevent voter manipulation.

Ok, now compare other things they do to enable voting. Is voting day a holiday and/or do workers get guaranteed paid time to vote? Are the ballot boxes equally accessible for most people, and not strategically placed to disenfranchise certain voters?

Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#516

Post by xp84 »

mullingitover wrote: post #349
slg wrote: post #345

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Anyway, it’s only those people who would be “disenfranchised” under a voter ID system and I’m not convinced our government would benefit from incorporating the opinions of someone so unserious I hate calling something a slippery slope, but I don't know how else to describe an argument that is fundamentally "Sure, it will disenfranchise people, but who cares about those people anyway?" Once you accept that people's r…

Exactly, a freedom you have to pay to access isn't a freedom. "If people can't get it together to pay a modest $9 fee for the 'don't get imprisoned forever' tax, who cares if they get throw into the forced labor camps?" Beyond this point: voting isn't just a freedom, it's a duty in a civilized democracy. We don't enforce it like Australia does, but anyone who not only doesn't care if it's performed, but is sanguine a…

Voting itself takes effort (even to vote stupidly, where you just vote a straight ticket blindly and pick all the judges and ballot props at random). Voting in a way that's good for society (meaning you read about the candidates and ballot props and actually think through their true implications) takes WAY more effort. Why is it so important that we enable people who can't be arsed to make more than a trivial effort at all to vote?

There are already a bunch of arbitrary de facto restrictions:

- If you can't read, you won't be able to use your ballot.

- If you don't have transportation or any time off to vote, you can't vote in person. (Also the main objection given to requirements to get an ID card).

- If you don't know where you'll be living consistently, mail-in voting is problematic.

We accept that there will be people whose lives are so chaotic and messed up that voting probably won't be easy for them. So why is the requirement of identity proof, which is not more difficult to overcome than the above existing barriers, such a trigger to some?

> anyone who not only doesn't care if it's performed, but is sanguine about it...

My response is, anyone who cares so little about casting a vote that they wouldn't set aside time once in a decade to get an ID for the purpose of voting isn't fully on board with participating in government by the people -- and I'm totally fine with that.

I also don't see the point in the Australian idea, especially since paying $20-50 is trivial for anyone who's not homeless, and uncollectible (moot point) if you are actually destitute. You're still getting basically the same set of people in the voting booth anyway -- only the ones who give a shit about voting.

Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#517

Post by mspecter »

kuerbel wrote: post #355
mspecter wrote: post #299

Hey all, coauthor here. Interesting to see it on Hacker News. I'm a professor in Georgia Tech's CS dept that works on problems related to security, privacy, and public policy. (CV: https://mikespecter.com/ ) Happy to answer any questions you all have.

Have you had a look at the Swiss post e-voting system and how it deals with verification?

I have not personally, but there's some fantastic work on the subject: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9152765?signou...

They find a few really bad issues. IIRC, the Swiss Post is looking into improving it, with the consultation of real cryptographers, so we'll see how that goes!

Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#518

Post by mspecter »

arjunchint wrote: post #418
mspecter wrote: post #301

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You might be interested in some prior work on blockchain voting, it's a bit harder to get right than one might think, and actually introduces some problems [1,2]. [1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentat... [2] https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/7/1/tyaa025/6...

These sources still presume SECRET blockchain voting as the goal.

The secret ballot is usually considered a core goal of an elections system, blockchain involvement or not.

Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#519

Post by rmunn »

wavemode wrote: post #353
rmunn wrote: post #97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hadn't heard about that one. Fascinating. Especially since the Black mayor then challenged the secret do-over, won, as was reinstated as mayor. Then the next year there was an actual election for the first time in over 60 years, and the Black mayor won reelection 66 to 26. Not 66% to 26%, 66 votes to 26 votes . Which just goes to show what a small town that was. P.S. Population of that town in 2020, according to the…

Now here's the kicker - he resigned! Apparently he doesn't really live in the town and wasn't eligible to run for mayor after all. https://www.al.com/news/2026/01/first-black-mayor-of-alabama...

That's hilarious. What a roller coaster of a soap-opera plot! Except it's not a soap opera, it's real life, and it happened in a small town of less than 150 people. The saying is right: truth often is stranger than fiction.

Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections

#520

Post by rstuart4133 »

croon wrote: post #510
rstuart4133 wrote: post #508

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> In the current paper systems you don't have to, True. But the "secret ballot in a polling booth using paper" systems are disappearing. 32% of Australian votes aren't done that way now. > In theory, yes. In practice, barely. If it was easy/practical it would be intrinsically susceptible to coercion. It can be reduced to scanning a QR code in an app. It is a bit of a mystery to me why you think that isn't easy, pract…

> It can be reduced to scanning a QR code in an app. It is a bit of a mystery to me why you think that isn't easy, practical or is susceptible to coercion. Because "scanning a QR code in an app" would lead to: 1) integrity loss, ie reduction of peers in the secret sharing concept. and/or 2) privacy loss, ie vote coercion, "show me you voted for our dear leader or something bad happens". You can either confirm your en…

> Because "scanning a QR code in an app" would lead to ...

> 1) integrity loss, ie reduction of peers in the secret sharing concept.

> 2) privacy loss, ie vote coercion, "show me you voted for our dear leader or something bad happens".

Following your instincts instead of doing the work required to understand Prêt à Voter will lead you to that conclusion. Your instincts are wrong in this case. Neither of your claims are true. The first paragraph of the Wikipedia page makes that plain. It says in part:

> In particular, Prêt à Voter enables voters to confirm that their vote is accurately included in the count whilst avoiding dangers of coercion or vote buying.

In case you haven't thought about it, vote buying is the hardest problem to solve for secret ballots. It is hardest because both the voter and a malicious third party are working cooperatively to corrupt the system. If you come up with a system that prevents that, you've pretty much solved all retail voting attacks. Prêt à Voter makes a vote verifiable, while ensuring votes can't be sold.

While you can't sell your vote with the typical implementation of Prêt à Voter, you can do it with your favoured paper ballot system:

1. Mallory obtains an authentic, blank ballot, and fills it in way he wants. Perhaps he does that by voting, pocketing the ballot paper, and putting the dummy in the ballot box.

2. Mallory gives the pre-filled ballot to a voter willing to sell his vote for an agreed sum outside the voting booth, where the transaction can't be detected. The voter isn't given his payment yet.

3. The voter goes into the secure voting place and is given a blank ballot. In the privacy afforded to him to cast a secret ballot he pockets the blank ballot, replacing it with the pre-filled ballot given to him by Mallory.

4. The voter casts the paid for vote.

5. The voter meets with Mallory in their secret spot, hands over the blank ballot and gets paid.

Rinse, lather and repeat all the way to winning the election.

If you haven't seen that little caper described before you will find it surprising. I did. But it is nowhere near the surprise you will get from spending the time to learn how Prêt à Voter achieves what appears to be impossible.

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