Earlier quoted context omitted.
They’re talking about national security. They want to read your messages so they can see if you’re a potential terrorist. They are not talking about users security. They don’t give a fuck about that as evidenced by the equifax debacle.
> They want to read your messages so they can see if you’re a potential terrorist. That is their stated reason. If given access they will also read your messages to determine if you are a drug dealer, or a drug user, or have committed financial crimes, or if you're organizing disfavored political activity, or...
Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
501–510 of 592 posts
Re: Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
#502Re: Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
#503Re: Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
#504Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not entirely sure how those four examples are supposedly invalidated by giving them a clever nickname. I'll take the privacy side in most any discussion of privacy-vs-security, but categorically denying the possibility that some crimes could be aided by encryption seems a step to far. It's also bad PR strategy: anybody not already on your side will be put off by your apparent lack of reasoning skills. Instead, ac…
Some crimes can also be aided by whispered in-person conversation. Should we require all in-person conversation to be shouted near a government office? The societal default used to be that substantially all conversations were inaccessible to the government except through testimony. Encryption does nothing to change the availability of information through testimony. Previously, remote conspirators could collaborate th…
A secure E2EE system must resist even targeted, legally authorised attacks. Are you suggesting that secure, practical E2EE systems do not currently exist? Would a world in which law enforcement must install physical listening devices and exploit unpublished software vulnerabilities to surveil suspects be more private than our current world, where E2EE is available but often disabled by default, and trusted intermediaries like Facebook and Google can be legally compelled to disclose non-E2EE messages?
> Forbidding end-to-end encryption, in combination with our mass surveillance apparatus, changes the societal default to be that substantially all conversations are trivially and automatically accessible
That is not (publicly acknowledged to be) the case today, even though non-E2EE platforms like Facebook are widely used. While Facebook could currently comply with laws authorising mass surveillance, and implementing secure E2EE would prevent them from doing so, the warrants under which they currently hand over non-E2EE messages are at least somewhat targeted. This controversy is not about a proposal to relax the need for warrants, it's about asking Facebook to preserve their ability to comply with them.
Re: Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
#505> We are writing to request that Facebook does not proceed with its plan to implement end-to-end encryption across its messaging services without ensuring that there is no reduction to user safety. Oh, so you’re asking for more end-to-end encryption? > While the letter acknowledges that Facebook, which owns Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and Instagram, captures 99% of child exploitation and terrorism-related content t…
1984 rings more true with each passing day.
"It was meant to be a warning, not a manual."
Re: Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
#506Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not entirely sure how those four examples are supposedly invalidated by giving them a clever nickname. I'll take the privacy side in most any discussion of privacy-vs-security, but categorically denying the possibility that some crimes could be aided by encryption seems a step to far. It's also bad PR strategy: anybody not already on your side will be put off by your apparent lack of reasoning skills. Instead, ac…
Basic human rights prevent people being jailed on sight. Some of them are criminals. Some of those rights are constantly challenged, yet no one questions their general value. Privacy, thus end to end encryption is a basic human right. There shouldn't be any reason to require proof of this. What we have here is simply the fear of the loss of an extremely powerful tool.
Re: Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
#507Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problem with your metaphor is that at the moment, without warning, the government can enter my house with a warrant. I don't believe anyone is seriously suggesting for "privacy" reasons we should forbid police, with a warrant, from entering private property? If you tried to set up a "super protection" around your house, which (for example) electrocuted people who entered by breaking the door down, and this hurt a…
>So to me, the real world seems to line up with having encryption with a "back door" only the government has access to. Physical access is easier to control as getting access has a cost. Digital access is effectively free. The problem with this is that physical access has a cost and limiting it behind approvals and procedures - can deter improper access. (Not always - if a cop really wanted into your house - they wil…
The problem is when the law is against them with things like national security orders, along with the question of how we can ensure that they are regulating access properly. But in theory, these things could be fixed.
Re: Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
#508Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not entirely sure how those four examples are supposedly invalidated by giving them a clever nickname. I'll take the privacy side in most any discussion of privacy-vs-security, but categorically denying the possibility that some crimes could be aided by encryption seems a step to far. It's also bad PR strategy: anybody not already on your side will be put off by your apparent lack of reasoning skills. Instead, ac…
There are ways for them to investigate via warrants. That covers all use cases for FBI/CIA/cops. They don't need any other techniques. It's the only logical interpretation of the US constitution to modern electronic communications. Otherwise you become what China is currently.
Re: Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
#509Earlier quoted context omitted.
"The societal default used to be that substantially all conversations were inaccessible to the government except through testimony" Sure. Before the telegraph was invented. And even before that people used security measures, such as wax seals on letters to prevent tampering or at least have an ability to detect whether or not the message has been tampered with. You seem to think of messaging systems as if they were s…
During WW2, American federal government established Office of Censorship whose sole purpose was to review and censor all communications coming into and out of the country. Now imagine them finding that someone is mailing letters written in an unbreakable code. How long do you think it would take for the FBI to break down that person's door? It wasn't done that way. Envelopes were opened, and stamped "Opened by Censor…
Re: Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption
#510Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not entirely sure how those four examples are supposedly invalidated by giving them a clever nickname. I'll take the privacy side in most any discussion of privacy-vs-security, but categorically denying the possibility that some crimes could be aided by encryption seems a step to far. It's also bad PR strategy: anybody not already on your side will be put off by your apparent lack of reasoning skills. Instead, ac…
Implementing end to end encryption in these messaging apps won't make any of these issues worse. The criminals this will supposedly help already have easy and convenient ways to do the same thing. The government has not caught anyone of any importance this way, so encryption of Facebook messages won't hinder any real investigation methods. This won't increase the number of people affected or reduce the number caught.…
The letter specifically describes an offender who was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment, detected when Facebook read his non-E2EE communications with a child victim. Are you suggesting this was an unimportant or unrepresentative case?