The Computational Theory of Mind (2015) • Hacker News Board

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#51

Post by mrmonkeyman » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 3:05 PM UTC

hackinthebochs wrote: post #34

pulisse wrote: post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How would a clockwork model of the mind explain the phenomenon of consciousness (as opposed to computation)?

The idea is that consciousness is what a planning algorithm feels like from the inside. A planning algorithm requires representations of the entities relevant to planning, e.g. various objects in the world, relevant laws, internal states such as emotions, motivations, etc. It is these representations from an internal perspective that have something it is like to have them. But the fact that this planning algorithm is…

Feels like? On.. "the inside"? How's that going to work?

Don't you guys see the inherent problem in this? There is no "feeling" and there is no "inside". How such an illusion can come to be is totally unaccounted for and an ignored problem.

You write like some "awareness" is watching these machinations, but in your model there is no awareness, nothing is watching this. There are just a bunch of bouncing billiard balls. Where is the "feeling"? Where, exactly, is the "illusion"?

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#52

Post by criddell » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 3:42 PM UTC

tcgv wrote: post #36

taneq wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

True random number generation can't be done by a deterministic computer, and it appears that human brains can, although not conclusive yet, and the precise mechanism is unclear: - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15922090

Why are you limiting it to deterministic computers? There are electronic circuits that can provide genuine random numbers.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#53

Post by criddell » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 3:45 PM UTC

yters wrote: post #47

Zigurd wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You may have the illusion of a "conscious experience" that is in fact a story told to yourself about how a thing you call "you" is in charge of your thoughts.

What is an illusion without consciousness?

The conscious experience might be there but at the same time it could be an entirely deterministic thing. Maybe you and I having this exchange was determined in the instant of the big bang.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#54

Post by logicallee » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 3:46 PM UTC

For anyone here who thinks consciousness and all thinking aren't an emergent property of "computation" in the mind, what do you think would fail to happen if you simulated it in silicon, trying to emulate it exactly?

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#55

Post by ukj » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 3:49 PM UTC

joe_the_user wrote: post #2

It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…

> Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means.

It means that if we internalise this idea we can use all the language we have developed to say precise things about computers/software/hardware to also say precise things about our minds.

After all “computer” was a human job description...

All descriptions (theories) are, fundamentally symbolic/linguistic.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#56

Post by omarhaneef » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 3:49 PM UTC

mjburgess wrote: post #44

omarhaneef wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You’re right in the sense that the CCTM (classical computational theory of mind) isn’t a complete theory. There are lot of problems. Studying it is essentially memorizing all the problems and the problems with various proposed solutions. As a theory, not only is it incomplete, it is only remotely plausible. He concedes that up front! It’s like the old joke about capitalism - worst but for any other. I would expect a…

That's an argument for a research paradigm, its not an argument for the truth. If there are fatal problems with Theory-A, Theory-A isn't true. No matter how much Theory-A might help with some other problem you have. The CCTM is the research paradigm for modern AI, parts of cognitive science, etc. -- and insofar as it provides a clear set of assumptions to arrive at useful models, so be it. Alexa can turn the lights o…

I disagree that a problem with theory-A means theory-A is not "true." Our favorite theories: say relativity or QM have plenty of problems but we still work on them.

But your argument with Alexa is in my view in the wrong "direction." Alexa doesn't know what it means to be a light, and perhaps a computer "never" will.

But the real question is, how do humans "know what a light is", or what do you mean when you say a human knows what a light is.

My intuition is similar to yours, that our living in a "deep and complex" environment has something to do with it, but what?

The deep and complex environment might explain how we learn what a light is, but what is it? To put in Fodor's terms, what is the representation?

When you or I "think" (what is thinking?) of the light (what does it mean to think of the light?), what is going on in our heads?

I suspect whatever theory of representation you come up with will look something like a computational theory. The notion or concept of the light will be "stored" and have "relationships" and so forth.

edit: readability

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#57

Post by omarhaneef » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 4:03 PM UTC

bolzano wrote: post #46

omarhaneef wrote: post #30

In a different lifetime I got to take a few classes with Jerry Fodor, and although this publication references him extensively, one of his most succinct arguments for the computational theory of mind is only alluded to: the lack of alternatives. Fodor was a snappy writer and talker. I urge you to view his videos if they can be found on YouTube. Unfortunately he passed away recently. The argument goes something like t…

He is fantastic, I've only been able to find a couple of videos of him on Youtube. If you have any links at all, I would really really appreciate the share, even just plain old audio recordings would be awesome. Thanks!

I also rely on youtube. If I knew then what I knew now I would have been more diligent in recording what he said.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#58

Post by BadThink6655321 » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 5:22 PM UTC

TheOtherHobbes wrote: post #28

joe_the_user wrote: post #2

It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…

Are you absolutely convinced that you can build a sentient mind out of clockwork parts? Because that's what your interpretation of basic materialism implies.

Clockwork parts? No. Parts that select from a combination of inputs? Yes.

Computability theory demands repeated combination/selection and memory. It doesn’t otherwise care how this is accomplished.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#59

Post by BadThink6655321 » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 5:29 PM UTC

mLuby wrote: post #8

DanielleMolloy wrote: post #5

Please let me apologize for the lack of understanding, maybe someone can add to this: If biological intelligence works like a Turing machine, is it even possible to know what or how certain brain areas compute without simulating them bottom-up? Question is influenced by this idea originally from the 80s: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_irreducibility

>biological intelligence works like a Turing machine We know it doesn't. There's no metaphorical linear tape in the brain; it's a network of neurons. But a Turing machine can simulate a network of neurons (see Machine Learning), just as a brain can model a Turing machine (see Programmer). There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot, but the question is whether that will continue to…

> There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot...

Such as? Are these things forbidden by theory, or just simply beyond current engineering practice?

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#60

Post by naasking » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 5:31 PM UTC

mjburgess wrote: post #44

omarhaneef wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You’re right in the sense that the CCTM (classical computational theory of mind) isn’t a complete theory. There are lot of problems. Studying it is essentially memorizing all the problems and the problems with various proposed solutions. As a theory, not only is it incomplete, it is only remotely plausible. He concedes that up front! It’s like the old joke about capitalism - worst but for any other. I would expect a…

That's an argument for a research paradigm, its not an argument for the truth. If there are fatal problems with Theory-A, Theory-A isn't true. No matter how much Theory-A might help with some other problem you have. The CCTM is the research paradigm for modern AI, parts of cognitive science, etc. -- and insofar as it provides a clear set of assumptions to arrive at useful models, so be it. Alexa can turn the lights o…

> I doubt she will ever know what a "light" is, or what she is doing when she turns it "on".

You mean Alexa may never know what we mean by "light" or "turning it on". Neither would an intelligent alien that doesn't rely on sight. That doesn't entail that such a creature isn't intelligent, or doesn't have a mental life, or its operations doesn't operate on a model consisting of a set of propositions.

> There is no "logic" which can specify such things in a limited set of propositions: the effect of the world on animals is not merely to add propositions to their "set of beliefs".

That's conjecture, although I think the way you've framed it is misleading. Instincts are also "beliefs" in this model, and the operation of a mind can have multiple layers with inconsistent sets of "beliefs" that sometimes drive seemingly inconsistent behaviour.