"GitHub's own security guidance recommends pinning actions to full commit SHAs as the only truly immutable way to consume an action" Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? If you don't want immutable releases, you don't get to publish an Action. They could decide to enforce this and mitigate this class of issue.
Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
41–50 of 97 posts
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#42Friendly reminder that just because someone is building security software it doesn't mean they are competent and won't cause more harm than good. Every month the security team wants me to give full code or cloud access to some new scanner they want to trial. They love the fancy dashboards and lengthy reports but if I allowed just 10% of what they wanted we would be pwned on the regular...
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#43Friendly reminder that just because someone is building security software it doesn't mean they are competent and won't cause more harm than good. Every month the security team wants me to give full code or cloud access to some new scanner they want to trial. They love the fancy dashboards and lengthy reports but if I allowed just 10% of what they wanted we would be pwned on the regular...
Fwiw w/r/t Trivy in particular,I don't think Trivy is bad software and I use it at work. We're unaffected by this breach because we use Nix to provide our code scanning tools and we write our own Actions workflows. Our Trivy version is pinned by Nix and periodically updated manually, so we've skipped these bad releases.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#44"GitHub's own security guidance recommends pinning actions to full commit SHAs as the only truly immutable way to consume an action" Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? If you don't want immutable releases, you don't get to publish an Action. They could decide to enforce this and mitigate this class of issue.
I always wish these arguments came with a requirement to include a response to "well, what about the other side of the coin?", otherwise, you've now forced me to ask: well?
The two sides of the coin: Security wants pinned versions, like you have, so that compromises aren't pulled in. Security does not want¹ pinned versions, so that security updates are pulled in.
The trick, of course, is some solution that allows the latter without the former, that doesn't just destroy dev productivity. And remember, …there is no evil bit.
(… I need to name this Law. "The Paradox of Pinning"?)
(¹it might not be so explicitly state, but a desire to have constant updated-ness w/ security patches amounts to an argument against pinning.)
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#45"GitHub's own security guidance recommends pinning actions to full commit SHAs as the only truly immutable way to consume an action" Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? If you don't want immutable releases, you don't get to publish an Action. They could decide to enforce this and mitigate this class of issue.
> Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? I always wish these arguments came with a requirement to include a response to "well, what about the other side of the coin?", otherwise, you've now forced me to ask: well? The two sides of the coin: Security wants pinned versions, like you have, so that compromises aren't pulled in. Security does not want¹ pinned versions, so that security updates a…
You already don't get updates pulled in with the system unless they swap the version out from under you, which is not a normal way to deploy.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#46"GitHub's own security guidance recommends pinning actions to full commit SHAs as the only truly immutable way to consume an action" Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? If you don't want immutable releases, you don't get to publish an Action. They could decide to enforce this and mitigate this class of issue.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#47/s But I thought npm was the issue, and all of this couldn't happen anywhere else?!
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? I always wish these arguments came with a requirement to include a response to "well, what about the other side of the coin?", otherwise, you've now forced me to ask: well? The two sides of the coin: Security wants pinned versions, like you have, so that compromises aren't pulled in. Security does not want¹ pinned versions, so that security updates a…
Their question isn't about pinned versions, it's about immutable versions. The question is why it is possible to change what commit "v5" refers to, not "why would you want to write v5". You already don't get updates pulled in with the system unless they swap the version out from under you, which is not a normal way to deploy.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#49"GitHub's own security guidance recommends pinning actions to full commit SHAs as the only truly immutable way to consume an action" Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? If you don't want immutable releases, you don't get to publish an Action. They could decide to enforce this and mitigate this class of issue.
> Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? I always wish these arguments came with a requirement to include a response to "well, what about the other side of the coin?", otherwise, you've now forced me to ask: well? The two sides of the coin: Security wants pinned versions, like you have, so that compromises aren't pulled in. Security does not want¹ pinned versions, so that security updates a…
In a more broad sense I think computing needs to move away from these centralised models where 'random person in Nebraska'[0] is silently doing a bunch of work for everyone, even with good intentions. Decisions should be deferred to the user as much as possible.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#50"GitHub's own security guidance recommends pinning actions to full commit SHAs as the only truly immutable way to consume an action" Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? If you don't want immutable releases, you don't get to publish an Action. They could decide to enforce this and mitigate this class of issue.
Allowing it to be updated can also fix security problems.
It’s basically all the same arguments as static vs dynamic linking.
Plus, I believe I saw that the one action was getting the latest version of trivy anyway.