How the heck are credential compromises still a thing with 2FA and refresh tokens???
Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
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Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#32Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#33Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#34I always run such tools inside sandboxes to limit the blast radius.
The sandbox will need internet access (to update data) and you will need to send code to test into it; so compromise already equals leaking all your code, without even breaking the sandboxing
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#35> On March 22, 2026, a threat actor used compromised credentials to publish a malicious Trivy v0.69.5 and v0.69.6 DockerHub images. ( https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/security/advisories/GH... ) So the first incident was on March 19th and the second incident is March 22nd —- evidently the attackers maintained persistence through maybe two separate credential rotation efforts.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#36I always run such tools inside sandboxes to limit the blast radius.
I don't think it would help here, they were stealing credentials
So, stealing credentials in the current directory and in all other directories are the same thing?
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#37Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#38Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? If you don't want immutable releases, you don't get to publish an Action. They could decide to enforce this and mitigate this class of issue.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#39Friendly reminder that just because someone is building security software it doesn't mean they are competent and won't cause more harm than good. Every month the security team wants me to give full code or cloud access to some new scanner they want to trial. They love the fancy dashboards and lengthy reports but if I allowed just 10% of what they wanted we would be pwned on the regular...
I audited Trivy's GitHub Actions a while back and found some worrying things, the most worrying bit was in the setup-trivy Action where it was doing a clone of main of the trivy repo and executing a shell script in there. There was no ref pinning until somebody raised a PR a few months ago. So a security company gave themselves arbitrary code execution in everyone's CI workflows. Aqua were breached earlier this month…