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Deniability and Duress

mit.edu

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Re: Deniability and Duress

#41

Post by Shivetya »

aorth wrote: post #18

The takeaway for me: US law enforcement can compel you to provide a fingerprint to unlock your phone, but cannot compel you to provide a password. In particular, a recent precedent-setting court case in Minnesota has decided that fingerprints used for access control can be taken from a suspect without violating his fifth amendment rights. The logic of the decision [...] is that fingerprints are tantamount to similar…

so why isn't there a feature for a duress fingerprint? all it does it turn the phone off or force the password required?

Re: Deniability and Duress

#42

Post by StavrosK »

mysticmarvel wrote: post #32
tomp wrote: post #30

> Scanning a pinky (or some other fingerprint / combination of fingerprints) might cause the phone to factory reset, or unlock and trigger deletion a specified portion of user data. IANAL, but AFAIK there is a strict line between not providing incriminating evidence (legal, protected under 5th Amendment) and destroying evidence (criminal).

My iPhone forces password entry after 5 failed attempts at TouchID unlock. If you can quickly thumb the sensor a few times, you can render fingerprint unlock impossible. Better to disable anyway, but it's an option.

Exactly this. If they can force you to give them a fingerprint, but not a password, just reset the phone. You haven't destroyed anything, the data is still there, it's just inaccessible without the password.

Re: Deniability and Duress

#43

Post by pc86 »

maxerickson wrote: post #35
tomp wrote: post #30

> Scanning a pinky (or some other fingerprint / combination of fingerprints) might cause the phone to factory reset, or unlock and trigger deletion a specified portion of user data. IANAL, but AFAIK there is a strict line between not providing incriminating evidence (legal, protected under 5th Amendment) and destroying evidence (criminal).

If you are a terrible person with really weird requirements you might prefer the charges related to destruction of evidence to the charges related to the evidence itself. (if you are a terrible person without really weird requirements you avoid capturing or destroy the evidence on an ongoing basis, not after you are caught)

I don't think being a "terrible person" (whatever the hell that means) has any bearing on whether or not you would want to protect your privacy.

Re: Deniability and Duress

#44

Post by pc86 »

matt4077 wrote: post #11

iPhones require the password(/code) when turned on and (IIRC) under certain other conditions. But I believe this isn't enough considering recent developments. They write: It’s important to note that deniability refers to the ability to deny some plaintext, not the ability to deny that you’re using a deniable algorithm. It's now common for border agents in the US to demand login credentials for social media accounts,…

What countries are only accessible via the US?

Re: Deniability and Duress

#45

Post by StavrosK »

Swizec wrote: post #23
microtherion wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The ESTA form asks for social media accounts (though not passwords, and ostensibly providing the accounts is "optional"): https://esta.cbp.dhs.gov/esta/

Oh wow that wasn't there last time I ESTA'd. Good thing I got that business visa a few years ago. Then again, I used my social media and general web presence as partial justification for the current O-1 visa so ... oh well. At least they can't find anything by googling my legal name.

Fucking hell, that's the first time I see this too. I might have to reconsider my US trip...

Re: Deniability and Duress

#46

Post by StavrosK »

nine_k wrote: post #38
Cthulhu_ wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> securely in the cloud isn't this a contradiction? Given how the NSA and co have backdoors in the cloud and such, and can order the operators of said cloud service to release information from their users. If you have sensitive stuff, best not to cross any borders I'd say. Stay away from the US.

Consider SpiderOak or similar things that encrypt data on the client side and never upload the key.

Borg is the best backup software I've found, for what it's worth.

Re: Deniability and Duress

#47

Post by throwawayish »

mynegation wrote: post #33
tomp wrote: post #30

> Scanning a pinky (or some other fingerprint / combination of fingerprints) might cause the phone to factory reset, or unlock and trigger deletion a specified portion of user data. IANAL, but AFAIK there is a strict line between not providing incriminating evidence (legal, protected under 5th Amendment) and destroying evidence (criminal).

I immediately thought the same thing upon reading. One thing that comes to mind is: automatically triggered data destruction. If laptop or the phone detects non-owner access attempts and destroys data on its own, is it destruction of evidence? Owner did not do it, and it was there just to protect from the real bad guys: corporate spies, identity thieves.

> is it destruction of evidence?

I'd say that depends on how much you pissed persecuting entities off.

Re: Deniability and Duress

#48

Post by maxerickson »

pc86 wrote: post #43
maxerickson wrote: post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you are a terrible person with really weird requirements you might prefer the charges related to destruction of evidence to the charges related to the evidence itself. (if you are a terrible person without really weird requirements you avoid capturing or destroy the evidence on an ongoing basis, not after you are caught)

I don't think being a "terrible person" (whatever the hell that means) has any bearing on whether or not you would want to protect your privacy.

Sure, but someone carrying around evidence of crimes with heavier punishments than destruction of evidence is considering a different scenario than someone simply concerned with their privacy.

Re: Deniability and Duress

#50

Post by kijin »

> For instance, scanning anything but your right index finger might force a password-only lock. Scanning a pinky (or some other fingerprint / combination of fingerprints) might cause the phone to factory reset, or unlock and trigger deletion a specified portion of user data.

That's not plausible deniability, it's willful destruction of evidence. It's going to look extremely suspicious when your phone suddenly asks for a second factor or gets factory reset. This will only invite more liberal use of the rubber hose.

True plausible deniability is completely different. Your phone should unlock and expose all sorts of insignificant-but-realistic data to make it look like you've been using it all the time. This can't be done convincingly with a hidden O/S unless you use the hidden O/S every day, which is impractical for most people.

What we need is software that allows us to mark certain bits of data (files, messages, call history, apps) as "safe to expose" (whitelist mode) or "must hide" (blacklist mode) with little more than a couple of taps/clicks during normal usage. Not just hidden at the application level, but gone from the underlying filesystem as well. Any ideas for an encrypted, possibly layered filesystem with two or more keys that expose different subsets of files, leaving the rest indistinguishable from empty space?

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