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Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

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Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#361

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sometimes there is no clear path from A to B. There is some weird fallacy where people tend to think every single company can make every single product if they simply hired the right engineers and throw money at it. I think it comes from underestimating the role of process, structure, and competency, which are the DNA and codebase of a company.

Sometimes the market says the most efficient outcome is for your company to die and a replacement rise from the ground elsewhere. Old, tired companies with lots of sunk costs and old employees are at a disadvantage.

Moreover, sometimes the most efficient outcome for owners is milk what you can from the business then close up shop. The idea of a public market with fractional ownership is you dont have to keep all your eggs in one basket.

Kodak does not need to become a cellphone company. You can take your dividends from Kodak and invest in Apple. When Kodak profits go to zero, you sell the the assets and move on.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#362
post #170

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> get the majority of the profit in the market But they werent able to just do this from the begining. It took a lot of building on the success and positive consumer appeal of the iPod.

The iPod applied the same strategy. When it launched it only worked on Macs with a FireWire port, meaning <10% of the personal computer market.

Also less space than a Nomad.

The killer feature of the iPod was the iTunes music store. Everybody was sick of the hoops the companies made you jump through to buy songs. Singles were basically out of fashion thanks to the domination of the CD, but most bands only released one or two good songs on a CD meaning each song cost like $5 and you had to rip it yourself and transfer it to whatever device you had, which was a lot of work. Apple realized people would buy a ton of music if you cut out the bullshit and price it reasonably, a strategy that had been previously untried in the market and no doubt caused a lot of CEO heartburn.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#363
post #284

Earlier quoted context omitted.

BYD+CATL is Android. Tesla is Apple.

I respectfully disagree. Tesla is run by a bigot, far right extremist. I would never send money to them, no matter their offerings. Not so with Apple.

Good grief. Yes, Musk is a raging asshole. But so soon we apparently forget that Jobs was also a raging asshole.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#364

Mirror since the 3 already posted don't actually work: https://archive.org/details/document_20250116

The host must be 404-ing high-traffic files?

That's probably what happens once the traffic quota is exceeded, I would guess.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#365
post #125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>they understand what they were facing Parts of the deck suggest that they didn't fully understand what they were facing. For example, the bullet "scaling the user experience to lower HW specs may be challenging. iPhone mini may be closer to iPod UI" comment still suggests they were stuck in the mindset of the time. They thought it was unlikely that Apple could deliver a horizontal platform, rather Apple would be lau…

That Apple succeeded in having people pay $500 and up for a phone that was cool but frankly not very useful, was amazing. We should remember the original iPhone was more a tech demonstrator than anything else. It had the revolutionary touch screen, yes, but you couldn't really DO that much with it. There wasn't even an app store! You still needed to buy a digital camera and a garmin GPS and so on. This was a telephon…

> It had the revolutionary touch screen, yes, but you couldn't really DO that much with it.

You glossed over the one killer feature of the original iPhone: It had a fully functional web browser and enough compute power to just barely run it. This was the thing that made all previous smartphones instantly obsolete. No goddamn WAP proxy. No needing 3-4 minutes to get Yahoo to render. It didn't completely trash the layout of every other page. It was an actually useful web browser.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#366
post #132

I was there as this played out. Nokia had a lot of good software and software engineers but not the management structure to do anything good with that. Nokia was huge as an organization and parts of that organization recognized the threat early on. The problem was at the board and executive level. These people had a blind spot for software. They thought they were still in the electronics business. Lots of people with…

Nokia also had a ex-Microsoft exec ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Elop ) that had the goal of ensuring Windows Phone would succeed, and tanked Nokia with it. I was on the DVLUP project where Nokia and Microsoft attempted to inject energy into windows phone app development. We could see the tension between the two companies as we were a 3rd party contracted by Nokia to build the platform. The Nokia exec we we…

Nokia was dead company walking before Stephen Elop. Elop saw the writing on the wall and made one of the choices available. A different CEO would have made a different choice but ultimately at that point it would still have been too late to save Nokia.

Nokia was a great hardware company that missed the boat when the market changed to be based around software. When the market changed again to be based around ecosystems, Nokia was beyond saving.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#367
post #177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If memory serves, it was a custom kernel and OS, then a semi-custom kernel with a few OS components shared with Windows 8, and then the Windows 10 'core' kernel (same as on the Xbox One?) with many shared OS components. At each step they left the majority of devices behind. What was equally worse was the triple (quadruple?) switch of app frameworks. If I remember correctly it was a dotnet abomination, then ?? then WP…

Buttersmooth UI is how I'd describe it too. I loved the themes at the time too.

It was incredibly smooth. The Windows Phone 7 browser was also very smooth compared to the iPhone/Android browsers of the time. Some miracles worked somewhere.

Also the keyboard was incredibly good.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#368
post #7

Alternative link to the presentation from a post on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/hypponen_the-nokia-design-arc...

Post linked has one slide, the other commenter has shared this: https://nokia-apple-iphone-was-launched-presentation.tiiny.s...

That link now 404s.

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#369

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I was a day one Android fan (got the Nexus One) but I'd actually debate what "in charge" means... to me it doesn't necessarily mean dominating market share. I think the iPhone defined the touch-based smartphone when it came out and continues to do so. These days Android has a much more cohesive concept (in the form of Material UI and so on) but in the early days it was just a hodgepodge mess of ideas, even if it domi…

it dominated the market because they seized the 'budget' smartphone market. Back in they hayday everyone dreaded a new android app coming into the shop because of all the absolute shit phones (slow cpus, tiny screens) the client wanted us to support because there were so many in the market (overseas). iPhone did and still does run the market, everyone else is a follower.

[dead]

Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]

#370
post #157

I was there as this played out. Nokia had a lot of good software and software engineers but not the management structure to do anything good with that. Nokia was huge as an organization and parts of that organization recognized the threat early on. The problem was at the board and executive level. These people had a blind spot for software. They thought they were still in the electronics business. Lots of people with…

> The iphone was solidly in charge by then Nit: the iPhone was only "in charge" for a brief year or two, and then Android ate its lunch in terms of marketshare. What is very interesting is that Apple has displayed twice over ( MacBooks and iPhones) that a minority marketshare can capture the vast majority of profits in that market. OEMs like HTC and LG made a few bucks profit off of any phone, sometimes even losing m…

> the iPhone was only "in charge" for a brief year or two, and then Android ate its lunch in terms of marketshare.

This is true worldwide, but there are significant regions where iOS quite handily beats Android (such as the US, Japan, and even some parts of Europe).

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