341–350 of 393 posts
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That’s even better. I do think it’s disturbing and creepy when someone goes through my private data without my knowledge.
That's not what they meant or what the phrase means. It's mildly racist and misogynist, and the kinds of discomfort it elicits are not the kind that will make people trust you, the user of the phrase.
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That's not what they meant or what the phrase means. It's mildly racist and misogynist, and the kinds of discomfort it elicits are not the kind that will make people trust you, the user of the phrase.
[flagged]
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I'm sorry, hopefully you come back to reality soon. I just went 2 weeks without touching a smartphone, I'm certain you can too.
I think you’re the one not living in reality. But, hey, at least the NSA won’t get ya.
I wonder how all those people did it in the 90s and 00s and before the age of smartphones.
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The only thing the math tells you is that the server software gave you a correct key. It does not tell you how it got that key. A compromised server would send you the key all the same. You still have to trust in the security infrastructure. Trust that Apple is running the hardware it says it is, Trust that apple is running the software it says it is. Security audits help build that trust, but it is not and never wil…
No, this really isn't right . To quote: verifiable transparency, goes one step further and does away with the hypothetical: security researchers must be able to verify the security and privacy guarantees of Private Cloud Compute, and they must be able to verify that the software that’s running in the PCC production environment is the same as the software they inspected when verifying the guarantees. So how does this…
> These are pretty strong guarantees, and really make it difficult for Apple to bypass.
These guarantees rely entirely on trust in the hardware but it's not your hardware.
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I think you’re the one not living in reality. But, hey, at least the NSA won’t get ya.
If you can live without a cellphone, you're not living in reality? Interesting argument. I wonder how all those people did it in the 90s and 00s and before the age of smartphones.
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Your own infrastructure is definitely less secure than this or even, say, Google. You do not have the capability and teams of SREs to detect intrusions, and an attacker would know that your server processes your data.
Maybe, but I can totally firewall my own servers to my heart's desire, including completely blocking it off from the internet and only allowing connections via my own network's routes.
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I think you’re the one not living in reality. But, hey, at least the NSA won’t get ya.
If you can live without a cellphone, you're not living in reality? Interesting argument. I wonder how all those people did it in the 90s and 00s and before the age of smartphones.
Reality is based in a context.
Or are we going to go to even more “get off my lawn” kind of places and talk about how ancient man survived quite fine without the internet?
I'm interested in how this compares to AWS nitro enclaves, which they mention briefly. The main difference seems to be verifiability down to the firmware level. Nitro enclaves does not provide measurements of the firmware[0], or hypervisor, furthermore they state that the hypervisor code can be updated transparently at any time[1]. Apple is going to provide images of the secure enclave processor operating system(sepO…
Nitro does measure firmware. If any firmware is unexpected, server will essentially stop being connected to the EC2 substrate network and/or server wiped clean automatically. People will be paged automatically, security will likely be pulled in, etc. There is no reason to measure hypervisor firmware as it’s not firmware in the case of EC2. The BIOS/UEFI firmware on the mobo is overwritten if it’s tampered with. Hyper…
Although in the end, I'm not sure how much of a difference it makes, as ultimately, even with measurements of the whole stack, the platform provider if compelled to do so, can still push out a malicious firmware that fakes it's measurements.
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"ensuring that clients will refuse to talk to non-audited systems." I'm trying to understand if this is really possible. I know they claim so but is there any info on how this would prevent Apple from executing different code to what is presented for audit?
The servers provide a hash of their environment to clients, who can compare it to the published list of audited environments. So the question is: could the hash be falsified? That’s why they’re publishing the source code to firmware and bootloader, so researchers can audit the secure boot foundations. I am sure there is some way that a completely malevolent Apple could design a weakness into this system so they could…
Matt Green's posts about it so am sure it's been thought out - but hard to understand how it doesn't just depend on employees doing the right thing, when if you could, you would need all the rigmarole.
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The only thing the math tells you is that the server software gave you a correct key. It does not tell you how it got that key. A compromised server would send you the key all the same. You still have to trust in the security infrastructure. Trust that Apple is running the hardware it says it is, Trust that apple is running the software it says it is. Security audits help build that trust, but it is not and never wil…
No, this really isn't right . To quote: verifiable transparency, goes one step further and does away with the hypothetical: security researchers must be able to verify the security and privacy guarantees of Private Cloud Compute, and they must be able to verify that the software that’s running in the PCC production environment is the same as the software they inspected when verifying the guarantees. So how does this…
Still, this is notably more secure than your typical cloud compute, where you have to just trust the cloud provider when they pinky swear that they won’t peek.