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FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

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Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#301

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My advice if you’re not on the level where three letter agencies are actively interested in your comings and goings: - Use a strong pass phrase - Enable biometrics so you don’t need to type that pass phrase 100 times per day - Learn the shortcut to have your phone disable biometrics and require the pass phrase so you can use it when police is coming for you, you’re entering the immigration line in the airport etc. -…

> Learn the shortcut to have your phone disable biometrics and require the pass phrase On my Pixel (Android), it's hold the power button for ~2 seconds then select Lockdown.

There are a couple of apps that will also lock down with a tap instantly. I'm sorry I forget the names though, but handy if you have it in hand and "open". I have been using iphone too long now to remember the names of the apps though. you can put a shortcut on every "page" of your android and tap it, it enforces locking the phone by passcode. so on most phones it would be a swipe and a tap, probably less than a 200 milliseconds if you practiced it.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#302
post #220

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ulbricht was caught via poor OPSEC and not via a Firefox/Tor 0day afaik. Though there was/is speculation that a Firefox/Tor 0day was used to bring down some Tor markets and possibly to locate the Silk Road's server. Silk Road 2.0 was brought down in like a few months, which could indicate such a 0day existed. Or that it was ran by some former Silk Road staff members who got doxed when Silk Road 1.0 was shut down.

Ulbricht was caught because an FBI agent, who would read things slowly and twice, recognized these 4 letters : heyy . That's how Ulbricht sometimes spelled hey , and the agent had seen that particular spelling before in his investigation, in an email from Ulbrict’s student email address. Nick Bilton's book “American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind Behind the Silk Road” is a great read, highly recom…

it strikes me as extremely naive to take this at face value. see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R2013...

much more likely -- sigint tooling was applied to identify ulbricht, bulk metadata was turned over for his comms history, and it was pored over for things they could connect with sr to get warrants. imo, at least.

but getting to claim you're such a sharp investigator that you can figure it out by noticing the word heyy makes for a much better story to tell an author.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#303

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"threat assessment' coordinator from my workplace" "I feared that I may lose my job." I understand that police/FBI have to conduct investigation. What dont understand is involvement of the employer , it's extremely disturbing - you have not been convincted, you have not been charged, you are not even a suspect or accused of anything at this point - how is your private life the business of your employer? Why is your p…

The FBI still has buildings named after J Edgar Hoover. That should tell you everything you need to know about their institutional respect for justice and due process.

[deleted]

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#304
post #162

This seems like a good place to say that I strongly recommend Yasha Levine's Surveillance Valley book ( https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34220713-surveillance-va... ) where he suggests that all of this is working as intended, going all the way back to the military counter-insurgency roots of the arpanet first in places like Vietnam, and then back home in anti-war and leftist movements. The contemporary themes that…

Did you even click on the link? Signal gives away NOTHING.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#305
post #295

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just like the NSA spying on Americans is unlawful [0] the FBI terrorizing political movements is unlawful [1] or the CIA operating in the US is unlawful [2] Yet, I'm pretty sure all these are still happening, to a certain degree, to this day. [0] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nsa-spying-idUSKBN25T... [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COINTELPRO [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_CHAOS

Larger point would be if it's obtained unlawfully it can't be used in a court of law against you. Recent cases: https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkppqk/court-throws-out-mess... https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252503524/Berlin-court-f...

Parallel Construction makes this a technicality/nuisance, not a show stopper.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#308

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> the teacher's perception of the incident might have bias and prejudice. I mean that's not entirely wrong either. Bullying was still a thing before zero tolerance policies. Not to say zero tolerance policies are the right solution, but personal bias _is_ a big problem when it comes to enforcement.

Of course. Bias and prejudice is always a real concern. In situations where the teacher gets it wrong and punishes the bullied kid, the kid learns an unfortunate but useful lesson; that some agents of the system cannot be relied on. But the zero tolerance response to this circumstance ensures the bullied student is prejudiced against, judging him guilty before considering the facts of the individual circumstance. Wha…

to be fair, that's a pretty valuable lesson to learn out here. it would be neat if we had a system we could rely on.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#309
post #295

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just like the NSA spying on Americans is unlawful [0] the FBI terrorizing political movements is unlawful [1] or the CIA operating in the US is unlawful [2] Yet, I'm pretty sure all these are still happening, to a certain degree, to this day. [0] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nsa-spying-idUSKBN25T... [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COINTELPRO [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_CHAOS

Larger point would be if it's obtained unlawfully it can't be used in a court of law against you. Recent cases: https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkppqk/court-throws-out-mess... https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252503524/Berlin-court-f...

Generally only if you have the means to hire a good lawyer.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#310

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's (scarily) interesting that they react with actual personal attendance based purely on a very limited set of electronic information. From your further description: > We are not religious (at all). We do not attend church, synagogue or mosque. We are lower middle class white Americans born and raised in the USA and have never traveled outside the country. Would not the FBI have been able to any amount of backgroun…

> It's (scarily) interesting that they react with actual personal attendance based purely on a very limited set of electronic information. Either their intel is better than they let on and didnt think they would be walking into an ambush or they are more stupid than we think.

Actually, I think they had no intel. You NEED intel for a judge to order a subpoena—and if a subpoena was issued, the ISP would open their firehose, and overwhelm the FBI with evidence suggesting that there’s nothing to investigate. And having visited extremist sites a handful of times—even if advertantly—is probably not going to meet the threshold for a subpoena.

If the FBI visited me and casually asked about my web history, I would casually ask them to pound sand (as should everyone!). But if the agent was accompanied with someone from my employer, I would eagerly cart up every single device in my home and offer to carry it out to their vehicle (as I fear most would).

It smells like someone is taking massive investigative shortcuts, at very significant cost to the accused. Then again, I can’t even fathom the upside for the FBI.

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