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Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

politico.eu

31–40 of 221 posts

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#31
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bouncer love it, when someone says "oh sorry, I forgot my ID, can you let me in anyway?" they just tell them to download the app :)

I don't know about other countries, but here it requires your passport or actual drivers license, and a 12 or 24 hour wait, to actually activate the drivers license app.

Mhh, maybe it was the Sundhedskortet app? But that does not have a photo.

To be honest I just overhead the bouncer talking about them liking the app. Maybe I misheard it.

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#32

Note that this is an implementation of eIDAS: https://www.eudi-wallet.eu/ The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. If somebody who has access to your unlocked phone can access the data in the app, then this is something that should be tightened up but it’s a substantial priv…

> The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody.

That's the theory. How is it in practice?

In my opinion, it just means there is a single government database to hack to get copies of all IDs...

By the way have the "security experts" checking this app evaluated that part? Or they're just worried about the app users cheating?

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#33
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You keep using the term “secure” that it sounds like you think education is like a prison sentence. You’re not doing this for security but for safety. A stair gate or drawer child-proofing lock are by no means secure but you use them anyway for the child’s safety. You can’t just leave every dangerous thing out in the open because you “view it as a pain to deal with” storing them safely and then blame everyone else fo…

You make it sound like having a phone in public is basically "open carry" which is absolute nonsense. What do you have on your phone that's dangerous? Phones aren't safety device, and they shouldn't be turned into one.

You make it sound like you put no effort in understanding my comment and just followed up with whatever supported your view.

If you have anything on your phone that should be off limits to your child but make no effort to ensure that (give them the phone, no passwords, no supervision) because it’s too inconvenient you are failing the child. Can I put it in simpler words?

> What do you have on your phone that's dangerous?

I hope you were asking hypothetically.

For one, the phone itself since staring into a small screen at god knows what because supervising them is a chore is bad for anything you can imagine, from eyes, to posture, to brain development. But also a browser that can access anything on the internet (modern Goatse, Rotten, Ogrish, other wholesome sites like that). My credit card numbers. All my passwords. Hardcore porn. Facebook and TikTok. The app that delivers booze to my doorstep. 50 shades of grey (the book and the movie). X (Twitter), I left the worst for last. If you really think a completely open internet connected phone is perfectly safe for a kid at the very least you’re in the wrong conversation.

It doesn’t matter, the discussion is about age verification for things that a child should be kept away from, whatever that is. If you’re trying to protect the kids from anything, especially legitimate concerns, then you can’t expect some mechanism to magically do all that parenting for you. It can help but not be the parent when the parent thinks it’s too inconvenient to actually do some parenting.

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#34

Note that this is an implementation of eIDAS: https://www.eudi-wallet.eu/ The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. If somebody who has access to your unlocked phone can access the data in the app, then this is something that should be tightened up but it’s a substantial priv…

> The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody.

No it isn't.

Literally that is not the scope document, and such a solution would not be permitted by the EU as compliant with the legislation.

The app isn't zero knowledge. A prototype workflow has been designed for a one way transfer to sites that is zero knowledge, but it doesn't actually deliver zero knowledge because it you have to verify your age with an external provider to get the credential (which is not zero knowledge), the app has to be secured with either Apple or Google's attestation services (which are not zero knowledge), and the site has to be able to check with the original external provider that the credential hasn't been revoked (which is in no way zero knowledge).

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#35
post #32

Note that this is an implementation of eIDAS: https://www.eudi-wallet.eu/ The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. If somebody who has access to your unlocked phone can access the data in the app, then this is something that should be tightened up but it’s a substantial priv…

> The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. That's the theory. How is it in practice? In my opinion, it just means there is a single government database to hack to get copies of all IDs... By the way have the "security experts" checking this app evaluated that part? Or they'r…

> In my opinion, it just means there is a single government database to hack to get copies of all IDs...

That doesn't make sense, all IDs are already in a single government database. Kind of by definition in fact, for IDs to be useful they need to be emitted by a central authority with associated security and revokability guarantees.

The implementations I've seen rely on an app reading your physical ID and its NFC chip, comparing that with a selfie to ensure it's the same person, and being able to provide anonymous proof you are of age based on that, or proof that you are indeed who you say you are.

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#36

Note that this is an implementation of eIDAS: https://www.eudi-wallet.eu/ The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. If somebody who has access to your unlocked phone can access the data in the app, then this is something that should be tightened up but it’s a substantial priv…

You are mixing things up, and EU abbreviations do not help. Many countries in EU already have electronic identity documents and delegate authentication to mobile apps one way or another. eID or mobile identity application operating over QR codes and used to log into websites and apps is a commodity here. This has nothing to do with age verification.

I’m not sure what you are saying I am mixing up.

The article links to the source code repository here:

https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-app-android...

That links to the tech spec:

> The solution leverages the existing eIDAS infrastructure, including eIDAS nodes and the trust framework for trusted services, to ensure a high level of security and reliability. By aligning with the technical architecture of the EU Digital Identity Wallet ARF, the solution delivers secure, reusable, and interoperable proofs of age.

> The solution enables users to present their Proof of Age attestation to Relying Parties, primarily for online use cases. The system is optimised for secure and privacy-preserving online presentation, allowing users to prove their eligibility without disclosing unnecessary personal information.

https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-doc-technic...

Annex A includes details on the ZKP:

> AVI SHOULD support the generation of Zero-Knowledge Proofs using the solution detailed in: "Matteo Frigo and abhi shelat, Anonymous credentials from ECDSA, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/2010, 2024, available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2010".

https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-doc-technic...

And the linked paper:

> Anonymous digital credentials allow a user to prove possession of an attribute that has been asserted by an identity issuer without revealing any extra information about themselves. For example, a user who has received a digital passport credential can prove their “age is ” without revealing any other attributes such as their name or date of birth.

https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2010

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#37
post #4

"Let’s say I downloaded the app, proved that I am over 18, then my nephew can take my phone, unlock my app and use it to prove he is over 18." - and how is that something that could, or should, be addressed by the app? Are we even serious??

The phone also needs to be rooted for any of the attacks to work.

At least that's what the manufacturer's AI generated article says: https://eidas-pro.com/blog/eu-age-verification-app-hack-expl...

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#38

Note that this is an implementation of eIDAS: https://www.eudi-wallet.eu/ The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. If somebody who has access to your unlocked phone can access the data in the app, then this is something that should be tightened up but it’s a substantial priv…

> The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. It is my understanding that this is not possible. I would be happy to be shown to be wrong, but to me it seems like you can either prevent people from lending out their credentials, or you can preserve the anonymity of the user, but…

Can attestations be rate-limited or is that the timing side-channel you are talking about?

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#39

Note that this is an implementation of eIDAS: https://www.eudi-wallet.eu/ The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. If somebody who has access to your unlocked phone can access the data in the app, then this is something that should be tightened up but it’s a substantial priv…

> The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. It is my understanding that this is not possible. I would be happy to be shown to be wrong, but to me it seems like you can either prevent people from lending out their credentials, or you can preserve the anonymity of the user, but…

> It is my understanding that this is not possible. I would be happy to be shown to be wrong, but to me it seems like you can either prevent people from lending out their credentials, or you can preserve the anonymity of the user, but not both.

This is not designed to prevent adults from coöperating with minors; that makes no sense as a design goal because any technical measure can always be bypassed with “download this for me and give me the file”. This is designed to prevent minors from being able to access systems without an adult.

Nothing prevents an adult from buying alcohol on behalf of minors; that doesn’t mean laws that prevent minors from directly buying alcohol are useless.

Re: Brussels launched an age checking app. Hackers took 2 minutes to break it

#40

Note that this is an implementation of eIDAS: https://www.eudi-wallet.eu/ The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. If somebody who has access to your unlocked phone can access the data in the app, then this is something that should be tightened up but it’s a substantial priv…

> The point of this is that you can use the credentials on your phone to prove that you are an adult to a website using zero-knowledge proofs to avoid disclosing your identity to anybody. It is my understanding that this is not possible. I would be happy to be shown to be wrong, but to me it seems like you can either prevent people from lending out their credentials, or you can preserve the anonymity of the user, but…

> You can use 0KP to prove you have a signed certificate issued by your government that says you are an adult, but then anyone with such a certificate can use it to masquerade as however many sock puppets they like and act as a proxy for people who aren't adults

The certificates in question can use a few mitigations: short lived, hardware stored (in a TPM, making distribution harder), be single use, have a random id which the service being accessed can check how many times has been used.

> but then the issuing government and the service providers have a timing side-channel they can use to correlate identities

That's not reallya concern, IMO. That would always exist as a risk - most people would probably have a flow of trying to do something, having to prove ID/age, doing that step, continuing with the something, which means you'd probably be able to time correlate the two sides quite often. The solution here is legal with strong barriers, not technical.

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