Also, the article makes the weird jump from the fact that it's
possible a VPN provider might log you, and
possible a government or similarly powerful entity might request those logs, and
possible that they might then get them - to the idea that you therefore must assume that
will happen.
Jumping through all kinds of administrative hurdles is still a hurdle, even for a government (in fact, in many ways - especially for a government!). A court may not force a VPN provider to hand over logs, and a a VPN provider may have little legal exposure in a country anyhow.
Even if a government somehow managed to get permission to see them, if a VPN provider doesn't have any (or none sufficiently detailed) it's pretty likely it will not suffer much for not having logs (especially given that various privacy laws might even make it illegal to keep unnecessary privacy-sensitive data floating around), and courts tend not to punish even illegal court-order violating behavior when the party was required to engage in that behavior (e.g. by law). If anything, that's a modicum of risk with a high potential reward (publicity here we come!)
And even if a VPN service maintains logs - what kind of logs? There are a lot packets floating around on a VPN, and storing metadata for every single one strikes me as a pretty excessive expense if there's no really good business case for it. Tying various incomplete logs together doesn't always reconstruct the whole story, so it's pretty plausible some logs may still contain less data than would be retrievable if you didn't use a VPN.
All in all it strikes me as invalid reasoning to assume that merely because it's possible a VPN might not keep traffic private that it will in practice leak said traffic. That does not appear to be the path of least resistance. So even if some UK government agency were to have the intent to track some of your traffic - a VPN might well prevent that or at least make it much more expensive (in both time and effort) for said agency to achieve that.