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Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

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Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#31
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Pattern detection. Pattern happens to be grammar.

However, patterns are language dependent. They don't mention what happened when an English only speaker heard a Chinese phrase.

If you hear long enough of something that is noise first time you hear it, eventually you will distinguish patterns if it is for example Chinese. Brain is pattern recognition machine.

Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#32

I suspect we have a "grammar" which is based on massively parallel pattern matching over a sequence of symbols of bounded length. (I.e. why we deal with ambiguities well, but not long sentences.)

if it's so massively parallel, why do I read your comment left to right one word at a time? why garden path sentences that mislead us as we build up an erroneous parse? sure there's some fuzzy pattern matching, but lexical parsing doesn't seem so massively parallel to me - more like a huge lookup table of fuzzy matches (including whole phrases, I don't have to say much about how I'm never gonna give you up, before th…

> If it were just pattern matching that grammatical error wouldn't bother you at all even if you notice it, you would just go with the most likely fuzzy interpretation.

I actually had to read the sentence about 3 times, and force myself to read it slowly word by word, before I spotted it.

We often don't read one word at a time.

I agree with you that "massively parallel" is probably drastically overstating it, though.

Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#33
post #4

> Neuroscientists and psychologists predominantly reject this viewpoint, contending that our comprehension does not result from an internal grammar; rather, it is based on both statistical calculations between words and sound cues to structure. Wait, is this true? There are people who seriously suggest that we don't have an innate notion of grammar?

Yes, there are. Or at least, that we don't have a special-purpose module of our brain devoted just to that. The common counter to Chomsky's version of innate grammar is that language is the result of the interaction of a bunch of different cognitive modules which all evolved for different purposes, but which when combined happen to make language possible, and have since been under selection pressure to make language…

Thanks for the second point. It's frustrated when they write titles like that for the public.

I always think that "human is born with some miracle thing" is quite suspicious. How can orderliness be born out of no where (no work spent, no energy consumed)? The probability of orderliness to be spontaneously assembled itself must be infinitesimally small.

Grammar might evolve along the way (due to statistical learning) but it seems too good to be true if it's born out of no where.

Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#34
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Let's say that you are very good at basketball, enough so that you can almost always make a shot from anywhere on the court. Your mind is computing, based off of visual feedback, how to fire your muscles in such a way so that the basketball makes a near-perfect parabola and makes it into the net. Does your brain "know" the formulas that describe projectile motion? Is it running a physics model in your brain?

I think that's a very good analogy, and no, I wouldn't say my brain would "know" Newton's formulas. However, I will still say my brain "knows" grammar. The difference is complexity. Even if you consider spins, throwing a ball is only about 9 degrees of freedom. It is too small to make good prediction on how the brain works, so Occam's razor dictates that it probably doesn't solve a differential equation. (Also I coul…

Let's make it complicated, then: if you're great at walking a tightrope on a windy day, is your brain storing a model of your muscular+skeletal structure and live-computing a kinematics physics model + wind simulation to simulate how you should be walking across that tightrope?

My point was that Newton's formulas are simplified models of how the world works. As a result, just because you know how to throw a ball doesn't mean you "know" Newton's formulas. Similarly, just because you know how to speak doesn't mean you "know" grammar.

The question to ask to help us answer this question would be: is grammar a simplified model of language?[1]

[1] This depends on whether you're a linguistic prescriptivist or descriptivist.

Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#35
I think we also have visual grammars. We are surprised if heavy and large objects are on top of light and small objects. We have priors on lighting and shadows, depth and occlusion, inside and outside.

We solve these statistically with complex priors and likelihoods. How much you can shove into the prior is the question of universal grammar. That you are born with linguistic priors is I think not so surprising. If they are of the old-fashioned symbolic variety that Chomsky proposes, would be surprising. It's way too "clean" for my liking, personal opinion!

Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Let's say that you are very good at basketball, enough so that you can almost always make a shot from anywhere on the court. Your mind is computing, based off of visual feedback, how to fire your muscles in such a way so that the basketball makes a near-perfect parabola and makes it into the net. Does your brain "know" the formulas that describe projectile motion? Is it running a physics model in your brain?

A very important difference: someone who is good at throwing a basketball (or any sport, really) will "switch off" their brain while doing so. There's various words for this, e.g. "being in the zone". Ask the person to think about something while throwing, and they'll likely miss. It takes years of training to teach the brain to do the correct motions while " switched off". Using language, on the other hand, requires…

Language doesn't seem to require conscious thought either. Philosophers like Heidegger and Wittgenstein talked about that a lot. The postulating of an internal thought process "behind" everything is basically what Heidegger spent his life refuting, from what I've read of Dreyfus's book... And Wittgenstein explains language as a tool that people use to get things done, more or less. You can talk without "really thinking", people do it all the time. Grammar is natural in that sense. Pinker's "The Language Instinct" mentions studies that show higher educated people in some situations tend to make more grammatical blunders and to be slightly less "fluent," maybe because of second guessing their language instincts.

(Any errors in this comment due to the fact that I wrote it without thinking.)

Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#37
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, there are. Or at least, that we don't have a special-purpose module of our brain devoted just to that. The common counter to Chomsky's version of innate grammar is that language is the result of the interaction of a bunch of different cognitive modules which all evolved for different purposes, but which when combined happen to make language possible, and have since been under selection pressure to make language…

Thanks for the second point. It's frustrated when they write titles like that for the public. I always think that "human is born with some miracle thing" is quite suspicious. How can orderliness be born out of no where (no work spent, no energy consumed)? The probability of orderliness to be spontaneously assembled itself must be infinitesimally small. Grammar might evolve along the way (due to statistical learning)…

Giving birth to a human child is not trivial. Lots of assembly required. DNA is pretty complex, and the process of motherhood is not just waiting for nine months and delivering a miracle.

Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#38

> Their results showed that the subjects’ brains distinctly tracked three components of the phrases they heard, reflecting a hierarchy in our neural processing of linguistic structures: words, phrases, and then sentences—at the same time. How are they distinguishing between grammar that's encoded in the brain due to "nature" vs grammar that's encoded in the brain via "nurture"? I think we all knew that the brain has…

Your assumption is that all information necessary and sufficient to decode grammar into its constituents is detectable from the spoken words that a child hears. According to Chomsky there is a distinction between the I-Language versus E-Language [1] (internal/ex) namely because grammar in most human languages is not the most computationally efficient way of structuring sentences hence the need for an uniquely human/innate ability [2].

This is also why monkeys can never be trained to learn human language [3].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transformational_grammar#.22I-...

[2] http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/11/noam-c...

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nim_Chimpsky

Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#39
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think that's a very good analogy, and no, I wouldn't say my brain would "know" Newton's formulas. However, I will still say my brain "knows" grammar. The difference is complexity. Even if you consider spins, throwing a ball is only about 9 degrees of freedom. It is too small to make good prediction on how the brain works, so Occam's razor dictates that it probably doesn't solve a differential equation. (Also I coul…

Let's make it complicated, then: if you're great at walking a tightrope on a windy day, is your brain storing a model of your muscular+skeletal structure and live-computing a kinematics physics model + wind simulation to simulate how you should be walking across that tightrope? My point was that Newton's formulas are simplified models of how the world works. As a result, just because you know how to throw a ball does…

I don't think that question has that much to do with prescriptivism and descriptivism. Prescriptivists want to use the study of grammar to uphold certain linguistic norms; descriptivists find that language works fine without expert supervision; neither is a stance on the scientific origin of linguistic structure. You could be a prescriptivist and believe that grammar is a simplified model: you would just want that model to carry normative weight (e.g. for conservative reasons, or to promote standardized national language, or whatever reason).

Re: Neuroscientists find new support for Chomsky’s “internal grammar” thesis

#40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A very important difference: someone who is good at throwing a basketball (or any sport, really) will "switch off" their brain while doing so. There's various words for this, e.g. "being in the zone". Ask the person to think about something while throwing, and they'll likely miss. It takes years of training to teach the brain to do the correct motions while " switched off". Using language, on the other hand, requires…

Actually if you look at research done on freestyle rappers, you'll find similar mechanisms as those found in great basketball players. http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/11/the-neuroa... Being in a flow state seems very similar to being in the zone.

And then consider that freestyle rapping is a formally demanding way of speaking, and that speaking is something people do all the time without much mental effort. Impressive rappers can produce rhyming and alliterating verses in "flow" but a normal dinner conversation is in flow by default (depending on how neurotic your dinner guests are).
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