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The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

blog.instapaper.com

251–260 of 263 posts

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#251
post #182

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And not servers hosted in other countries? I'd be very curious to hear the thought process behind that decision.

Perhaps all their employees live in the US, so they consider it not worth the trouble to fly someone to Indonesia whenever a server in Jakarta needs rebooting.

It's not necessary that they have physical access in order to do that, though.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#252
post #98
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is not reasonable if the FBI does not have a warrant for your servers(/storage space). Instapaper is completely right to call this "theft". If his servers are included in the warrant because they were suspected of housing whatever it is the FBI was after, and the court granted the FBI the right to seize them, then yeah, it's reasonable. If he was sharing a physical machine with the bad guys, then yeah, sorry, that…

I'm guessing they could have asked to take the whole rack as to not have to tell the hosting company about the raid and risk alerting the target. They also did the raid in the middle of the night which shows they were probably trying to avoid alerting the target. They probably didn't have anyway to know which machine it was just which rack it was. They also probably didn't have to tell the hosting company directly ju…

Even if it was indeed a necessary precaution (for which I have doubts), any innocent parties affected by this should be contacted for arranging a proper reimbursement and be issued an official apology, as soon as the operation was completed, and without them having to pursue it.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#253
post #145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think so too. He says: I have no idea whether I’ll ever see the server again In this case the host probably doesn't know better than him. According to the NYTimes they are a swiss company, they only rent space and connectivity from the data center. I see people jump up and down accusing their host being a bad host when their websites go down for 10 minutes. The thing is, shit like this happens all the time. Some ye…

The problem with DigitalOne was a complete lack of communication around this event. It was a long time (and a lot of badgering) before any of us learned anything about what had happened. I can sympathize with being busy during a crisis, but total silence for 24+ hours, with no working website, email, status page, or twitter account, is not acceptable.

Yeah, that is what hosting companies often lack: communication with their customer during crisis. I totally agree that DigitalOne should inform their customers about the incident and they handled the case poorly. But, like I said, put all the blame on them is too harsh.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#254
post #212

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are you joking?

No, not at all. Until a few months ago, Instapaper didn't require users to set a password -- you could (and originally were encouraged to) use it without a password at all. This makes a lot of sense. If more sites storing non-critical data did this we'd have far less password fatigue and people more wary about what they trust to such sites. Just now they see their "password1" as impenetrable security when they might…

So how did you authenticate?

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#255

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This would only be protection against thieves that steal your harddrives, if the US government had your drives they can legally compel you to divulge your password.

There are systems you can use to defeat this. One password decrypts the drive, another wipes it.

If there was a court order for the decryption keys for your drive and you gave them a key that destroyed it, you would almost certainly be found guilty of deliberately destroying evidence.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#256

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If I get in your car that's just laying there on the street and "borrow" it for a week without telling you anything, do you think the court will question whether I overstepped my bounds ? Do you think I can avoid getting slapped? After all, I do have the right to drive cars, including cars which I don't own.

What? No, seriously-- what? How is this at all analogous to a warranted search? The FBI had permission to take something - so did they perform due diligence to make sure they took the correct something? That is the question. So let's say I gave you permission to drive my car. It's green. You hop in a green car near my house, find the keys in the ignition and leave for four hours of errands. (Typically, I'd give you m…

Nope, the correct analogy is that he took all the green cars in addition to all the blue and red cars.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#257
post #198

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Fantastic. One more question: does increasing the work factor automagically upgrade existing passwords in some way? As in, will bcrypt passwords created today be strong enough in 2020?

getsat and tptacek have already answered your question, so I won't rehash that (pun wholly intended), but I should point out that one interesting property of PBKDF2 is that you can increment the work factor (number of iterations). PBKDF2(password, iterations=10) == PBKDF2(PBKDF2(password, iterations=5), iterations=5) Thus you could, say, increase the number of iterations every month. All that said, you should still u…

That does introduce a security concern though. While it might be hard in practise, if you have a copy of a hashed password iterated 200 times, then a copy of the same hashed password iterated 300 times and have cracked the 200 iteration hash, you could verify the other hash is the same by applying 100 iterations to the hash. To solve this you would want to change the salt whenever you change the password, which involves doing all the iterations again. Then you are no better off then using a non-incrementing solution like bcrypt. The only situation where you wouldn't be able to make a new salt, however, is if the user hasn't logged in for a while (which is quite possible for single-use accounts on websites).

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#258

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not going to lie and say I was already thinking that, but I did have a notion that, in such a scheme, if somebodies passowrd was "1111111" then your salt + password would be the unimpressive 1111111111111. But if you don't mind a follow-up, wouldn't it still defeat rainbow tables? Why not?

In your scheme, if your password is "apple scrapple", the hash value is always going to be (say) "f1d2d2f924e986ac86fdf7b36c94bcdf32beec15". An attacker can precompute that and just use text search to find everyone with the password "apple scrapple".

They would still need a rainbow suited to the algorithm that is used to create the salt, or to have it large enough to contain the password+salt value within it. Still means that the entire database can be used with the same rainbow table, however.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#259
post #130

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Netherlands, Sweden, etc. provide pretty good coverage and is where a lot of the seedboxes for torrenting are held. If you have something you want the government to have a almost nonexistent (depending on what it is) chance of getting to, go with Russia, China, etc. and other countries that probably don't have the best relations with the United States.

Russia and China are perhaps good examples of places to host something the US government has little chance of getting to, but the governments of those countries are far worse about this sort of thing than that of the States, so I wouldn't want my data to be stored there.

Depends on your data, you don't want your company IP or your bank details held there.

But they are hardly likely to pass onto the FBI the fact that you read the wiki article on Marx and so might be a security risk.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#260
post #81
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I dont understand. If you can use mixed-cased, letters and symbols you have 26 * 2 + 20 = 72 possible characters. 72^8 >> 1e9 It would still take more than 8 days to brute force at 1 billion/sec. And using a longer password (16 chars?) would make this a very long time. Or is there other trick that makes this fast? Or, is it simply that people don't choose random, long passwords?

You're looking at more like 5+ billion/sec today. There was a listing of modern consumer video cards + their hashing capabilities posted on another HN story recently, but I can't find it.

> You're looking at more like 5+ billion/sec today.

Sounds about right http://blog.zorinaq.com/?e=43 And a few times more if it's md5.

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