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The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

blog.instapaper.com

71–80 of 263 posts

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#71
post #67
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> can brute force millions Modern consumer video cards can do billions per second now. You might as well just store them in plaintext instead of using SHA1/MD5 with or without salting. :/

I dont understand. If you can use mixed-cased, letters and symbols you have 26 * 2 + 20 = 72 possible characters. 72^8 >> 1e9 It would still take more than 8 days to brute force at 1 billion/sec. And using a longer password (16 chars?) would make this a very long time. Or is there other trick that makes this fast? Or, is it simply that people don't choose random, long passwords?

> Or, is it simply that people don't choose random, long passwords?

That's always part of the problem.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#72
post #66
post #25

Instapaper stores only salted SHA-1 hashes of passwords, so those are relatively safe. -- Obligatory statement on NEVER USING SHA-1 HASHES to make passwords "safe". Any normal person can brute force millions of SHA-1 hashes (salted however much you want) per second on a GPU. If the FBI so wanted (although I don't believe they do) I'm sure they could brute force almost every single password in that database. Granted,…

That was my first thought too. Not only does the FBI have the salted hashes, but they also have a copy of the code for the website. So they know what the salt values are. This makes it even easier to brute force the hashes.

You've been downmodded because password hash salts are public nonce values; usually, schemes that depend on "secret salts" are crackpot alternatives to secure password hashes.

(I didn't downmod you).

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#73
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No there isn't. You only think that because when geeks discuss anything that involves one or more knobs, a huge debate must necessarily ensue about the proper values of those knobs. Just use the bcrypt defaults. You will be fine. You will in particular be so much better off than salted SHA-1 that this topic will be mooted. Later on, maybe in 5-10 years, you can re-engage with the debate about what a good cost factor…

Thanks. I am just trying to navigate the sea of misinformation that spews forth everywhere about salted hashes vs bcrypt vs scrypt. I can see that lots of people claim that bcrypt is better, but I am not aware of anything about it other than the original paper. Basically, I want to know what the chances are that two months after I implement bcrypt a huge issue with it will be discovered and I'll have to move everythi…

There is virtually no chance that, after selecting bcrypt, you will be forced to scramble to replace it in 2 months.

There is no chance that, after selecting bcrypt, you will be forced to scramble to replace it with salted SHA-1 hashes. bcrypt is strictly better than what you're doing now.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#74
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have been thinking about switching everything to bcrypt, but there is definitely way too much confusion about bcrypt vs scrypt, how many rounds to set for bcrypt, etc. What is the definitive source for figuring out what the new standard should be? Does anyone have any links to something that's peer-reviewed and approved for use by someone with enough authority to do so?

No there isn't. You only think that because when geeks discuss anything that involves one or more knobs, a huge debate must necessarily ensue about the proper values of those knobs. Just use the bcrypt defaults. You will be fine. You will in particular be so much better off than salted SHA-1 that this topic will be mooted. Later on, maybe in 5-10 years, you can re-engage with the debate about what a good cost factor…

What's a ready to go bcrypt library for C/C++? I mean include headers, link lib / so, and call a function.

I've been looking into this over the past few days, and I've decided to just extract the relevant files from py-bcrypt, and get rid of the compatibility layer.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#75
post #6

I'm trying to think of an analogy which can explain why this might be reasonable from the FBIs perspective. Suppose you were using a shared storage space (shared servers, or server farm) with several other dudes. One of them is a drug dealer. One day the police/FBI decide to raid the storage space since the drug dealer has been using it to store illegal drugs. Is it not reasonable to consider this collateral damage (…

this is not shared hosting. the server taken belonged to instapaper. being located in the same datacenter should not be grounds for seizure. if you're looking for a metaphor, think about a self-storage facility ([one of these places]( http://www.moversandpackers.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/s... ). imagine you're renting one of those units, and somebody renting a unit on the other side of the yard is a drug dealer.…

The server belonged to Digital One.

I didn’t own the hardware — I was leasing it from DigitalOne.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#76
"a Swiss hosting company leasing blade servers"

If they are truly blade servers, then they were possibly sharing the same chassis, power supply and backplane. Could the FBI have pulled just the blades in question? Possibly. But I can very easily imagine the entire blade chassis being viewed as a monolithic component that they would want to be able to perform whatever forensic analysis they are planning. They could also have pulled whatever blades they were not after, and left them, but until you replace the chassis, you are dead in the water.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#77

All the more reason for data havens to exist. Run your server from a country where the police can't just take it with impunity.

I think it's probably safer to proceed with the assumption that any sufficiently motivated government can seize your physical machine anytime they wish.

I should note that I'm not disagreeing with you, I just think there are more important considerations to make before physical location of the data.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#78
post #31
post #25

Instapaper stores only salted SHA-1 hashes of passwords, so those are relatively safe. -- Obligatory statement on NEVER USING SHA-1 HASHES to make passwords "safe". Any normal person can brute force millions of SHA-1 hashes (salted however much you want) per second on a GPU. If the FBI so wanted (although I don't believe they do) I'm sure they could brute force almost every single password in that database. Granted,…

Can you describe why it's better?

It takes much longer to compute the hash of a given password, which essentially makes it as if everyone chose passwords with a couple extra bytes of entropy in them.

Re: The FBI stole an Instapaper server in an unrelated raid

#79
post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Thanks. I am just trying to navigate the sea of misinformation that spews forth everywhere about salted hashes vs bcrypt vs scrypt. I can see that lots of people claim that bcrypt is better, but I am not aware of anything about it other than the original paper. Basically, I want to know what the chances are that two months after I implement bcrypt a huge issue with it will be discovered and I'll have to move everythi…

There is virtually no chance that, after selecting bcrypt, you will be forced to scramble to replace it in 2 months. There is no chance that, after selecting bcrypt, you will be forced to scramble to replace it with salted SHA-1 hashes. bcrypt is strictly better than what you're doing now.

Fantastic. One more question: does increasing the work factor automagically upgrade existing passwords in some way? As in, will bcrypt passwords created today be strong enough in 2020?
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