Earlier quoted context omitted.
I for one find it totally neat that people realize their expensive EV cert was a waste of money. Although that was true before, too. EV certs are a waste of money, the only thing they do is show a green bar. They don't improve security.
EV certificates have the same level of confidentiality and integrity as DV certs, but they have different authentication - specifically, they tie the certificate to a legal entity rather than a domain name. ie. https://paypal.com-customerservice.ru vs PayPal Inc [US] | https://paypal.com I run https://certsimple.com . We sell EV certs. But you can verify the above pretty easily by checking out the EV guidelines, the…
What makes an EV cert an EV cert is that it contains a Certificate Policies extension. (There are also requirements for the EV to have certain things in the Subject; I'm only saying that they're not necessarily forbidden from the Subject in the DV case.)
That said, many CAs like to overwrite whatever subject you give them with stuff like what's in your example. But you can find examples on the Internet where this doesn't hold, and the Subject contains useful information (e.g., Wikipedia, Let's Encrypt, Google).
One of the things I wish that x.509 was would be that certificates could have been simply a signed (CSR + additional data from CA); since CSRs are themselves signed, this would have prevented the CA from being able to change the CSR after it's submission; that is, the process of submitting the CSR would give the CA two options: append information and sign, or not sign. As it is, their first option is "rewrite the cert however we like and sign"
It doesn't matter so much for the Subject, but CAs will also do things like take a requested extension that has the critical bit set in the CSR, and mark it as non-critical in the certificate. (or even flat out drop the extension) A dev who blindly assumes that the CA will either do as asked, or refuse with a reason then runs the risk of putting a certificate that was really ever requested into production.
(One, I suppose, could assert that allowing free-form Subjects might cause a CA to sign a cert whose Subject is lying or misleading, which could be bad if the reader thinks the signature implies validation of that data.)