TLDR: Google has lost trust in Symantec's ability to properly validate certificates they issue. Chrome has a Root Certificate Policy that expects a CA to perform in a manner commensurate with the trust being placed in them and the Google team appears to see evidence that they are not living up to the standard laid out. They propose a gradual distrust of existing certificates by reducing the 'maximum age' of the certi…
Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
21–30 of 329 posts
Re: Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
#22Earlier quoted context omitted.
Perhaps it's neat for you, I just found out that our newly issued EV certificate status is being revoked in the next build of Chrome, so our expensive EV certificates may as well be $5 StartSSL certificates. I imagine that there will be a lot of angry customers asking for refunds from Symantec/Verisign for certificates already issued which no longer conform to the offered product.
I for one find it totally neat that people realize their expensive EV cert was a waste of money. Although that was true before, too. EV certs are a waste of money, the only thing they do is show a green bar. They don't improve security.
They don't improve security -- that is true.
Re: Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
Perhaps it's neat for you, I just found out that our newly issued EV certificate status is being revoked in the next build of Chrome, so our expensive EV certificates may as well be $5 StartSSL certificates. I imagine that there will be a lot of angry customers asking for refunds from Symantec/Verisign for certificates already issued which no longer conform to the offered product.
I for one find it totally neat that people realize their expensive EV cert was a waste of money. Although that was true before, too. EV certs are a waste of money, the only thing they do is show a green bar. They don't improve security.
Re: Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
#24Google's also been looking to limit the maximum validity lifetimes in general through the CA/B Forum[1] in a ballot that ended up not passing (with hints[2] that Chrome would end up enforcing something similar itself even if it wasn't part of the Baseline Requirements). This seems to be indicative of the general indication that Chrome wants to head in anyway[3]. [1] https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-January/…
Kinda undermines the idea of having a standards group if Google is going to strongarm the industry by doing their own thing anyways
Re: Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
#25Re: Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
Perhaps it's neat for you, I just found out that our newly issued EV certificate status is being revoked in the next build of Chrome, so our expensive EV certificates may as well be $5 StartSSL certificates. I imagine that there will be a lot of angry customers asking for refunds from Symantec/Verisign for certificates already issued which no longer conform to the offered product.
I for one find it totally neat that people realize their expensive EV cert was a waste of money. Although that was true before, too. EV certs are a waste of money, the only thing they do is show a green bar. They don't improve security.
ie.
https://paypal.com-customerservice.ru
vs PayPal Inc [US] | https://paypal.com
I run https://certsimple.com. We sell EV certs. But you can verify the above pretty easily by checking out the EV guidelines, the additional requirements that apply only to EV certs (https://cabforum.org/extended-validation/). You can also see the difference with openssl pretty easily:Here is a DV cert:
openssl x509 -in domain-validated-example.com.crt -noout -text | grep Subject
OU=Domain Control Validated
CN=example.com
DNS:example.com
Here is an EV cert: openssl x509 -in extended-validated-example.com.crt -noout -text | grep Subject:
jurisdictionOfIncorporationCountryName=GB
businessCategory=Private Organization
serialNumber=09378892
C=GB
ST=City of London
L=London
O=example Limited
CN=example.com
DNS:example.com -Re: Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
#27This is huge, Symantec owns about 15% of the SSL certificate market[1], and as stated in the article, has issued 30% of in-use certificates. No certificate authority of this size has ever been raked over the coals like this. [1] https://w3techs.com/technologies/history_overview/ssl_certif...
Pretty much it will decide the question on whether or not the certificate system is even workable. My thesis is that either Symantec will not be able to respond (and so lose their ability to be a root certificate) in which case it will warn other root cert authorities to shape up or lose their business, or they will placate the Google and Chromium teams somehow and show that root cert authorities can be brought to be…
IIRC that's Amazon's answer to 'how should a user install Amazon Prime on Android?' I don't know how successful they've been convincing users to allow installation of untrusted apps (I certainly haven't done it), but … probably more than a few have done it.
Re: Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
#28Earlier quoted context omitted.
I for one find it totally neat that people realize their expensive EV cert was a waste of money. Although that was true before, too. EV certs are a waste of money, the only thing they do is show a green bar. They don't improve security.
EV certificates have the same level of confidentiality and integrity as DV certs, but they have different authentication - specifically, they tie the certificate to a legal entity rather than a domain name. ie. https://paypal.com-customerservice.ru vs PayPal Inc [US] | https://paypal.com I run https://certsimple.com . We sell EV certs. But you can verify the above pretty easily by checking out the EV guidelines, the…
Re: Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
#29This is huge, Symantec owns about 15% of the SSL certificate market[1], and as stated in the article, has issued 30% of in-use certificates. No certificate authority of this size has ever been raked over the coals like this. [1] https://w3techs.com/technologies/history_overview/ssl_certif...
Pretty much it will decide the question on whether or not the certificate system is even workable. My thesis is that either Symantec will not be able to respond (and so lose their ability to be a root certificate) in which case it will warn other root cert authorities to shape up or lose their business, or they will placate the Google and Chromium teams somehow and show that root cert authorities can be brought to be…
Or switch browsers. Google needs to (and will) play this so it ends up being unattractive for other browser vendors not to distrust Symantec as well.
Re: Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in Existing Symantec-Issued Certificates
#30TLDR: Google has lost trust in Symantec's ability to properly validate certificates they issue. Chrome has a Root Certificate Policy that expects a CA to perform in a manner commensurate with the trust being placed in them and the Google team appears to see evidence that they are not living up to the standard laid out. They propose a gradual distrust of existing certificates by reducing the 'maximum age' of the certi…