Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

discuss.grapheneos.org

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

241–250 of 284 posts

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#241

Post by therealpygon »

rzk wrote: post #4

I think this has been posted in response to this news story [1] to clarify that GrapheneOS has strong protection against data being extracted even without a duress PIN/password. On a related note, a recent article [2] also describes how GrapheneOS helped a journalist protect his work and his confidential sources citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where ke…

I’m still curious if they “weren’t inside the U.S.”, how they are being charged with a law that is only applicable to…the U.S.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#242

Post by tt24 »

codethief wrote: post #236
drnick1 wrote: post #169

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I am wary that I could be targeted at a border just for having a google pixel with grapheneOS. Is that likely to happen at all in a civilized (Western) country?

Yes, see https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/23/cop-city-pro... . The OP is a response to this, as has been pointed out several times here in this discussion.

Not what the article says at all.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#243

Post by siilats »

t1234s wrote: post #87

I always leave my phone and laptop off when going through TSA or Passport Control. I don't think in the US you an be compelled into giving up your password. They are free to confiscate the device but with it powered down good luck trying to break the password.

I was just told if I don’t give my pin they take my green card. You cannot call a lawyer so do you want to gamble or give your pin? WhatsApp just needs Face ID with unique pin not the main app one.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#244

Post by layla5alive »

gruez wrote: post #228
dredmorbius wrote: post #226

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Those are ... relatively minor concerns. Firing off as part of a duress key entry, and removing itself (from the decoy partition) as its work is done, would suffice. ADB / forensic tools would be ineffective if USB access is denied (as discussed elsewhere in this thread).

>ADB / forensic tools would be ineffective if USB access is denied (as discussed elsewhere in this thread). Well no, because if you gave the pin, you'd expect the phone to work normally, including enabling adb. If you gave the pin but adb doesn't work that would be massively suspicious. Same if adb worked but logs were scrubbed. Otherwise you're back at "border guards found out you gave a duress pin, now you're being…

It doesn't feel like you're very interested in solving this problem - you seem more interested in defending the status quo

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#245

Post by dredmorbius »

layla5alive wrote: post #244
gruez wrote: post #228

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>ADB / forensic tools would be ineffective if USB access is denied (as discussed elsewhere in this thread). Well no, because if you gave the pin, you'd expect the phone to work normally, including enabling adb. If you gave the pin but adb doesn't work that would be massively suspicious. Same if adb worked but logs were scrubbed. Otherwise you're back at "border guards found out you gave a duress pin, now you're being…

It doesn't feel like you're very interested in solving this problem - you seem more interested in defending the status quo

In fairness, an adversarial challenge can be useful in pointing out weaknesses (and possible mitigations) to a particular technical approach.

It's not clear that all of those objections are substantive or insurmountable.

"The USB port may have died" might be one possible response. (Not technically a lie, and hence defensible in court.) Or just silence.

Alternatively, some way of directing such probes to the decoy partition and presenting a sufficiently coherent impression of a valid partition might be another approach.

Much of this comes down to risks presented and costs of mitigation (or of getting mitigations wrong).

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#246

Post by dredmorbius »

curt15 wrote: post #141
K3V1N_FLYNN wrote: post #96

Earlier quoted context omitted.

[flagged]

Any independent reasons for your claim besides appeal to authority?

More technically an argument from presumption and/or plausiblity. But still lacking in strong evidence.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#247

Post by one33seven »

matheusmoreira wrote: post #231
microtonal wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is why it is important to continue iterating everywhere that device security is important for everyone. iPhone has nearly the same level of protection and we also do not see it as 'criminal by default'. Secondly, it is important to get as many people to use GrapheneOS as possible, including non-tech people. The more widespread it becomes, the harder it will become to paint this picture.

GrapheneOS is good enough to have an entire column dedicated to it in Cellebrite's support matrix, and if I remember correctly the device could break into iPhones but not phones running GrapheneOS.

AFAIK iPhones in lockdown mode are meant when comparing iPhone to GrapheneOS

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#248

Post by cromka »

gruez wrote: post #221
dredmorbius wrote: post #219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Who carriers around a phone that doesn't have any activity for months/years? An activity-generator might help address that.

Well the activity generator is going to have to be very careful to not accidentally overwrite data on the hidden volume, and somehow able to hide itself from adb or forensic tools that it's enabled.

The activity generator may be a tool on your PC which is well aware of the hidden partition's presence. All it has to do is changing partition size before writing anything, then restoring it. It may also generate using your real data, which you explicitly ack. Some safe communication with your grandma and mother, some messages from your employer, banks, other recent 2FA codes. You white flag contact names and it does the job for you.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#249

Post by one33seven »

praguegolem wrote: post #225
libroot wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is also relevant if you get the phone back. There could be some nasty hw modifications that could leak data out of the phone in AFU state. Hopefully people in these kinds of situations take this into account. IMO all phones and computers should be treated as unsafe to unlock after they've been seized.

Im skeptical of what the average lab can do on modern day hardware, but it's not something I would ever want to test my luck on.

I remember cases of that happening to diplomates or something, but I didnt find it. So not for an average lab maybe, but three letter agencies will easily swap your phone if they can't get in.
Post reply on HN