Earlier quoted context omitted.
In regards to your first link, the quote "'It’s concerning – and sends the message that [GrapheneOS] is criminal by default,' said Christophe Boutry, a cybersecurity and surveillance expert." really is leading language. It's stating that protection is criminal and that vulnerability is law-abiding.
This is why it is important to continue iterating everywhere that device security is important for everyone. iPhone has nearly the same level of protection and we also do not see it as 'criminal by default'. Secondly, it is important to get as many people to use GrapheneOS as possible, including non-tech people. The more widespread it becomes, the harder it will become to paint this picture.
GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
231–240 of 284 posts
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#232Earlier quoted context omitted.
IIRC it was the only one that Cellebrite couldn't break, but this was based on quite old news.
There are more recent leaks. The last release of GrapheneOS they've been able to exploit on locked device is still from 2022 as of a couple months ago. They take longer to break into iPhones than stock Pixels but that may largely be due to Google giving much earlier access for public testing. They have a far shorter window to prepare for a new iOS release before it's in production as a regular update for users.
That's impressive!!
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#233Earlier quoted context omitted.
citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where keys cannot be extracted. Also worth mentioning that you can set auto-reboot to a shorter period (down to 10 minutes). So if you anticipate situations where your phone can be seized (border crossings, demonstrations), it's worth temporarily setting this to a short time period (or rebooting your phone yourself to ge…
I dont understand why people like a journalist working on things they dont want seized would carry this kind of data on their device at a situation like this (border crossing), I see it as more useful to remove that kind of data from the device first.
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#234Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#235Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#236What GrapheneOS is missing is a complete backup and restore solution so that people can preventively wipe their smartphone before crossing the border. It would be nice to have the possibility to backup/restore every app and their data from an ssh/sftp server the way google/apple users do with google cloud / icloud. I'd rather wipe my smartphone, only add a couple of direct contacts, a copy of my passport and the pdf…
> I am wary that I could be targeted at a border just for having a google pixel with grapheneOS. Is that likely to happen at all in a civilized (Western) country?
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#237Earlier quoted context omitted.
I hate this meme. The point is to at least make them resort to hitting you with the $5 wrench, at which point they're probably committing a more serious offence than what you're up for (dependent on country).
The United States has famously shot and killed protesters in the Vietnam war era. They have dedicated torture facilities for people suspected, not even convicted, of terrorism. Police officers use lethal violence for no reason every month and rarely get more than a talking to. In a perfect society, your point makes sense, but I don't see why the authorities in the real world would need to care about committing a wors…
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#238Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I am wary that I could be targeted at a border just for having a google pixel with grapheneOS. Is that likely to happen at all in a civilized (Western) country?
Yes, see https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/23/cop-city-pro... . The OP is a response to this, as has been pointed out several times here in this discussion.
The headline of that article ("US government targets Cop City protester over phone operating system") rests firmly in the lies category of clickbait.
They were targeted for secondary inspection upon their return to the US because they were on a terrorist watchlist, not because they have a phone that runs GrapheneOS.
At least some of what investigators did during that inspection seems likely to be illegal (and the courts will decide if it was, or was not). Meanwhile, the grounds for being on a watchlist to begin with seem dubious at best, as is often the case with such lists.
But none of this was instigated by the presence of GrapheneOS on their phone.
GrapheneOS didn't enter the picture until the person who was already detained and being investigated (and being refused access to a lawyer) provided the phone's duress PIN to nuke the device (by erasing the crypto keys and rebooting) instead of the normal PIN.
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#239Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, see https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/23/cop-city-pro... . The OP is a response to this, as has been pointed out several times here in this discussion.
No. Not even close. The headline of that article ("US government targets Cop City protester over phone operating system") rests firmly in the lies category of clickbait. They were targeted for secondary inspection upon their return to the US because they were on a terrorist watchlist, not because they have a phone that runs GrapheneOS. At least some of what investigators did during that inspection seems likely to be…
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#240Earlier quoted context omitted.
No. Not even close. The headline of that article ("US government targets Cop City protester over phone operating system") rests firmly in the lies category of clickbait. They were targeted for secondary inspection upon their return to the US because they were on a terrorist watchlist, not because they have a phone that runs GrapheneOS. At least some of what investigators did during that inspection seems likely to be…
You're re-stating what the headline says.
I've done no such thing.