For any one who has not read the cockpit recording of air-france-447 I would encourage them to[1]. It is simply jaw dropping study in how things go wrong so fast — a risk with AI we have barely begun to acknowledge let alone regulate as a community. [1]( https://tailstrike.com/database/01-june-2009-air-france-447/ )
That's the one where one of the pilots pulled up the entire time, ignoring an alarm literally blaring the word "stall" for 2 minutes. The poor captain found out I the last 10s what he had been doing but it was too late. A couple accidents occurred largely due to Airbus averaging conflicting inputs with nothing more than a small warning light when it occurred. I'm pretty sure they would have gotten the Boeing treatmen…
> At the same time he made an abrupt nose-up input on the side-stick, an action that was unnecessary and excessive under the circumstances. The aircraft's stall warning sounded briefly twice due to the angle of attack tolerance being exceeded
...
> The crew's lack of response to the stall warning, whether due to a failure to identify the aural warning, to the transience of the stall warnings that could have been considered spurious, to the absence of any visual information that could confirm that the aircraft was approaching stall after losing the characteristic speeds, to confusing stall-related buffet for overspeed-related buffet, to the indications by the flight director that might have confirmed the crew's mistaken view of their actions, or to difficulty in identifying and understanding the implications of the switch to alternate law, which does not protect the angle of attack.
Its a complicated interplay of systems, where autonomous control systems are changing modes and receiving bad information during a complex, raplidly developing situation.