Live data from Hacker News

Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

berthub.eu

241–250 of 286 posts

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#241

Earlier quoted context omitted.

China makes consumer crap not our guns and bombs. In a wartime situation maybe people can’t get iphone cases from temu, big whoop. Not the first time the american population rationed consumer products in wartime. We will still have power and air, sea, and space superiority which is what really matters.

China makes a lot of electronics on which our infrastructure and logistics run. Much good a gun or a bomb will do you if you suddenly cannot get them from point A where they are made/stored to point B where they need to be used on time.

There is no scenario where the US military cannot move a bomb from point A to B. Everything else would sooner stop than that ability.

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#242

At times it's a bit difficult to read, as it seems to be a telescript of a speech. But the overall gist and main topic are one that needs much more attention sooner rather than later/never.

My colleagues and I submitted a similar talk/paper for a different NCSC conference (but weren't accepted). I see that this talk by Bert Hubert covers mostly the ground. so I am pleased, but worried about what this take misses out. Hubert is addressing much of the ground that lies between security and resilience. Our emphasis is on how mitigation lies in education and autonomous systems over regulation. Not that regul…

"Security" is not the same thing itself, it cleaves meaning:

1) Hypervigilance; which is unsustainable.

2) Carefree ease; which is what the champion Red Bull athlete achieves from constant practice and repetition.

I thank Kelly Shortridge (https://kellyshortridge.com/blog/posts/) for pointing out the cleavage.

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#243
post #189
post #139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That is the kind of diplomacy would have prevented Russia from invading its neighbours. Only if you subscribe to the argument that Russia has no intention to gobble up countries west of it at least to the furthest extent of USSR and its satellites. No European neighbors of Russia subscribe to that anymore. Finland and Sweden were the last holdouts who thought that having a "responsible" diplomacy would prevent war…

> Only if you subscribe to the argument that Russia has no intention to gobble up countries west of it at least to the furthest extent of USSR and its satellites. Russia doesn't have any intention of doing that. Putin is currently 71 and we've seen no particular interest in grand campaigns to reconstitute the USSR so far in his lifetime, it isn't going to start. It turns out they weren't even militarily prepared to t…

> Russia doesn't have any intention of doing that.

That's a strange thing to say while Russia is in the middle of of gobbling up Ukraine (a country west of it within the extent of the USSR)

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#244
post #242

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My colleagues and I submitted a similar talk/paper for a different NCSC conference (but weren't accepted). I see that this talk by Bert Hubert covers mostly the ground. so I am pleased, but worried about what this take misses out. Hubert is addressing much of the ground that lies between security and resilience. Our emphasis is on how mitigation lies in education and autonomous systems over regulation. Not that regul…

"Security" is not the same thing itself, it cleaves meaning: 1) Hypervigilance; which is unsustainable. 2) Carefree ease; which is what the champion Red Bull athlete achieves from constant practice and repetition. I thank Kelly Shortridge ( https://kellyshortridge.com/blog/posts/ ) for pointing out the cleavage.

These are interesting distinctions.

I'm working on distinguishing a whole cluster of things that frequently get collaopsed into the same mushy confusion;

security, safety, reliability, resilience, protection, sustainability...

And there's also inner and outer security, which I think your remark addresses.

Thanks for the link which I wasn't aware of.

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#245
post #110

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Copper land lines cost a fortune to maintain, and with everyone having moved to cellphones years ago, don't generate income to pay for their upkeep. People pay far more for an internet line that dumps out a gig of traffic, while very few pay for a hard line that is hard to cut and only carries a few kb of traffic.

> everyone having moved to cellphones years ago That is untrue. The news is full of stories of people who are right now being forced-off hard line connections that they want and will pay for. The choice is being removed, which is not a fair market. But, telling any group of people that "they are the only ones" is gas-lighting . Systematic lies to marginalise people was central to the Purdue Pharma opioid scandal and…

Detractors please don't get so upset at someone pointing out broad, sweeping, parochial generalisations are not okay (or at least try to defend your position). If nothing else they just make a bad argument.

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#246

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The gunboat kind.

That's a great way to get countries to promptly ally with China and Russia instead.

I see why one might think that, if they lacked all knowledge of the history of region and Russia’s involvement.

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#247

When I recently asked some air traffic controllers what would happen if GPS became unavailable, it was grumpy sounds all around. I understand a scramble to vector everything to land everything would result in a very busy day for them, because suddenly most planes would be unable to safely navigate, and thus effectively grounded. Cutting the budget for ground based navaids is nuts, in my opinion.

GPS is only one of three currently deployed satellite positioning systems, why aren't planes using the others?

All of them share the same reciever and generally the same frequency bands. Jamming one, jams them all.

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#248

Earlier quoted context omitted.

China makes a lot of electronics on which our infrastructure and logistics run. Much good a gun or a bomb will do you if you suddenly cannot get them from point A where they are made/stored to point B where they need to be used on time.

There is no scenario where the US military cannot move a bomb from point A to B. Everything else would sooner stop than that ability.

Look at the rate at which munitions are expended on the frontlines in Ukraine, for example. Those kinds of amounts need the transportation network to be working in good order. Bring down a single major logistics hub, and bad things happen.

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#249
post #3

Author here - if you have any questions, please do let me know!

Excellent talk. Thank you for highlighting risks, and explaining the need for robust infrastructure with clear, vivid images. Our systems need communicators like you.

There is one story I would like to clarify. The transcript says

> there were 4,000 wind turbines that could no longer be operated.

I tried to learn more about this. What I have found differs in some key details, suggesting that the turbines did stay in operation, and that the number was 5,800 turbines, not 4,000. What was lost appears to be the ability to do remote monitoring and remote control.

https://cyberconflicts.cyberpeaceinstitute.org/law-and-polic...

Can you comment on these differences? It's worth resolving them, as I will definitely be sharing your transcript with other people.

Re: Cyber Security: A pre-war reality check

#250

Over a decade ago I wrote an article that included the prediction that the vulnerability of western infrastructure to cyber operations would prevent the US from intervening to support lesser allies. The rationale was the domestic costs of chaos caused by infrastructure attacks would cause hesitation to intervene in foreign wars, and this hesitation and vulnerability would embolden foreign antagonists like Russia and…

I think what is missing from this analysis is the offensive capability of American cyber. The way it is completely downplayed I suspect is proportional to its strength. If there was all this chatter how we need to invest more in offensive cyber I would be worried. The way we pretend like it doesn't even exist is all you need to know.

Exactly. It's capable and has been for decades, many many years ahead of some of our counterparts.

While it doesn't mean we're fine, I would argue the depth and breadth of coverage has been strategically calculated and held to the point where there are still many contingencies foreign and domestic. I would also argue that the act of "cyber warfare" against us infrastructure would almost guarantee chaos for the attackers given the worlds reliance on us technology and assets, potentially self crippling their own capabilities.

In some ways there's a Mutually Assured Destruction perspective with cyber operations. There are levels of acceptability and most Nation States wouldn't dare cross the line. Where the real risk lies is with rogue small groups. Groups that don't require a lot of money and or time, just a few well placed exploits.

Having been in that world, at the higher echelons, I can attest that MONEY is being spent. Much more than many would know, to secure our foothold and capabilities.

I would thus agree, if we had excess chatter about needing more money for offensive cyber capabilities, I would be much more concerned.

Good thing about it is Cyber is less expensive than kinetic, and money can go much further.

Post reply on HN