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Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

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Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#241

Post by oriolid »

seba_dos1 wrote: post #232
oriolid wrote: post #228

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The version of the story I was told that the Maemo/Moblin mashup was just as bad as the idea of combining two different frameworks that do essentially the same thing sounds like, nowhere near production ready, and the Harmattan aka MeeGo-branded Maemo with Qt was the only way it could be made to work at all. I haven't heard anyone say that genuine MeeGo would make things better.

That was the sentiment of my comment as well, I guess I weren't clear enough - Nokia N9 was made to work great on what technically was still Maemo, but since they were supposed to go with MeeGo afterwards it would still require a lot of work to actually do that.

Ok, I misunderstood. I thought it was clear at that point that Meego was a dead end, but Harmattan was missing things like app sandboxing and some app store and payment related features, the package management was a mess, etc.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#242

Post by mlajtos »

zxspectrum1982 wrote: post #229
nextos wrote: post #219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I never understood this memo. All they had to do was to switch to MeeGo. There was no burning platform. Hardware was great and software was great, but needed a bit more polish. MeeGo was more advanced than iOS in many ways at the time of this memo, and Maemo had been released way before the iPhone. The 770 was released in late 2005 and it was totally futuristic. However, Elop had no interest in going this route. When…

Maemo and MeeGo were sandbagged from the beginning because of Gnome and Gtk+, which were simply not fit for the job. IMHO what Nokia should have done was release Qtopia phones from day 1, as an alternative to Symbian, and prepare the migration from Symbian to Qtopia after that. But they did it in reverse: first Symbian, then Symbian to whatever will be new (Maemo, MeeGo, who cares: something new to be developed, so a…

N9 (and N950) were Qt-based, not Gtk.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#243

Post by nextos »

jarkkom wrote: post #226
nextos wrote: post #219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I never understood this memo. All they had to do was to switch to MeeGo. There was no burning platform. Hardware was great and software was great, but needed a bit more polish. MeeGo was more advanced than iOS in many ways at the time of this memo, and Maemo had been released way before the iPhone. The 770 was released in late 2005 and it was totally futuristic. However, Elop had no interest in going this route. When…

N9 was not "proper" MeeGo, internally it was still mostly Maemo Harmattan, followup to N900, though they had few canceled hardware projects between N9 and N900. MeeGo was suppposed to be co-developed with Intel, but it was never going to go anywhere, because neither Nokia or Intel had no idea what they were doing. Nokia wasn't built to be a software company and Intel has given up on x86 in phones. Only reason why N9…

I know, but despite being a weird hybrid between Maemo and MeeGo, it was really capable.

I used a N9 as my daily driver for 7 years. The card-based UI was incredibly elegant and easy to use with one hand. I prefer it to current iOS or Android. Besides, gestures blended really well with the curved screen edges. It had a great dark mode which also blended well with the AMOLED screen.

Offline GPS navigation was a pleasure to use, and unmatched till date. It had a terminal, which let me SSH anywhere to do quick jobs. I handled lots of tasks this way. For example, I used a remote Mutt instance running on my workstation to read email. The terminal was a real terminal running on the N9. For example, ifconfig could work on all network devices, including the mobile radio.

Messaging was highly integrated. Different services (e.g. XMPP, Skype, etc) were just addons. All contact management, chat and calls were performed from the same application irrespective of the protocol used to handle transport.

And lastly, it was an open device. You could install anything you wanted. It was truly Linux on your pocket.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#244

Post by zxspectrum1982 »

mlajtos wrote: post #242
zxspectrum1982 wrote: post #229

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maemo and MeeGo were sandbagged from the beginning because of Gnome and Gtk+, which were simply not fit for the job. IMHO what Nokia should have done was release Qtopia phones from day 1, as an alternative to Symbian, and prepare the migration from Symbian to Qtopia after that. But they did it in reverse: first Symbian, then Symbian to whatever will be new (Maemo, MeeGo, who cares: something new to be developed, so a…

N9 (and N950) were Qt-based, not Gtk.

Glib, Gtk+ and various Gnome components were still running in Maemo and MeeGo.

N9 was released in 2011, by that time Nokia was already dead.

Trolltech was acquired in 2008. Nokia could have have a modern alternative to iOS and Android from day 1 but they made the terrible mistake of reinventing the wheel and trusting Gnome.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#245

Post by trelane »

belltaco wrote: post #230
trelane wrote: post #221

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I never understood this memo I totally understood it as soon as it was leaked. MicroSoft exec joined a phone company as a CEO back when MS was trying to convince manufacturers to adopt Windows Phone. Double bonus: they could kill and incipient Linux competitor in one stroke. If you've read the Halloween Documents or docs from the Comes case, it's quite clear: classic "love them to death."

>MicroSoft exec joined a phone company as a CEO One does not just "join" the biggest company in a foreign country as CEO. The board decided to hire him after evaluating all options. The board's chairman was this guy who was CEO of Nokia for 14 years. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jorma_Ollila Why would he allow Elop to be hired unless he thought it was in the best interest of Nokia to align with Microsoft? Not to men…

Technically correct, but this doesn't contradict what I said.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#246

Post by tomxor »

Nokinside wrote: post #167

Nokia's made institutional mistakes that doomed Nokia phones before hiring Elop. (I was there). In a sense Nokia was (organizationally) victim of its own success. During the dumb phone and feature phone era Nokia did everything better than others. Everything from the supply chain management, to the phone design and manufacturing worked so well. Why would you sideline leaders and organizations who build all that and w…

> In a sense Nokia was (organizationally) victim of its own success. During the dumb phone and feature phone era Nokia did everything better than others. Everything from the supply chain management, to the phone design and manufacturing worked so well.

They are still the best, Nokia "dumb" phones feel a bit like the f91 Casio watch... but just like those watches, they aren't as popular as they once were.

For people who want a no bullshit, inexpensive, bulletproof, practical phone that lasts and isn't horrible to use, Nokia is still the best. But without competing with smartphones Nokias only other option was to downsize, because as great as they are dumb phones are no longer popular enough - so as you say they were a victim of their own success, they reached a size that was unsustainable in the face of what was to come.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#247

Post by blagie »

tomxor wrote: post #246
Nokinside wrote: post #167

Nokia's made institutional mistakes that doomed Nokia phones before hiring Elop. (I was there). In a sense Nokia was (organizationally) victim of its own success. During the dumb phone and feature phone era Nokia did everything better than others. Everything from the supply chain management, to the phone design and manufacturing worked so well. Why would you sideline leaders and organizations who build all that and w…

> In a sense Nokia was (organizationally) victim of its own success. During the dumb phone and feature phone era Nokia did everything better than others. Everything from the supply chain management, to the phone design and manufacturing worked so well. They are still the best, Nokia "dumb" phones feel a bit like the f91 Casio watch... but just like those watches, they aren't as popular as they once were. For people w…

I think Nokia had a third choice: Explore new market segments.

Personally, I want a smartphone along the lines of traditional Nokia phones: Big and tough. I'm glad to have something double the thickness of a normal phone, but:

- The screen shouldn't crack if you squint at it funny (bezel is fine)

- The battery should last a week (double, or more, the thickness of modern smartphones is fine)

- The cell coverage should be spectacular. Again, thickness means more space for antennas.

- It should have good cameras, at least 1080 resolution

- Standard plugs and jacks (USB-C, headphone, SD, dual SIM, etc.)

- Ideally, software updates forever, as stock Android / open source as possible, as little tracking as possible, etc.

- Ideally, stylus (with built-in storage)

- Good security, app sandboxing, no data collection, no cloud sketchiness, reasonable ToS

I think there are a lot of corporate segments as well. Increasing size should also cut down on NREs and allow more modularity, making it easier to make niche devices. I think there are enough markets to have a diversity of devices if NREs can be brought in-line.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#248

Post by karmakurtisaani »

trelane wrote: post #245
belltaco wrote: post #230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>MicroSoft exec joined a phone company as a CEO One does not just "join" the biggest company in a foreign country as CEO. The board decided to hire him after evaluating all options. The board's chairman was this guy who was CEO of Nokia for 14 years. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jorma_Ollila Why would he allow Elop to be hired unless he thought it was in the best interest of Nokia to align with Microsoft? Not to men…

Technically correct, but this doesn't contradict what I said.

An interesting point is that Nokia managed to sell its phone business to MS for a good amount. It was a sinking ship and MS phones never really took off, so who stooged whom is a good question.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#249

Post by toast0 »

jarkkom wrote: post #226
nextos wrote: post #219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I never understood this memo. All they had to do was to switch to MeeGo. There was no burning platform. Hardware was great and software was great, but needed a bit more polish. MeeGo was more advanced than iOS in many ways at the time of this memo, and Maemo had been released way before the iPhone. The 770 was released in late 2005 and it was totally futuristic. However, Elop had no interest in going this route. When…

N9 was not "proper" MeeGo, internally it was still mostly Maemo Harmattan, followup to N900, though they had few canceled hardware projects between N9 and N900. MeeGo was suppposed to be co-developed with Intel, but it was never going to go anywhere, because neither Nokia or Intel had no idea what they were doing. Nokia wasn't built to be a software company and Intel has given up on x86 in phones. Only reason why N9…

> Intel has given up on x86 in phones.

Intel gave up on x86 in phones right before Microsoft gave their Windows Mobile 10 Continuum demo, which was almost an eternity after the N9.

If N9 had been widely released and marketted and successful (it did well in small release, but who knows), that may have changed Intel's course. If Nokia hadn't abandoned it before release, it would have gotten application support; I joined WhatsApp around all this, and there were plans to support it as Symbian users were a large part of user base, so the next thing from Nokia was highly likely to be used, but not when Nokia drops it. Third party WA client development for the N9 was somewhat successful and became the start for a lot of other third party clients.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#250

Post by zxspectrum1982 »

dsr_ wrote: post #231
stuaxo wrote: post #213

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Aah that's awful. I remember when Maemo first arrived wanting one, and they never made it mainstream.

Let's compare the Nokia N900 (Nov 2009) to the Motorola Droid (Oct 2009). They arrived at about the same time. They used the same CPU. They both had (approximately) 800x480 screens, which at the time was flagship class. They both used slide-out keyboards, removable batteries, a 5MP camera, 256MB of RAM, and some on-board storage plus a microSD slot. They weighed within 20g of each other. The N900 had a resistive touc…

The N900 had 32 GB of storage, which was absurdly huge at the moment. That phone could have seen sold at $300-400 with 2-4 GB of storage, which was more than enough at the time. My first Android phone, in 2010, had 0.5 GB of storage.
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