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Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

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Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#161
post #22

I'm not saying this is a great letter, but he wasn't wrong. I owned both Symbian and Maemo devices, and the experience (both to use and develop) really was this bad. That's not to say everything about it was bad, or that there was nothing to like (as HN comments have often pointed out, there was), but it didn't hold a candle to iOS, or even Android. (And Android in those days was pretty hideous.) Now what Nokia did i…

I think it’s simple enough to see why Nokia thought Windows would be the right choice. It was far more polished than Android at the time. It ran well on cheap hardware. And they would have Microsoft backing them.

As a software engineer I'd have to disagree. In 2011 Windows on handheld devices was a consistently low quality product that had at least a decade of Microsoft failing at it behind it. Believing that Microsoft would suddenly be capable of producing a quality product after more than a decade of not being able to was a highly irrational view. And this isn't something you'd have to particularly clever to see back then.

Let's not forget just how bad Microsoft products for handhelds were in the 2000s. (In fact, if you have any devices from back then, dig them out and try them. They are a lot worse than everyone seems to remember. And Microsoft released this stuff with a straight face).

Android might have been behind in 2011, but it had more momentum and it didn't have bone cancer - it had sound bones. It was pretty obvious that Android was going to be the better bet when you have 1-2 years of lead time. As Nokia would have had anyway to get something put together.

It is really hard to see how rational people would make such poor choices - unless motivated to do so.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#162
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Symbian was the biggest problem with Nokia phones. The hardware was always amazing. I owned a Communicator 9290, and have yet to have a phone that performed as well on speaker. Bar none. Noise cancelling and volume both. I had an e90, and although it was less amazing on that front, the build quality, and look at feel just was... Great! I'd pay iPhone Pro prices for (basically) an e90 running Android with a decent cam…

> Symbian was the biggest problem with Nokia phones. I actually miss it, those were simpler times where your phone didn't spam you with ads or notifications or didn't get outdated every 2 years. No constant data collection or surveillance to the scales we deal with now. More so, I actually miss the feeling of how new everything was, in the sense that is you wanted to play some games you'd sometimes scour WAP sites fo…

I must live in simpler times then, with an iPhone from 2017 that has notifications set where I want them to be.

I do have a newer one, that's because the camera is something I care about, not because an X isn't fast enough or whatever, it remains a capable phone.

I get nostalgic for the HipTop, personally. Probably because I never had one, by the time I was done with flip phones the slab-o-glass was the obvious winner. Seriously cool little gizmos though, I don't think a better typing experience has been made for a pocketable jeejah to this day.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#163
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Nokia N9 was the best phone I have ever owned. I'll counter with the Nokia N900. > I believe, they should have pushed with Meego. With vendor support their OS could've been a hit. So say we all.

> I'll counter with the Nokia N900. I've never understood this about N900 fans. My experience with the N9 was great, and never left me wishing I could go back to something more like a Sharp Zaurus with modern cell connectivity. What is it that makes the N900 appealing? Is it strictly the physical keyboard? So the N950 would have been the N900 killer? Or was there something else about it?

> I've never understood this about N900 fans.

> Or was there something else about it?

It's pretty simple: hacker vs. user points of view

i used both N9 and N900. N9 was a way more polished, user-centric device. I love the UX and even how the device looks

however, for (low-level) hackers, N9/N950 was a bit hostile environment compared to N900. The first major stumbling block was Aegis (somewhat similar to Samsung's Knox perhaps). With N900, you can just boot any other Linux by simply loading u-boot to memory using the flasher. Nothing else. N9/N950's Aegis prevented that kind of luxury, so you needed to mess with the OS first, deal with permanent ominous warranty warning, and risk bricking it (see https://talk.maemo.org/showthread.php?t=81579). On the other hand, N900 is basically unbrickable. So N950 loses to N900 because of these reasons, even though it has a keyboard, a somewhat better one in fact

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#164

I'm pretty sure the metaphorical platform had already fully melted down by 2011, they just hadn't realized it yet. Nokia was not dead on January 9th, 2007 but maybe by 2008 when the App Store launched or perhaps in 2010 when FaceTime launched with the iPhone 4. At that time Nokia made very solid utility devices that admirably did their jobs. What they failed to ever make and what I suspect they failed to realize that…

> Apple was making was a desire object - something that was more than the sum of its parts. It's harder to do now with iPhone's market size, but I think we're looking at it with rosy glasses. Where Apple succeeded is having a viable touch interface. That's where RIM, Nokia, Fujitsu, Compaq and countless other device makers failed at. Including Nokia. Otherwise the iPhone was buggy and crashing all the time, battery l…

> I don't know anyone actually relying on it to make "serious" calls (we kept our feature phones) it would straight ignore some of the incomming calls

I know there was a lot of noise about dropped calls and all that in the US, but this was not a thing here in Europe. I would assume that the issue was at least as much with AT&T than with the iPhone.

Here there were controversies about a lot of things (for example, it became caught up in the electro-sensitivity pseudoscience argument, there was also some noise about the glass front being brittle), but not reception. At least not before the iPhone 4.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#165
post #156

They didn't lose when the iPhones and Androids came out. They lost when at their peak because they became complacent. It just took a few years to manifest itself. If the leadership had been worth their salaries they would have known with every fiber of their being that Symbian was already dead. Both due to where hardware was going and because of the rather obvious answer to "how do the next 5 billion people get onlin…

[deleted]

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#166

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The letter talks about a man standing on a burning platform choosing to jump into the icy waters instead. In this metaphor, Nokias actions were neither staying on the platform not jumping into the water but shooting itself in the head instead. If the internally Nokia OSes were not going anywhere, which looked to be the case from the outside, the obvious solution was to go with Android. Something that already had the…

Android was a choice. Not the obvious one. Seriously how many Android manufacturers are really successful? Samsung? Google? Pretty much everyone else is completely interchangeable in the crowd of low cost devices. LG, HTC, Sony …etc have all but disappeared and they all chose Android. Sony especially had some solid hits back in the day. Microsoft utterly failed Nokia but I don’t consider the decision at the time to b…

Sony still has ten percent of the Japanese mobile market. Granted they'd be happier to be in the winners circle, but you've seen Sony's product strategy, selling a handful of phones to 10 million people is a business they're comfortable staying in. They'll sell you five different audio recorders, after all.

Edit to add: the most popular vendor, by far, is Apple, with more than 60% of the market. Steve Jobs studied Sony very carefully, back in the day. It shows.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#167
Nokia's made institutional mistakes that doomed Nokia phones before hiring Elop. (I was there).

In a sense Nokia was (organizationally) victim of its own success. During the dumb phone and feature phone era Nokia did everything better than others. Everything from the supply chain management, to the phone design and manufacturing worked so well. Why would you sideline leaders and organizations who build all that and wanted to build on that.

When Netflix made the decision to move from mail-based rental to streaming, they did not allow leaders involved in rental business to any meetings involving the company future planning. It's one of the best organizational decisions ever made.

Nokia had multiple choices to stay in game at the beginning. Adopt Android and be like Samsung. Create a new internal Linux based computing platform. Instead, Nokia allowed more senior leaders Symbian/Feature phone teams to interfere and sabotage in multiple big and small ways because their teams still made all the money. As a result, the response to Apple and Android was constant internal reorganization and failed American style compensation structure that caused talent to leave the company, not new stuff.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#168

I'm not saying this is a great letter, but he wasn't wrong. I owned both Symbian and Maemo devices, and the experience (both to use and develop) really was this bad. That's not to say everything about it was bad, or that there was nothing to like (as HN comments have often pointed out, there was), but it didn't hold a candle to iOS, or even Android. (And Android in those days was pretty hideous.) Now what Nokia did i…

I worked in Nokia at the time this happened and saw from the inside how the company was ran into the ground by internal incompetence, years of mismanagement, arrogance, and ineptness.

Stephen Elop gets the blame for this often but he was merely the messenger boy. Put there by a board that allowed all this to happen long before he was installed to quickly execute what had been decided by that board. And that board was lead by its former CEO Jorma Ollila. Who made Nokia big in the nineties and was instrumental in its demise and involved with all the key blunders in the ten years prior to selling the remains of the phone division to Microsoft.

Nokia thought they were being smart by jumping ship to Microsoft's Windows Phone. But the reality was that was the merely the latest in a series of very misguided moves that started in the late nineties when they failed to see the potential of Linux and bet on Symbian instead. Nokia's leadership had an enormous blindspot when it came to software. It's technical leadership consisted of people with radio and electrical engineering backgrounds. They were simply incapable of seeing what was happening very clearly in the industry in the late nineties. Linux was happening in a very big and obvious way. And it was inevitably going to run on phones. That was clear in 1999 and a reality before the first Symbian phones even shipped.

By the time Google bought Android, backing Symbian had very obviously been a bad move. By that time there were so many people trying to get Linux going on phones that it was just a matter of time before someone succeeded. Google wanted in on the action. Linux/Android was their quick way in.

Nokia was struggling to get Symbian to market while all that was happening. It was crap. The first versions crashed all the time and were really sluggish and klunky. Incidentally, Nokia actually killed a touch screen platform for Symbian that they never launced. In 2005 as the rumors about the iphone started circulating. Nokia was instead obsessing over flip phones and saw Motorola's razr as its biggest threat. So, it killed the touch screen platform mistakingly thinking that it was not needed.

All this was so obvious that in fact a department in Nokia took it upon themselves to build a Linux based platform. Maemo. The first product launched in late 2005. It was based on Debian Linux and featuring a UI built using GTK and a web browser that was based on Mozilla. A full six years before the first Ipad launched, Nokia had an linux based tablet with a touch screen. Exactly the right kind of thing to be bringing to market around then. Except the Nokia management was completely blind to this and kept on favoring Symbian.

Years later when Google finally unveiled Android after Apple launched the iphone. Google had been relying on a lot of the R&D that went into Maemo. As they lacked a phone until they launched the first Nexus, they even used the N800 as a development platform for Android. There was even a port of Android that you could boot on an N800. I know because I had one and tried it.

Google bought and eventually launched Android between 2005 and 2009. But it was Nokia that was doing a lot of the heavy lifting on kernel development. By 2008 Nokia had a very coherent platform strategy for launching a Linux based range of phones. By 2010 that strategy included a UI platform (QT), Meego, and a then still secret entirely new platform based on Linux aimed at feature phones that got unceremoniously cancelled in 2012 without a product ever having been launched.

Nokia's failure was favoring Symbian throughout this chaotic period until it was crystal clear that the market was never going to favor Symbian and that all attempts at open sourcing it and fixing it were simply not succeeding. By then Google was succeeding with Android and Apple was growing market share with the iphone without Nokia ever having gotten serious at even trying to compete with the platform it had all along.

The thing is, it took Google many years to turn Android into a decent platform after they launched it. The first versions had all sorts of issues with poor UX, poor performance, stability, security, etc. Manufacturers used it mainly because Symbian and Windows CE were worse and there wasn't much else in the market that they could use. And they were hopeless at doing software themselves. And while the iphone was popular, the first versions were pretty limited in features.

So, Nokia had a chance for several years to launch a platform based on the same Linux kernel that Android was using that they were using in Meego. They had all the pieces to pull that off; including a large base of existing users that still loved their Nokias. But they blew their chances because internally Symbian was the darling and people backing that spend years frustrating and delaying Meego.

Phones that were intended to launch with Meego in fact launched with Symbian. They bought Trolltech (QT) to fix the UI for Meego but that turned into a project to fix Symbian instead. The original Maemo devices were using GTK. That move delayed a Meego launch by three years or so as the UI platform they had was scrapped in favor of QT. The only Linux phone with QT that ever launched was the N9. And only after they decided to kill the platform and fire the team. The N900 before that (2009) was still using GTK. It was fine. I had one. Pretty awesome device at the time. Way nicer than anything Google was shipping. But it was very obviously a developer phone and never aimed at consumers ,and a bit klunky, and limited from a hardware point of view. Almost as if they wanted it to fail.

The N9 was launched after Stephen Elop had been appointed around the time of this silly memo. The decision to can it was of course taken before he joined. One of his first moves was killing that at the same time as he was killing Symbian. Basically, he killed Symbian, Meego, and Meltemi (the linux based feature phone platform) to make room for windows phone. In a bizarre move of defiance, Nokia actually managed to launch an Android phone just before MS acquired the phone unit and promptly killed that.

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#169
post #156

They didn't lose when the iPhones and Androids came out. They lost when at their peak because they became complacent. It just took a few years to manifest itself. If the leadership had been worth their salaries they would have known with every fiber of their being that Symbian was already dead. Both due to where hardware was going and because of the rather obvious answer to "how do the next 5 billion people get onlin…

Funny how getting acquihired by Microsoft, pocketing $5bn+, and still making the best phones to this date, is considered "losing".

Re: Nokia’s Burning Platform Memo (2011)

#170

Nokia's made institutional mistakes that doomed Nokia phones before hiring Elop. (I was there). In a sense Nokia was (organizationally) victim of its own success. During the dumb phone and feature phone era Nokia did everything better than others. Everything from the supply chain management, to the phone design and manufacturing worked so well. Why would you sideline leaders and organizations who build all that and w…

> When Netflix made the decision to move from mail-based rental to streaming, they did not allow leaders involved in rental business to any meetings involving the company future planning.

I wonder, who was the “they” that successfully made such a decision? In most places, there wouldn’t be any senior leadership that isn’t “tainted”, so to speak, by the previous business model. Even a freshly appointed CEO is ineffective if not supported by the bulk of the organization. I wonder how Netflix managed to solve this.

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