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For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

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Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#231

`nosuid` and probably `nodev` should IMO be the default filesystem mount options. `/dev` is already a special devtmpfs and the initrd minimal /dev can just explicitly mount the initrd tmpfs rootfs with `dev` and `suid` if necessary. Letting SUID binaries just "exist" anywhere is a stupendous security issue. What if you mount some external storage medium, how are you to verify that none of the SUID binaries on that bl…

Without read permissions you cannot execute the binary, that would not make any sense. To execute the binary it needs to be read from disk and loaded into memory. In fact if you have read permissions but not executable permissions on a specific binary then you can still execute it by calling the linker directly /bin/ld.so.1 /path/to/binary (the linker will read and load the binary and then jump to the entry point wit…

> Without read permissions you cannot execute the binary

This is not correct, as when the binary is setuid-someone-else, you are not the one executing it; they are.

  $ cat hello.c 
  
  #include 
  
  int main(void)
  {
      (void) puts("Hello, world!");
      return 0;
  }
  
  $ clang-21 -Weverything hello.c -o hello
  $ sudo chown root:root hello
  $ sudo chmod 4711 hello
  
  $ ls -l hello
  -rws--x--x 1 root root 16056 Apr 30 22:22 hello
  
  $ ./hello
  Hello, world!
  
  $ id
  uid=1000(aaron) gid=1000(aaron) groups=1000(aaron),27(sudo),46(plugdev),100(users)
Removing world-readability from all setuid-root binaries on the system would be sufficient to kill the PoC script provided for this vulnerability. It would not be sufficient to prevent exploitation though; there are many ways to abuse the ability to write to files you have read access to in order to gain root, for example by using the vulnerability to alter the cached copy of a file in /etc/sudoers.d/, or overwrite /etc/passwd, or /etc/crontab, ... the list goes on.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#232

`nosuid` and probably `nodev` should IMO be the default filesystem mount options. `/dev` is already a special devtmpfs and the initrd minimal /dev can just explicitly mount the initrd tmpfs rootfs with `dev` and `suid` if necessary. Letting SUID binaries just "exist" anywhere is a stupendous security issue. What if you mount some external storage medium, how are you to verify that none of the SUID binaries on that bl…

Without read permissions you cannot execute the binary, that would not make any sense. To execute the binary it needs to be read from disk and loaded into memory. In fact if you have read permissions but not executable permissions on a specific binary then you can still execute it by calling the linker directly /bin/ld.so.1 /path/to/binary (the linker will read and load the binary and then jump to the entry point wit…

this ld.so magic will lose the suid bit

    $ /bin/ld.so `which sudo`
    sudo-rs: sudo must be owned by uid 0 and have the setuid bit set

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#233
post #220

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, it's incompetence from everyone involved except the company making the disclosure , which, despite the fact that the existing norms are not in fact binding (like people downthread seem to believe), they followed.

Really? It seems very odd to not check in on the status of the fixes, even if it's technically possible to pass the blame to other people. Even if the only purpose of looking at the status to make yourself look good in marketing materials, it's surprising that it didn't happen.

One of the reasons this unavoidable deadline was invented, is that the alternative is that one company (or all of them) can simply decide to ignore the vuln report, and then the vulnerability will stay forever undisclosed and forever out there in the wild. And prisoner's dilemma suggests that most companies would chose "do nothing" in this scenario: they don't have to do anything, and if the vuln stays undisclosed, it probably won't be exploited anyhow. Win-win!

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#234

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> publicly sharing the exploit was irresponsible they did it in the established industry standard way that probably every single security researcher you can think of follows (for good reason, i would add). whoever did the marketing on "responsible disclosure" was a genius. tptacek says it much better than me: " "Responsible disclosure" is an Orwellian term cooked up between @Stake and Microsoft and other large vendor…

In my world, responsibility is not just checking a box of following industry practice. Responsibility, as Wikipedia puts it on their social responsibility page, is working together with others for the benefit of the community. And yes, sometimes that's a bit larger burden than would ideally be the case. It's an imperfect world, after all -- and let's not forget the disclosure as it happened also placed a larger burde…

No.

The problem is that vendors and developers have repeatedly shown that if you give them an inch, they take a mile. Look at exactly what happened with BlueHammer this month. The security researcher went full disclosure because Microsoft didn't listen to their reports.

Disclosure is vital. It's essential. Because the truth is, if a security researcher has found it, it's extremely likely that it's already been found by either black hats or by state actors. Ignorance is not actually protection from exploitation.

The security researcher also has a responsibility to the general public that is still actively using vulnerable software in ignorance. They need to be protected from vendor and developer negligence as well as from exploits. And the only way to protect yourself from an exploit that hasn't yet been patched is to know that it is there.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#235

For context, the author of the linked post, Sam James, is a Gentoo developer. Anyway, this is a disaster. It was extremely irresponsible to share the exploit with the world before the distributions shipped the fix. Who knows how many shared hosting providers were hacked with this. It's also worrying that it seems there's no communication between the kernel security team and distribution maintainers. One would hope th…

The notification happen when the fix was shipped. That people would prefer to been spoon fed only serious security issues is understandable, but not realistic.

A large percentage of kernel fixes have the potential to be similarly bad. For some the potential isn't even realized until after the fix has shipped.

Ever stable release GregKH says you must upgrade now, because there is something security relevant in there. This happens at least once a week.

As for shared hosting providers it is my sense that there is always at least one local privilege escalation available to miscreants. Making shared hosting only safe if there is a certain amount of trust.

I remember bugs that were similarly bad from my university days 30+ years ago. Has anything substantially changed?

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#236
post #114

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is absolutely not true that viable commercial vulnerability labs need to "accept the norms around responsible disclosure". There are no such norms. "Responsible disclosure" is an Orwellian term cooked up between @Stake and Microsoft and other large vendors to coerce researchers into synchronizing with vendor release schedules. It was fantastically successful at that, and it's worth pushing back on at every opportu…

Microsoft's policy is: "if you contact us with a vulnerability, you automatically agree to the terms of our responsible disclosure policy", which includes waiting 30 days after patch was created, and says nothing about how long that process takes. There is actually no way to give them a friendly heads up, and then do your own thing. The only way not to be bound is by not sending them any notification at all...

Since no contract is signed, this is just pure fantasy from your part.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#237

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In my world, responsibility is not just checking a box of following industry practice. Responsibility, as Wikipedia puts it on their social responsibility page, is working together with others for the benefit of the community. And yes, sometimes that's a bit larger burden than would ideally be the case. It's an imperfect world, after all -- and let's not forget the disclosure as it happened also placed a larger burde…

No. The problem is that vendors and developers have repeatedly shown that if you give them an inch, they take a mile. Look at exactly what happened with BlueHammer this month. The security researcher went full disclosure because Microsoft didn't listen to their reports. Disclosure is vital. It's essential . Because the truth is, if a security researcher has found it, it's extremely likely that it's already been found…

The situation with e.g. BlueHammer is fundamentally different: there, the only party that could act on it (Microsoft) ignored them. In this case, the parties that could act on it weren't notified at all.

I'm also not proposing delaying the disclosure to the general public at all. They already waited 30 days with that, that's fine. Just look a bit further than your checklist of only contacting upstream, and send a mail to the distributions if they haven't picked it up a week or two before.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#238

For context, the author of the linked post, Sam James, is a Gentoo developer. Anyway, this is a disaster. It was extremely irresponsible to share the exploit with the world before the distributions shipped the fix. Who knows how many shared hosting providers were hacked with this. It's also worrying that it seems there's no communication between the kernel security team and distribution maintainers. One would hope th…

> It was extremely irresponsible to share the exploit with the world before the distributions shipped the fix.

It's a total arsehole'y move to not share with open-source projects (like Debian) but for commercial vendors like Microsoft I don't give a crap.

Now let's not get carried away either: that's a privilege escalation, so it already requires access to a local account. We're not exactly in Jia Tan "I backdoor every SSH out there if your Linux distro is using systemd" territory either.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#239

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure, maybe it's not a _requirement_, but now we're all in more pain because the reporters are more interested in Fame than Safe Remediation.

No, you're in more pain, but other defenders with different postures benefit from having faster and fuller disclosure.

Mind explaining how sitting on it a month after the patch landed is 'faster'? To my mind, that's a month where attackers could analyze commit logs, but maintainers are not acting with urgency to ship fixes.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#240
post #220

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Really? It seems very odd to not check in on the status of the fixes, even if it's technically possible to pass the blame to other people. Even if the only purpose of looking at the status to make yourself look good in marketing materials, it's surprising that it didn't happen.

One of the reasons this unavoidable deadline was invented, is that the alternative is that one company (or all of them) can simply decide to ignore the vuln report, and then the vulnerability will stay forever undisclosed and forever out there in the wild. And prisoner's dilemma suggests that most companies would chose "do nothing" in this scenario: they don't have to do anything, and if the vuln stays undisclosed, i…

I'm confused. Can you explain how this applies to the current situation, where no vuln reports were submitted to the groups responsible for distributing patches?
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