Live data from Hacker News

For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

openwall.com

191–200 of 578 posts

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#191

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Counterpoint. End users have a right to mitigate this issue on their systems. It is a really really bad look for Linux, puts a bit of water on all hype around switching from Windows.

It does? The disclosure even says the concern for single user systems is very low. If someone has access to your single user system, remote or otherwise, you’ve already lost on the sort of device people would be switching from windows to Linux on.

> The disclosure even says the concern for single user systems is very low.

For single user systems (not rigorously defined, I presume it's the intersection of our two definitions which we might be talking about) the nature of the exploit is local privilege escalation, of which there could be many possible, and many mitigations / countermeasures against. This could have suddenly appeared from the ether of "unknown unknowns" for some people.

Those people farther up the food chain still potentially have service accounts, maybe even user accounts for some purposes, perhaps "trusted" services which deliver them code which they deserialize and run once. (Have a pickle.)

severity * impact * likelihood

Not everyone looking to migrate from Windows 95 plans to run everything as root afterward.

On the copy.fail site:

    echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf
    rmmod algif_aead 2>/dev/null || true
Not everybody needs or wants to wait for their distro, or plans to patch their IC firmware when a config change will do.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#192

Hey Xint Code / tylerni7 https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=tylerni7 >, maybe you should improve your disclosure process as well? Maybe make it mandatory for users of your tool?

The security research community would run you out on a rail if you tried to take a successful research product and attach mandatory disclosure norms to it.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#193
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Expecting people to do the right thing is a fundamental issue here. Why would you ever expect for all of vulnerabilities to be disclosed privately? There's very little actual incentive to do this. I'm honestly unaware of what systems could be put in place to prevent this but expecting people to always do the right thing is fantasy level thinking. I mean I bet the disclosers thought they were doing the right thing, he…

Why wouldn't the linux security team notify the main linux distributions?

Because one of them might have an incentive to not do so. In this case it's because they want to advertise their own company.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#194

Earlier quoted context omitted.

i have no problem with disclosing a vulnerability 30 days after its patched in the thing you reported to. (in fact, for those unaware, this is the same policy that google's project zero uses: "90+30" https://projectzero.google/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.h... ) the real problem is: > It's also worrying that it seems there's no communication between the kernel security team and distribution maintainers. the report…

> they are in a much better position to coordinate and communicate with the maintainers than random reporters are. They openly refuse to do this and have been given authority by MITRE to work against any such process.

right, which is why it is confusing that the animosity is aimed at the reporters rather than the kernel security team.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#195
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Expecting people to do the right thing is a fundamental issue here. Why would you ever expect for all of vulnerabilities to be disclosed privately? There's very little actual incentive to do this. I'm honestly unaware of what systems could be put in place to prevent this but expecting people to always do the right thing is fantasy level thinking. I mean I bet the disclosers thought they were doing the right thing, he…

I can accept (and welcome) disclosure before there are patches. But publishing a working exploit together with the disclosure before patches are available is really really irresponsible, maybe even criminal. And no, the proposed mitigations don't help with half of the distributions out there...

The patch was available. Upstream just doesn't communicate vulnerabilities because they have a personal dispute with distros about how to handle patching.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#196
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Patches were available for nearly a month.

Basic care would involve making sure the patches had made it into the wild before ending the embargo, and nagging the relevant parties if not. Edit: As of this writing, most distros including Redhat, Fedora, Debian Stable, do not have patches available in the package repos, though they're being actively worked on.

That's mostly on Greg, a bit on the author.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#197
post #187

Earlier quoted context omitted.

its an industry standard disclosure process. 90 days after reporting, or 30 days after the patch lands, the vuln is disclosed. the linux kernel team is in a 10000% better position to communicate to and coordinate their downstreams. it seems completely backwards to me to suggest that the reporter should be responsible for figuring out every possible downstream and opening up separate reports to each of them. the kerne…

Yes, it's just incompetence from everyone involved, not malice. The company making the disclosure doesn't actually care, and the kernel processes are ineffective.

No, it's incompetence from everyone involved except the company making the disclosure, which, despite the fact that the existing norms are not in fact binding (like people downthread seem to believe), they followed.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#198

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Does it? Now that I see their name again in this context they're blacklisted for life.

Researchers are under no obligation to engage in coordinated disclosure and are free to sell 0day for profit. Just fyi. Be glad it was disclosed at all. Be glad a patch was available prior to release.

> Researchers are under no obligation to engage in coordinated disclosure and are free to sell 0day for profit. Just fyi. Be glad it was disclosed at all.

I'm so glad these so called "researchers" aren't totally evil, I'm so grateful they're only half evil, give them a lollipop.

Whatever, the way they disclosed it isn't much different from no disclosure at all - the exploit would have been identified in the wild and fixed soon thereafter.

"Researchers"...

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#199
post #31

For context, the author of the linked post, Sam James, is a Gentoo developer. Anyway, this is a disaster. It was extremely irresponsible to share the exploit with the world before the distributions shipped the fix. Who knows how many shared hosting providers were hacked with this. It's also worrying that it seems there's no communication between the kernel security team and distribution maintainers. One would hope th…

The disclosure was more about marketing than security. From the disclosure page: > Is your software AI-era safe? > Copy Fail was surfaced by Xint Code about an hour of scan time against the Linux crypto/ subsystem. [...] > [Try Xint Code] More chaos makes their product seem even more attractive.

I worked at the industry's first commercial vulnerability lab (Secure Networks) in the mid-90s, and many of my friends at the time founded X-Force. Commercial vulnerability research has always been about marketing: marketing pays for the vulnerability research. That doesn't make it any less prosocial.

Re: For Linux kernel vulnerabilities, there is no heads-up to distributions

#200
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Expecting people to do the right thing is a fundamental issue here. Why would you ever expect for all of vulnerabilities to be disclosed privately? There's very little actual incentive to do this. I'm honestly unaware of what systems could be put in place to prevent this but expecting people to always do the right thing is fantasy level thinking. I mean I bet the disclosers thought they were doing the right thing, he…

Why wouldn't the linux security team notify the main linux distributions?

Greg and Linus do not believe in the entire concept of "vulnerabilities" in the Linux kernel and do not believe in the methods that distros use like cherry picking, therefor they typically are against issuing CVEs, scoring CVEs, describing vulnerabilities at all (if you use the word "vulnerability", your patch will be rejected), etc.

It's fundamentally their position to not work the way that you describe.

Post reply on HN