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Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

nytimes.com

221–230 of 280 posts

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#221
post #118

Earlier quoted context omitted.

engineers overseeing this work There the thing: nobody wants to pay engineers on par with managers. Maybe one can not manage something he/she can not understand.

> There the thing: nobody wants to pay engineers on par with managers I used to think like that but I learned in time that the core issue is that engineers rarely know how to present their job in terms of monetary benefit during salary negotiations. i.e. as an automation engineer I led an initiative that saved a previous employer more than 60k€ yearly using automation and optimizing other validation workflows. as pri…

>>> by replacing a licensed component with an open source one, filling the feature gaps myself outside of work hours.

Your achievement is to save money by doing all the work for free in your spare time?

While I agree that engineers should negotiate better and keep track of their achievements, that is not one at all.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#223

This whole plane sounds like any ugly hack. They slapped very different engines on an existing airframe. Then, when it inevitability exhibited undesirable behaviour, they tried to paper over the cracks. Then they hid this information from their customers, regulatory agencies and the pilots. It makes me wonder if there are other issues with the Max that the public doesn't know about yet. I hope a thorough review of Bo…

The sad thing is that we'll probably see this plane fly again by the end of the year, because the millions of dollars in retrofits will still be cheaper than having to scrap all existing planes. We have no idea what other potentially lethal corners have been cut. What if they go back into service, after several months of retrofitting all of them at Boeing maintenance hangers, and then the following year there are two…

>>> The sad thing is that we'll probably see this plane fly again by the end of the year, because the millions of dollars in retrofits will still be cheaper than having to scrap all existing planes.

In the US maybe. In Europe and Asia, I don't think so.

The planes have been grounded pending investigation. Given the speed of investigations and the political ramifications of all of this, I bet they won't be ungrounded anytime soon.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#224
post #202

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the pilots were putting that much force on the yoke it is pretty apparent that the pilots really truly wanted the plan to do what they asked of it. I am curious what scenarios the designers of the plan drove then to not trust that the human in the seat really has no idea what they are doing. Was the ignoring the wishes of the pilot and attempt to prevent a crazed irresponsible and unlicensed idiot from doing somet…

If it only were that simple. Airbus in particular has a lot of systems which PREVENT the human from doing things. One plane actually crashed because the prevention system disabled itself and the pilots believed it was still there to protect them from bad actions on their part: > caused the autopilot to disconnect, after which the crew reacted incorrectly and ultimately caused the aircraft to enter an aerodynamic stal…

I liked the part where it would turn off the stall warning when the nose was too high, then turn them back on again when the nose dropped, which may have convinced the copilot that holding the stick back was helping.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#225
post #165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The sad thing is that we'll probably see this plane fly again by the end of the year, because the millions of dollars in retrofits will still be cheaper than having to scrap all existing planes. We have no idea what other potentially lethal corners have been cut. What if they go back into service, after several months of retrofitting all of them at Boeing maintenance hangers, and then the following year there are two…

I had forgotten about the rudder problems! Worth a read: https://imgur.com/a/5wcFx8M > Perhaps the single most complex, insidious, and long-lasting mechanical problem in the history of commercial aviation was the mysterious rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s. Although it had long been rumoured to exist, the defect was suddenly thrust into the spotlight when United Airlines flight 585 crashe…

For anyone who enjoyed the write up, it's from reddit user AdmiralCloudberg who has a bunch of them, and they're all good: https://www.reddit.com/r/AdmiralCloudberg/comments/a4ckhv/pl...

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#226
post #205
post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Eventually, artificial intelligence. Maybe not in the near future, but as technology progresses and every manufacturer strives to optimize their designs with the latest features, it will become an unsourmountable task to oversee every aspect of it (efficiently). I'm not talking about actively designing, but rather for warning/flagging for potential error. In very complex enterprises like global transport or building…

AI is only as good as its training data and goals/success conditions.

Yes, AI is designed in very particular situations to fit ver specific tasks. I never meant there to be a single mind controlling the whole world. Today you could program an assisting AI that told you when "you missed a spot" when painting your house. It's simply not cost effective. But eventually driving and medical diagnosis AI, while imperfect, will have a better success rate that humans. Do you really think that won't apply to industrial production eventually, say in a hundred years?

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#227
post #161

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The FAA needs to grow a pair and declare this type certification and all other certifications older than ~30 years EOLed. That doesn't mean you can't continue operating those planes, it just means you can't retrofit some changes onto a deeply legacy model and still call it the same type.

Say what now? It sounds like you want the FAA to revoke the A320 type certificate?

Yes. The A320neo should be the last new design allowed under the same certification. They'll be forced to re-certify whatever they do next anyway, so they won't have to try to shoehorn things into the older design like Boeing did with the 737.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#228
post #88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In what world is scrapping the airframes due to a (serious) software fault the best and most sensible solution? Do you believe there could be undiagnosed problems with the wings, fuselage, tail, hydraulics, electrics, fueling system, gear, etc.?

In what world is scrapping the airframes due to a (serious) software fault the best and most sensible solution? A world in which the faulty software was required to fix faulty hardware.

Maybe we should just scrap all airplanes due to the inherient risk of strapping jet engines on metal tubes and forcing them 10's of thousands of feet into the air.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#229
post #2

Is this only me, or all this one-vs-two AoA sensor talk seems some kind of diversion from the real problem with this plane. I mean, if one-sensor based MCAS failed twice so early in the life span of the plane model, what is the probability that a two-sensor model will fail pretty soon as well? The math should be simple, we have all data needed: combined hours flown by all planes of the type and number of failures (at…

I want to know why the Boeing flight computer needs pitot tube input at all. Modern ublox GPSes can easily obtain 3D lock on multiple satellite constellations within a minute of booting. Several of these in parallel for redundancy if you are paranoid. Flight controllers on fixed wings don't even need a magnetometer to stabilize. Just GPS path heading. If all else fails, solid state accelerometers are very reliable. A…

"Why (does) the Boeing flight computer needs pitot tube input at all ?" If there is a strong tailwind, the plane needs a much higher ground speed to avoid stalls.

If these accidents prove anything, it's that we need a computer that takes many different inputs (GPS from the tail and the nose, pitot, barometer, AoA indicator, input from the pilot, engine RPM, etc) and put them into a mathematical model of the airplane before overriding the pilot.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#230
post #80
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem isn’t failure, but detecting failure. If the sensor had just stopped responding, there wouldn’t have been any problem. The planes would keep flying, the sensors would get replaced, and everyone would be fine. What happened was that the sensor gave erroneous readings. The MCAS system reacted to those erroneous reading and crashes the plane. With two sensors, you can detect failure. It’s very unlikely that…

Would you not need three sensors? With only two, wouldn’t it be difficult to determine which is correct?

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