Earlier quoted context omitted.
If only we had a currency that was immune to 51% attacks because a government was willing to use force to preserve its value, and therefore doesn't need a massive use of energy for its proof of work.
We call it a 51% attack an attack, but from the perspective of PoW it's always about the chain with the most work. Anyone is just as valid as anyone else to propose blocks. That's the point of Bitcoin: a way to always figure what the truth is, and make it as expensive as possible for people to attack/change this truth. The only problem here is that PoW only knows one cost: hashing, and due to macro shifts in mining h…
We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
211–220 of 289 posts
Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
#212Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think it's just not worth the time. What do you do when you've successfully run a 51% attack? You go on an exchange and double spend the money, which means you have to maintain the 51% attack for longer than min # of confirmations for this currency on said exchange. And even after that, most exchanges (in NA at least, can't say much about intl) require KYC.
Exactly, it's not worth the time. And once the attack is underway, it'll be detected and everyone can simply increase the number of confirmations needed before finalising.
If I understand correctly this attack managed to reorganize hundreds of blocks. That's a lot of time to wait for confirmations.
Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
#213Earlier quoted context omitted.
They still have to get out ahead by six blocks, however. This drops to zero every time they start over, so it doesn't change the basic calculus.
They don't need to get ahead by six blocks. They need to get ahead, with at least six blocks mined on the public chain. There's a massive difference there! The chain starts at block 1000, and you make a spend that will be included at block 1001 on the public chain. At the same time, you start mining your private chain from block 1000 (and you don't include that transaction in it). Now, the exchange you're using requi…
We're saying the same thing, but I see now that this was unclear.
The point of this sub-thread is that 51% doesn't give you a guarantee you'll mine faster than the 49%, just an edge, and that edge narrows as more blocks are required.
A casino with a 1% house advantage would have days when it was in the red, around 178 of them in fact. By analogy, you need to line up six days in the black, in a row.
The chance of doing that is lower than 51%.
Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
#214Earlier quoted context omitted.
So, I just ran through the same thought process and the problem is this: How does a new entrant to the network know which is the valid chain? They didn't see the previous 20 confirmations, so the only rule they can use is picking the longest chain. Another way to do it is to have a separate voting system to attest to the "valid" chain, but then you could use an ordinary botnet to outvote the real chain. In short, con…
I don't follow this. A new entrant to the network knows which is the valid chain because the chain the network uses defines "the network". Consider the case[1] of Ethereum Classic (ETC) versus Ethereum (ETH). They are exactly the same, except for the chain each group of miners follows. The ETC blockchain is a valid ETH blockchain and the ETH blockchain is a valid ETC blockchain, but miners adhere to one or the other…
If you propose an addition that is one block long, and I propose an addition that's 2 blocks long, then my chain wins. (These all have to be valid blocks that solve the mining challenge). Miners select the chain with the most work. That's the consensus mechanism by which the blockchain is established (among nodes operating all with the same rule sets).
At any given instantaneous point in time, there may be multiple instantaneous forks of the main blockchain - people who have mined out valid next blocks and are fighting to get them accepted as the primary chain. Imagine that two different miners by coincidence mine out the next block. One of those chains has to win. The chain that wins is the one that propagates through the network most quickly such that other miners begin building upon it and extending the chain - the one with the most work wins. The other chain(s) die and the transactions on it have to be resubmitted.
When multiple branches exist on the blockchain, some consensus process has to reconcile which of them wins. That process is that miners select the longest chain. Don't act as if one single block is magically appended to the chain and everyone knows which block that is; a consensus process operates to select that block (or sequence of blocks), and it operates by selecting the longest chain. When two or more blocks are mined out simultaneously by different miners, the one that wins is likely to be the chain that propagates more quickly to other miners. Since miners build on the longest chain, then the miner who distributes their chain more widely among other miners is likely to win, since those miners will begin building upon it (seeing it as the longest chain thus far).
To continue the story, let's say that you and I both simultaneously mine out the next block of Bitcoin. You don't tell anyone about your block, and keep it to yourself. I distribute my block to the entire network. Thus, other miners start building on my block, and it becomes part of the main bitcoin blockchain. Once that happens, it doesn't matter if you start telling other people about your block -- it's not part of bitcoin any more because my chain exists which is much longer (my block + whatever other blocks people have mined out on top of it).
Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
#215Earlier quoted context omitted.
51% attackers mine in secret. Basically, you spend your coins today, while controlling a 51% share. When everyone else's 49% hash-power creates 98 blocks, your 51% share will create 102 blocks. But secretly. That's the key. Now that your chain is +4 ahead (or wait even longer and become +10 ahead), you can spend your coins on the public chain. Then, you publish your 102 alternative blocks (which barely adds any hash…
If only we had a currency that was immune to 51% attacks because a government was willing to use force to preserve its value, and therefore doesn't need a massive use of energy for its proof of work.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-01/estonia-c...
Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
#216Earlier quoted context omitted.
51% attacks are quite possibly wire fraud so I would refrain from bragging about them. More accurately, trying to double spend the coins is wire fraud.
Which government will prosecute?
Theft and fraud don't take on different meanings just because the currency is digital.
Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
#217Earlier quoted context omitted.
Worse in every way to checking accounts and credit cards. Quite a few Venezuelans would beg to differ about that.
So for cryptocurrencies to be the "better solution" you just need your entire country to have a total meltdown lasting multiple years?
That happens more often than one might think. There are quite a few countries, that are currenly on the brink of collapse, so it is not unlikely that one or more of them will adopt a cryptocurrency some time in the not to far-off future.
Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
#218Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, of course! And once the damage has been done, it's even harder to reverse. Perhaps if Dinkycoin's devs are fast enough, they could release a fork to undo it?
As long as the attacker maintains 51%, he can eventually just repeat the attack, regardless of the number of forks.
Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
#219Earlier quoted context omitted.
> They do; for a transaction to be revocable means you haven't accepted that it went through. If every block is revocable indefinitely, then you can't say that 20 confirmations confirm a block, because they don't. From the blockchain perspective a block with a confirmation is confirmed. But everyone else can make new rules on top regarding payments: Do you consider most crypto exchanges to not support "Bitcoin" since…
>> With a consensus of decentralized, less-than-perfectly-synchronized miners, you'd want a fuzzier boundary -- which is what "wait for 20 following transactions" provides. > This is done to raise the cost of reversing the transaction (the more confirmations deep, the more expensive your attack needs to be). No, it isn't done at all. You state as much: > From the blockchain perspective a block with a confirmation is…
What the paper doesn't say is that the formula doesn't work if there is more than one chain. Since an ETH miner can easily switch to ETC at any time, proof-of-work isn't really protecting ETC at all. There is another chain that was a lot harder to calculate, which means the ETC chain stands on thin ice.
Why not freeze the blockchain at certain points, then? Well, it cannot be easily done. There is the problem of choosing which blocks should be frozen, and when. How do you calculate that? What if there's a network split at that time? What happens if the protocol results in an unwanted fork? What happens if malicious actors try to settle on a wrong chain? This is the very problem that Bitcoin solved. Forgetting the idea of a final truth, and making the blocks work like a wave of consensus that eventually reaches everyone. Clever and simple, but with some drawbacks that have to be understood.
Of course, there are lots of people working on new ways of establishing decentralized consensus. The Ethereum devs have been working hard on this for a few years.
Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
#220Earlier quoted context omitted.
How can there be coins with $5M+ market cap where the cost of a 51% attack is $3.00 ?? In an efficient market, thieves should just immediately attack that. Or is the benefit too low?
The only way to profit is to double-spend, so you'll have to buy or already own a substantial amount of those junk coins and then sell them. After you performed the attack, those coins that you now could theoretically sell again may be suspended from trading or should at least trade at a substantially lower price. Add in the opportunity cost of exercising such an attack and it's not clear that you could turn a profit…
You know, in case turning a profit is not the only possible motivation for anybody to do anything. Many acts of war and violence are not profitable, certainly not directly profitable, and yet history shows people will attack each other anyhow.
'Bit' worrisome if your whole concept of finance depends on altruistically greedy actors who can never act out of spite or malice. That would be creepy but nice compared to the real world as it has always existed.