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Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

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21–30 of 57 posts

Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

#22

Resilient players, regardless of if they are cooperators or not would obviously add long-term stability; to me, this reads as adding stability creates stability. Majority of players are do not express resilient behaviors, regardless of the impact on them; that is they are random, unable to create a consistent valid strategy, etc. - it is not that they are just greedy, since if that were the case, the system dynamics…

It's not obvious that adding a minority if stable players will stabilize the overall game.

It was not surprising in face of what was previously known, but it was not obvious either.

Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

#23

looks at TV selling me various pocket knives reads a bunch of people who think they know what they're talking about Is there a place in between for those who don't care about armchair intellectuals? I just want to know. Because a whole lot of basically retards made HN their new home so I'm curious. I'm the only person who noticed, I'm sure.

Have you read The Evolution of Cooperation? Do you have a rare and valuable perspective on the book that no one else is seeing?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Cooperation

Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

#24

Resilient players, regardless of if they are cooperators or not would obviously add long-term stability; to me, this reads as adding stability creates stability. Majority of players are do not express resilient behaviors, regardless of the impact on them; that is they are random, unable to create a consistent valid strategy, etc. - it is not that they are just greedy, since if that were the case, the system dynamics…

It's not obvious that adding a minority if stable players will stabilize the overall game. It was not surprising in face of what was previously known, but it was not obvious either.

When designing this experiment, we were pretty sure that cooperation would break down altogether based on what people had previously tried. That it didn't and resembles more what we see in the real world (things generally work and people don't stab each other in the back) was not obvious.

A general challenge in doing social science research is that once you present a new result, someone will always claim that it was obvious because of X. What they don't see was that there was a Y that could have plausibly explained an entirely different result. Once we've shown which of X or Y is more likely, the world updates, but it was not obvious to begin with.

My collaborator Duncan Watts (one of the pioneers in the field of network science) has written a book about this phenomenon: Everything is Obvious, Once You Know the Answer.

Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

#25
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not obvious that adding a minority if stable players will stabilize the overall game. It was not surprising in face of what was previously known, but it was not obvious either.

When designing this experiment, we were pretty sure that cooperation would break down altogether based on what people had previously tried. That it didn't and resembles more what we see in the real world (things generally work and people don't stab each other in the back) was not obvious. A general challenge in doing social science research is that once you present a new result, someone will always claim that it was…

Realize that saying something is "obvious" is often not the case, though by definition resilience adds stability and in a dynamic system any addition of any truly resilient element is amplifier of stability, especially in a finite system.

If you're saying that the resilient players might switch to being non-resilient, sure, it's not obvious what would happen, but my assumption is that a resilient player is resilient.

Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

#26
post #21

Lead author of the paper here; AMA. The main novelty about this work is that we had 100 people play repeated PD for a month instead of The findings can be summarized in a sentence as "a minority of nice people can make everyone better off."

Hi, interesting findings!

You say as a summary :

> a minority of nice people can make everyone better off

Was it possible for you to identify the "nice people" group vs the other group?

If yes, overall which group was better off ?

Once the non nice people start cooperating, i guess you can't make the difference between a nice person and a non nice one

Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

#27
post #21

Lead author of the paper here; AMA. The main novelty about this work is that we had 100 people play repeated PD for a month instead of The findings can be summarized in a sentence as "a minority of nice people can make everyone better off."

But what cost do they incur? Is it made up for in some way to them?

Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

#28
post #20
post #5

It seems to me that in countries with systemic corruption there is a huge game of prisoner's dilemma being played, with everyone making the 'wrong' decision. Here's a fascinating quote from a book about Kenyan graft [1]: -------------------- Where does each individual draw the limits of his or her compassion, beyond which duties of kindness, generosity and personal obligation no longer apply? I was raised in a househ…

Great post and wonderfully illustrated! The prisoner dilemma also ties into the tragedy of the commons: when multiple players decide to defect and exploit the commons to the fullest, then commons lose their value for all. It is also related to temporal discounting - we prefer to pollute today and ignore the price tag we will face in the future. We know so much about game theory yet we can't apply it in politics, beca…

I think it's more that you have to understand game theory to follow it. Otherwise it's a descriptive language for understanding why things are.

Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

#29
post #21

Lead author of the paper here; AMA. The main novelty about this work is that we had 100 people play repeated PD for a month instead of The findings can be summarized in a sentence as "a minority of nice people can make everyone better off."

I wonder if a better one sentence conclusion might be something like "Predictably nice players consistently distribute their gains to the group". After all, the interesting variable here is repeatability; that is, as certain players learn which players are consistently "nice" through repeated trials, they get iteratively better at gaming them to forfeit their (potential) gains.

In other words, over time, the "compound interest" on the gains the nice individuals lose gets rewarded to the group. Any individual in the group who can game "niceness" benefits the group at the expense of the nice individual. "Good guys finish last," or something of that nature?

Stabilized long-running cooperation seems like a very bad desired(?) outcome, by the way; is that what you're saying is a good thing? Pareto improvements are usually realized / discovered / gained by individuals who eschew tradition and playing nice.

Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

#30
post #21

Lead author of the paper here; AMA. The main novelty about this work is that we had 100 people play repeated PD for a month instead of The findings can be summarized in a sentence as "a minority of nice people can make everyone better off."

Has anyone tried to test test how different kinds of prejudges affect these games?

I'm thinking about same game setting, except that players are asked to give their mugshot and real or fake mugshots of males, females, people different ethnicity, looks and ages are shown to them.

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