Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
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Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
#2Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
#3So, people aren't strictly rational actors, and altruism is inherent and beneficial. Which isn't exactly surprising. However I don't hold out hope for evidence-based science to central to socio-economic policy, since it would force wide swaths of the population to give up thier cherished beliefs about how they wish the world works, and instead embrace how the world actually does.
Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
#4Respond in kind to every action taken against you. If someone offends, attack, if they offer peace, be peaceful.
Nice people will more often offer the olive branch (sub-optimally), so anyone else playing the optimal strategy will offer it back. Over time this probably results in a lower violence rate. Even mean people (also sub-optimal) will get dragged into niceness over time since nice/mean probably changes dynamically.
Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
#5Here's a fascinating quote from a book about Kenyan graft [1]:
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Where does each individual draw the limits of his or her compassion, beyond which duties of kindness, generosity and personal obligation no longer apply? I was raised in a household where my parents drew them in totally different places, according to their very different characters and backgrounds.
As an Italian, my mother grew up in a country whose government had given birth to Fascism, formed a discreditable pact with Hitler, and launched itself on a series of unnecessary wars which left Italy occupied and battle-scarred. There then followed a seemingly endless series of short-lived, sleaze-ridden administrations. The experience left her utterly cynical about officialdom. Although she dutifully voted in every election, the malevolence of the system was taken for granted, and she would happily have lied and cheated in any encounter with the state had she believed she could get away with it. But no one worked harder for her fellow man, for in the place of the state she maintained her own support network. An instinctive practitioner of what sociologists call 'the economics of affection', my mother had a circle of compassion drawn to include a collection of lonely acquaintances. She visited their council flats bearing cakes, sent amusing press cuttings to their prison cells, queued at the gates of their psychiatric hospitals. Hers was a world of one-on-one interactions, in which obligations, duties, morality itself, took strictly personal form, and were no less onerous for it. The glow she radiated was life-enhancing, but its light only stretched so far, and beyond lay utter darkness. Protecting one's own was vital, for life had taught her that the world outside would show no mercy. She was not alone in her ability to get things done without the state's involvement. 'Il mio sistema' Italians call it: 'my system'. Italy is, after all, the birthplace of the Mafia, the ultimate of personal 'sistema', and my mother's mindset was instinctively mafioso.
My father, in contract, was typical of a certain sort of law-abiding, diffident Englishman for whom a set of impartial, lucid rules represented civilisation at its most advanced. He was raided in a country which pluckily held out against the Germans during the Second World War and then set up the National Health Service in which he spent his career, and his trust in the essential decency of his duly elected representatives was so profound that he was shocked to the core by British perfidy during the Suez crisis, and believed Tony Blair when he said there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. When, as an eleven-year-old schoolgirl, I mentioned - with a certain pride - that I usually managed to get home without paying my bus fare, he explained disapprovingly that if everyone behaved that way, London Transport would grind to a halt. Remove the civic ethos, and anarchy descended. A logical man, he saw this as the only practical way of running a complex society. It also, conveniently for an Englishman awkward with personal intimacy, enabled him to engage with his fellow man at a completely impersonal level. Not for him my mother's instinctive charm, the immediate eye contact, the hand on arm. He felt no obligation to provide for nieces and nephews, and had a cousin come up for a job before one of the many appointment boards on which he sat, he would have immediately excused himself. Nothing could be more repugnant to him than asking a friend to bend the rules as a personal favour. What need was there for a rival, alternative sistema, if the existing arrangement of rights and duties already delivered?
My father's world view was typically northern European. My mother's characteristically Mediterranean approach would have made perfect sense to any Kenyan. In an 'us-against-the-rest' universe, the put-upon pine to belong to a form of Masonic lodge whose advantages are labelled 'Members Only'. In the industrialised world, that 'us' is usually defined by class, religion, or profession. In Kenya, it was inevitably defined by tribe
[1] https://www.amazon.com/Its-Our-Turn-Eat-Whistle-Blower/dp/00...
Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
#6Majority of players are do not express resilient behaviors, regardless of the impact on them; that is they are random, unable to create a consistent valid strategy, etc. - it is not that they are just greedy, since if that were the case, the system dynamics would be much more stable.
Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
#7Suppose both you and a partner get arrested whilst trying to rob a bank. Without a confession from one of you, the police can only convict you of a minor offense (say trespassing).
The police place you in different cells, and offer you both the following bargain. If you confess to the robbery, and your partner does not, you get a complete pardon, and your partner gets a full sentence (say 120 months in jail). If you both confess, you get a slightly reduced 100 months in jail. Finally, if you both remain silent then each gets a 3 month sentence for trespassing.
You both now have this tension between individual and collectively optimal action. Your personal sentence is smaller (independent of what your partner does) after confessing, but you both benefit from coordinating to not confess. You can draw the payoffs in a matrix (left is row player and right is column player) to visualise this.
c c'
c 100,100 0,120
c' 120, 0 3,3
This tension applies to lots of other interactions (e.g. firms colluding to restrict output, communities collaborating to maintain public goods, neighbours not pissing each other off by throwing massive parties).Even if there is a repeated interaction for a finite amount of time, you can expect rational self-interested agents to be unable to collaborate in the final period. This means they have no way of punishing in the penultimate round, and so by induction you would expect 'unravelling' to non-cooperation right from the beginning.
This paper found that a subset of the population appearing not to be self-interested was sufficient to prevent this complete unravelling. Even a selfish player may wish to collaborate in early interactions if there is a high enough chance that they won't be immediately punished.
Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
#8Resilient players, regardless of if they are cooperators or not would obviously add long-term stability; to me, this reads as adding stability creates stability. Majority of players are do not express resilient behaviors, regardless of the impact on them; that is they are random, unable to create a consistent valid strategy, etc. - it is not that they are just greedy, since if that were the case, the system dynamics…
Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
#9reads a bunch of people who think they know what they're talking about
Is there a place in between for those who don't care about armchair intellectuals?
I just want to know. Because a whole lot of basically retards made HN their new home so I'm curious. I'm the only person who noticed, I'm sure.
Re: Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
#10Resilient players, regardless of if they are cooperators or not would obviously add long-term stability; to me, this reads as adding stability creates stability. Majority of players are do not express resilient behaviors, regardless of the impact on them; that is they are random, unable to create a consistent valid strategy, etc. - it is not that they are just greedy, since if that were the case, the system dynamics…
I'd wager that resilient defectors would not create long-term stable cooperation. They might create stable defection, so in that way adding stability would create stability. But only one of those stable outcomes is actually desirable.