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System Hardening in Android 11

security.googleblog.com

171–180 of 211 posts

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#171
post #12

In addition on Android 11 API * apps can't simply access the "external" storage (enforces scoped storage) * apps can't get a list of all installed apps (package visibility, they can specify app names and intent signatures in the Manifest they want to query) These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocke…

> These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocked [1]. The problem with unlocked devices is that it's a legitimate security risk. With a signed OS and hardware attestation, you can verify with 100% certainty that the foundation of the device's security model is there and fully intact. Upon that foundati…

> A device can be unlocked by anybody with physical access and the passcode. For example a malicious party could install a malicious version of Android on your device if they have unattended access to your phone for a while.

This wipes all existing data and notifies the user that the device is not secure whenever it's booted. There's no way that a user would fail to realize this. I agree that it's unrealistic to expect apps that directly deal with money/finance/etc. to be supported on unlocked devices, but aside from that it should be fair game.

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#172
post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or the One Android App That Does Not Suck: Termux?

Sadly it seems that prior restrictions in Android have already taken their toll on Termux: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23224669

Yeah.

So much the worse for Android.

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#173

This dumbing down and locking down on phones and computers, is really worring me. I'm a power user which have been using computers as a tool which I have been in control of (more or less), but now things are really turning. Todays phones are in control of us as we lose more or more power of them. Living in Sweden, I am almost forced to use proprietary phones and software, just to live here. Any idea for what a free s…

Were you worried about dumbing down of phones 15 years ago? In the age of the rotary phones? Are you worried about dumbing down of your washing machine? Stop looking at phones as computers. Lots of things have CPUs in them, not all are general purpose computers. Your car probably has more CPUs than you imagine.

General computing is waaaay easier today than ever.

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#174

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're upset about them requiring hardware attestation in SafetyNet (I am too) so you move to a platform that is way less flexible and way more closed? Not a troll, I'm really curious.

Is it clear exactly what SafetyNet does and reports back to Google? Is its source code available (including for any TrustZone component), maybe as part of AOSP? I am OK with the concept and I can value it also as a protection against advanced malware, but only if it is totally transparent (to me!) what data it collects and relies upon.

I think they use industry standard techniques (trust anchroing, attestation, etc) but their implementation is not fully open.

I'm actually fine with that.

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#175
post #12

In addition on Android 11 API * apps can't simply access the "external" storage (enforces scoped storage) * apps can't get a list of all installed apps (package visibility, they can specify app names and intent signatures in the Manifest they want to query) These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocke…

I am running lineage microg rom and I was literally forced to reverse my banking app (for its usage I am paying to my bank) and remove safetynet and various root checks to be able to use it (luckly they are not updating it very often).

The android ecosystem is toxic to the point where software developers are raging a war against their users.

Luckly there are still projects like lineage and microg where the software is still under control of their users, but google is slowly plugging the holes.

I hope that the true linux on phones (pine?) will emerge and stop this exploitation of user rights.

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It does not. Enforcing SafetyNet only makes it harder for users to use custom ROMs. It provides no benefit whatsoever to the end user. It does provide major benefits to app makers who hope to control the user's device.

I agree that DRM, and control is probably the main reason why they are doing this. However, most people do not unlock their bootloaders and install custom ROMs. For them having an unlockeded system is an indication of something "bad" happening (spying, fraud, theft) and given how central smartphones are becoming in users life, I prefer that my mothers banking app refuses to work if her smartphones chain of trust is c…

Before we enact new regulations in the hope of forcing corporations to build a 'fair' app ecosystem, I would argue step 1 is to repeal section anti-circumvention laws that give big tech one more stick to hit consumers with.

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It does not. Enforcing SafetyNet only makes it harder for users to use custom ROMs. It provides no benefit whatsoever to the end user. It does provide major benefits to app makers who hope to control the user's device.

I agree that DRM, and control is probably the main reason why they are doing this. However, most people do not unlock their bootloaders and install custom ROMs. For them having an unlockeded system is an indication of something "bad" happening (spying, fraud, theft) and given how central smartphones are becoming in users life, I prefer that my mothers banking app refuses to work if her smartphones chain of trust is c…

> For them having an unlockeded system is an indication of something "bad" happening (spying, fraud, theft) and given how central smartphones are becoming in users life, I prefer that my mothers banking app refuses to work if her smartphones chain of trust is compromised.

In real life, the main security issue on smartphones right now is dubious quality stock ROMs and checking the bootloader won't help you with that.

The move should be in the opposite direction, it should be impossible for security reasons to query if the bootloader is unlocked or not from the device itself.

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#178

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocked [1]. The problem with unlocked devices is that it's a legitimate security risk. With a signed OS and hardware attestation, you can verify with 100% certainty that the foundation of the device's security model is there and fully intact. Upon that foundati…

I'd say this is the biggest issue. I own both a rooted, unlocked Android phone and a locked Samsung tablet. I have no way to know how safe any particular custom ROM is, so there's no way I'm willingly going to use any of the banking-/payment-related apps on my phone. I find it baffling that people put their trust in people who are largely anonymous and have no accountability.

Depending on what your goals are, I'd recommend going down the route I chose: run AOSP.

Tagged releases of AOSP are the same base code that all the retail distributions of Android are based on, so should be just as safe.

If you have a Pixel device, the RattlesnakeOS project [0] will allow you to run your own automated AOSP distro, complete with OTAs, on AWS. It also supports adding a few modifications like MicroG.

All but the most recent Pixel devices are also supported by GrapheneOS, which is a security-focused ROM.

Both of these projects support signed builds, so once you flash them to your device, you can lock the bootloader.

[0]: https://github.com/dan-v/rattlesnakeos-stack

[1]: https://grapheneos.org/

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#179

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocked [1]. The problem with unlocked devices is that it's a legitimate security risk. With a signed OS and hardware attestation, you can verify with 100% certainty that the foundation of the device's security model is there and fully intact. Upon that foundati…

> A device can be unlocked by anybody with physical access and the passcode. For example a malicious party could install a malicious version of Android on your device if they have unattended access to your phone for a while. This wipes all existing data and notifies the user that the device is not secure whenever it's booted. There's no way that a user would fail to realize this. I agree that it's unrealistic to expe…

> There's no way that a user would fail to realize this.

I think you place far more trust in an average user than they deserve. If a user saw that their phone was factory reset and had a scary warning, I can easily see many users happily ignoring it and setting up their phone again, assuming it was the result of some bug.

The more tech-savvy HN crowd might be worried and flash it with fastboot to be safe but don't expect that of a random average person.

Re: System Hardening in Android 11

#180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I can give an anecdote. I love most things about iOS design more than Android, and I've used both, but have stuck with Android over the last 7-8ish years. Mainly because of the amount that I could customize things, freely make little app projects, install custom ROMs, etc. Over the last few years, it's gotten inconvenient to tinker, and I just don't find myself bothering with it anymore. I've run into issues where ce…

> Especially with the upcoming change to allow iOS to use a different default (finally). Did you leave a word out here? I assume you were going to write default keyboard ?

It was edited I think, the word is browser.
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