Earlier quoted context omitted.
Fantastic. Now explain how that works to non-programmers. You may not hand-wave, you may not ask them to trust a black box, and they must truly understand and trust your system. And then you can compare that explanation to the explanation for paper ballots, envelopes, and voting urns. The public's trust in a voting system is a very important feature of that voting system. That the public can participate in voting is…
You are requesting new requirements that are not part of the voting system currently in use. I currently have to trust a black box whose inner functions are hand-waved away such that I cannot understand it even if I wanted to. Established systems of voting have equally established attack vectors. If someone cannot understand what a cryptographic hash function does , even if they don't need to understand how , they ca…
They are absolutely part of the voting system currently in use.
I strongly suggest that you follow tptacek's advice in the top comment and volunteer as an election worker a couple of times so you get a feel for how the process actually works.
> Someone might go to a hundred HTTPS sites a day, and the security works invisibly to them
Most people have no idea why or how that is more secure than HTTP, they can't tell the difference, they don't need to know the difference. But the biggest difference is that in online banking or whatever, there are humans who can check if something's gone wrong, if your account has been hacked, you can call your bank and ask them what happened, and you can usually trust them to know what's going on and what went wrong, and you'll get your money back. Or not, and then you can sue them. Either way, it's fixable.
Voting has no authority that can fix things if something went wrong. The voters are the authority, which means that all the voters need to understand and trust the entire system for it to be authoritative.