171–180 of 212 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
They're not exactly trivial to find - but they are trivial to use. Why not use one if you are concerned?
> They're not exactly trivial to find I guess it depends on your definition of "trivial", but I wouldn't want to bet my privacy on the TSA's inability to locate a hidden partition any more than I would want to bet it on their basic honesty and respect for my Constitutional rights.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
They're not exactly trivial to find - but they are trivial to use. Why not use one if you are concerned?
> They're not exactly trivial to find I guess it depends on your definition of "trivial", but I wouldn't want to bet my privacy on the TSA's inability to locate a hidden partition any more than I would want to bet it on their basic honesty and respect for my Constitutional rights.
I guess they didn't read Riley v California[1]. In the opinion of the SCOTUS: > Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life". The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founde…
> the same requirement must also hold for Terry stops and simple safety inspections. You must show your work here.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terry_v._Ohio
A narrow search for weapons is permitted without probable cause, if the officer has "specific and articulable facts" that someone "may be armed and presently dangerous". Terry stops can allow a pat down for weapons; an actual search outside the scope of the immediate safety of the officer still requires probable cause and a warrant as usual (where the Riley decision would apply).
I'd like to know what kind of weapons the TSA might be looking for if the consider someone with a laptop or phone "armed and presently dangerous".
> simple safety inspections.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan_Department_of_State_P...
Briefly, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz allowed a brief questioning to gain "reasonable suspicion" of a crime (i.e. drunk driving), but only because it negligibly impacted 4th Amendment rights. Actual searches still required probable cause or arrest (Riley again), or the infamous "plain view" exception. Don't leave anything incriminating in "plain view" on your device's screen.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The bigger problem with hidden partitions is the TSA agent asks you if there is a hidden partition and then if they are able to find out they you have lied you have committed a crime.
> TSA agent asks you ... and then if they are able to find out they you have lied you have committed a crime. Not sure that's the case: TSA agents are not police or any other law enforcement any more than the gate agent is,and can't make arrests or anything like that. Pretty sure you can say what you like (though please, be polite!). I once pulled out my phone to photograph the badge of an agent who was particularly…
Aren't TSA agents government, federal, employees?
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1001?qt-us_code_t...
> Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—
> (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
> (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
> (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Presumably whatever forensic tools they have will easily detect hidden partitions. The advice I hear for international travelers is disk encryption + FedEx'ing your laptop to its destination.
> easily detect hidden partitions. Even hidden volumes in encrypted partitions? Has that feature of VeraCrypt been cracked? https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Hidden%20Volume.html
I guess they didn't read Riley v California[1]. In the opinion of the SCOTUS: > Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life". The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founde…
Unfortunately the same requirement isn't generally understood to hold in these circumstances. For example, the 9th circuit court of appeals in U.S. vs Davis[1] held that airport searches are "administrative searches" and are permissible in much broader ways than searches while being arrested. [1] http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2005/06/07/04...
> The procedure is geared towards detection and deterrence of airborne terrorism [...] This was a limited search, confined in its intrusiveness (both in duration and scope) and in its attempt to discover weapons and explosives.³
> ³This would, perhaps, be a different case if there were improper motives established by the record below or argued in the briefs.
I'd like to know what "weapons and explosives" that might be useful for "airborne terrorism" the TSA thinks it might find buy searching the data on a laptop or phone.
The most important characteristic of these devices is that I'm 100% happy to just walk away from them (and there are no easily recovered credentials for any "cloud based" services I use).
If I'm traveling for work (and have equipment that belongs to my employer with me), I am equally happy to walk away from those devices (though I'll also leave the contact info for my company's lawyer).
I guess they didn't read Riley v California[1]. In the opinion of the SCOTUS: > Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life". The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founde…
Im not sure that matters. They may make it a condition of travel; you do not have to let the TSA search your phone, but you will not be allowed to proceed into the airport without doing so. That is what all the TSA searches have appeared like to me. Just a denial of service for maintaining a level of privacy.
You know what, you really don't. Your rights aren't supposed to be just a legal burden to circumvent with various tricks, they're supposed to hold in all domains of public life. I want to be able to fly in a plane without having some asshole dig through my personal life. You think someone is dangerous? Check for bombs. Check for weapons. Why are they checking for beliefs? What kind of bullshit is this?
idea: scrub all data and accounts from your electronics before flying. leave your phone unlocked, but primed with a goatse booby trap so that the agents get an unpleasant surprise that's totally legal and comes with total deniability -- hey, you just loved goatse so that's why it's on your phone and laptop. if the agent is offended, perhaps they should have minded their own fucking business.
>> so that the agents get an unpleasant surprise YOU will get the surprise: if you're a US citizen they cannot deny you entry to the USA but they can make your life miserable by searching and delaying you every single time. If you're not a US citizen and try to be a "smartass," they have all the power to deny you entry in the USA. No appeals.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
For iPhones: https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/02/26/gover... For every other phone, Google is your friend.
So that's what's happening? The TSA takes your phone, teleports it to cellebrite who unlock and clone it in ten minutes, then they teleport it back?