If you want to know what a "Vulnerability Disclosure Policy" (VDP) would look like if its main purpose is to claim we have VDP and create an appearance of responsible security posture, but not really to learn about vulnerabilities - read Flock's VDP. They sincerely welcome your vulnerability disclosures, except in cases where you have to "interact" with the device/service or download its data. Other than that TINY ca…
Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
161–170 of 270 posts
Re: Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
#162Earlier quoted context omitted.
so is my all-passwords.txt file on my desktop
My passwords are in an encrypted block in a text file that can be unencrypted inline in an Emacs session with a keystroke sequence that looks like a cat just chased a mouse across the keyboard, and that's before entering the decryption password. To access it, an attacker would first have to learn Emacs. Pretty sure that's a post-quantum level of security.
Re: Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
#163> According to our analysis, the camera’s logs recorded about 21 days of activity across several periods. During those windows, the device photographed roughly 50,200 vehicles and generated about 1.6 million images. On a typical day, it logged around 3,300 vehicles, with a high of 4,454. Has there been any report about which state this camera was recovered in? New Hampshire has a strict 3 minute rule for non-hit plat…
The images were deleted the moment they were uploaded. But the record in the log files persisted. The camera doesn't have enough memory to store that many data.
Re: Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
#164> According to our analysis, the camera’s logs recorded about 21 days of activity across several periods. During those windows, the device photographed roughly 50,200 vehicles and generated about 1.6 million images. On a typical day, it logged around 3,300 vehicles, with a high of 4,454. Has there been any report about which state this camera was recovered in? New Hampshire has a strict 3 minute rule for non-hit plat…
The images were deleted the moment they were uploaded. But the record in the log files persisted. The camera doesn't have enough memory to store that many data.
???
> VIII. Records of number plates read by each LPR shall not be recorded or transmitted anywhere and shall be purged from the system within 3 minutes of their capture [...]
But you're saying that these non-hit image captures were uploaded somewhere?
Re: Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
#165All these cameras do is pre-select the images that are worthy uploading. Everything else happens at Flock. That's why they don't give anything about the camera's security. The images are all from a public place, so no privacy expectations and what's theworst that could happen? Someone uploads their cat images or the pr0n collection? Ai figures that one out rather quickly.
Assuming the point of these cameras is security (and not just surveillance for stalker cops), being able to upload replacement footage would subvert that entirely. This has been a feature of many spy and cops/robber movies.
I almost guarantee you, if the camera even has a SIM-Card then it's pre-configured with all the necessary information to find and join the mobile core network via APN.
It turns on, joins the core network, gets handed an ip address and additional information like a servername/ip as its reporting endpoint, establishes the connection and starts taking pictures that it then sorts out and uploads.
That's pretty much it. No login credentials, no complicated protocols, nothing. The things is identified via IMEI, Mac or some other burned in "serial" and that's all that's necessary to make it happen.
So there are no credentials that could get lost, no technology that would be worth anything, access is being controlled on the network side and the images that are being taken are from a public place with no expectation for privacy.
The core system only has to be secure enough so that it doesn't get hacked via an open bluetooth tty or something and everything else is handled by the network it belongs to. That's why DNS manipulation and similar stuff doesn't get you anywhere.
Besides that, it has to be cheap and doesn't have to adhere to any security standards whatsoever. It's a pole with a mini camera and a solar cell that can just be vandalized by the next person that shows up.
Re: Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
#166I wonder if a stingray could be used to force a software update in a flock camera. If so maybe it could brick all the flock cameras it can connect to.
Re: Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
#167This is pure laziness aka “reduced time to market” on the part of Flock. It takes time and effort to think through proper secure boot architecture and to implement key management in a way that doesn’t kill developer productivity. Their product managers, though, should have realized that setting these up in unsecured public spaces means that their threat model really does include local physical access to everything. U…
The flip side of this laziness is that now, when my elected representatives tell me "these are just license-plate readers that don't record video", I have evidence to show them that's false. If Flock had done a more competent job of securing their system, it would be harder to demonstrate this in a compelling way. To a technically-inclined person, it's obvious from the get-go that somewhere in Flock's pipeline, video…
Re: Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
#168Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also, a reminder that ALPR abuse predates Flock. Flock has just made it more visible. About a decade ago I personally heard a cop let it slip that he had plate-stalked someone for the crime of saying mean things about his department on Twitter. The difference today is that more departments have access to these kinds of tools. Fixed ALPRs aren't the only privacy problem, either. Many tow trucks have roving ALPRs that…
I work in a different embedded space but our keepalive heartbeat messages have a payload of <3
Re: Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
#169This is pure laziness aka “reduced time to market” on the part of Flock. It takes time and effort to think through proper secure boot architecture and to implement key management in a way that doesn’t kill developer productivity. Their product managers, though, should have realized that setting these up in unsecured public spaces means that their threat model really does include local physical access to everything. U…
I really hate how Product Managers somehow get to take the reins of engineering teams instead of having to sell them product ideas. It's madness, they often lack the technical skills and "optimise away" requirements surfaced by eng teams they don't comprehend or just don't like having to deal with.
Re: Hackers Got Inside a Flock Camera
#170If you want to know what a "Vulnerability Disclosure Policy" (VDP) would look like if its main purpose is to claim we have VDP and create an appearance of responsible security posture, but not really to learn about vulnerabilities - read Flock's VDP. They sincerely welcome your vulnerability disclosures, except in cases where you have to "interact" with the device/service or download its data. Other than that TINY ca…
The carveouts for stuff like configuration and DNS are entirely reasonable. Have you ever been behind a security@ email before? You get a lot of BS reports of that sort.