141–150 of 270 posts
So… all that data is literally there for any unauthorized person to walk up and take it. It’s not even suitably encrypted on device? Zero trust in anything Flock says.
I always assumed Flock's security posture was like most other companies. It's nice to see confirmation. I think I should add a "X'); DROP TABLE Cameras;--" bumper sticker to my car now. Couldn't resist: https://github.com/EvanAnderson/whimsy/blob/main/Drop_Table_...
That's why they don't give anything about the camera's security.
The images are all from a public place, so no privacy expectations and what's theworst that could happen? Someone uploads their cat images or the pr0n collection?
Ai figures that one out rather quickly.
The article says that Flock says "their cameras don't do facial recognition" The cameras don't, but they don't say the system doesn't. They don't say facial recognition isn't a click away through another integration. I would absolutely assume that any system that sends your image to LE is part of a facial recognition system in practice. We know now that the cameras do recognize people and intentionally transmits imag…
It seems the inevitable next step would be post-processed facial recognition (checked against those ready-for-the-taking ID photos) in their OS Investigator platform.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Apparently police are accessing the network via their personal devices. I highly doubt their security practices online are any better than this. I wouldn't be surprised either to see things that chinese manufacturers do such as intentional back doors. Overall this goes from disappointing to fairly repugnant.
Allegedly you can buy credentials on the darkweb to perform national searches. Might explain why some of the logged reasons for recent searches were “LMAO”
If you want to know what a "Vulnerability Disclosure Policy" (VDP) would look like if its main purpose is to claim we have VDP and create an appearance of responsible security posture, but not really to learn about vulnerabilities - read Flock's VDP. They sincerely welcome your vulnerability disclosures, except in cases where you have to "interact" with the device/service or download its data. Other than that TINY ca…
So… all that data is literally there for any unauthorized person to walk up and take it. It’s not even suitably encrypted on device? Zero trust in anything Flock says.
> all that data is literally there for any unauthorized person to walk up and take it. All that data about ... license plates if you're willing to steal/damage private property. Seems like it would be a lot easier to setup your own ALPR.
Also, there’s way more data on there than plate data.
> According to our analysis, the camera’s logs recorded about 21 days of activity across several periods. During those windows, the device photographed roughly 50,200 vehicles and generated about 1.6 million images. On a typical day, it logged around 3,300 vehicles, with a high of 4,454. Has there been any report about which state this camera was recovered in? New Hampshire has a strict 3 minute rule for non-hit plat…
All these cameras do is pre-select the images that are worthy uploading. Everything else happens at Flock. That's why they don't give anything about the camera's security. The images are all from a public place, so no privacy expectations and what's theworst that could happen? Someone uploads their cat images or the pr0n collection? Ai figures that one out rather quickly.
This reporting was done in collaboration with 404media. Here's the discussion for 404's article: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49726577 Distributed Denial of Secrets has published the partition images: https://ddosecrets.org/article/flock-alpr-camera
do the articles have significantly different information/coverage to warrant two submissions?