Really love this post. My favorite line is: > Every month of less than 20% growth should have been a red flag. I think that's pretty insightful. 20% growth is great for a normal business, of course; for a VC-backed startup it can show some warning signs about future hard decisions you might have to face. I think there's certainly lots of discussion that has been had — and should be had — about "should I or shouldn't…
These “metrics” are exactly why you see these venture backed SV companies engage in the behavior we saw posted all over the front page of HN yesterday (I.e. silently apply workers tips to their “guaranteed” pay and pocket the difference). But hey it’s an HN/SV unicorn, so there is too much investment that needs to be made back to fail now...and they have the perfect back story, rejected from YC until they personally…
Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
141–150 of 380 posts
Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
#142Earlier quoted context omitted.
crunchbase says pinterest has had 15 funding rounds. certainly they weren't all complete rounds and it would've been nice equity but nowhere near the nominal 1-2% early employees get.
If he stayed he might have ended up in an executive position, getting additional stock grants down the line.
Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
#143Earlier quoted context omitted.
> There is, of course, the $178,000,000 we have {sent, channelled, moved-through-our-platform, assisted in transferring} to creators All of the above seem synonymous and none seems particularly malicious, but "sent" is easiest way to express it. For a marketplace, I don't think anyone's naive to believe the host is directly advancing funds to the tune of millions. Is it really necessary to nitpick that?
They should have said $178,000,000 in transactions.
Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
#144Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
#145Jesus this part sucks: "In those nine months, when the whole team knew that we were fighting for our company’s life, not a single person left Gumroad. From “this is gonna be hard,” to “yep, turns out it was,” every single person worked harder than ever." Did everyone one of these people have significant equity in the company? I'd expect people who love their jobs and who work on something crucial, such as researching…
If gumroad became a billion dollar company you'd be retiring on that 9 months of work with even a tiny bit of equity. I bet there are plenty of people that bailed out of google, facebook or other similarly positioned startups at that stage and regret it.
Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
#146Earlier quoted context omitted.
Thanks for sharing your story, Sahil. Something I was wondering: do you think that Gumroad could have gotten to where it was without raising money to begin with? You mentioned sales not really changing with or whithout a sales team, but do you think you could have developed Gumroad in the beginning with a smaller group of developers, or even just by yourself?
I don't think Gumroad could be the high-quality, full-featured product it is today without raising VC funding. Less, maybe, but bootstrapped, no. (Though, I was living in SF.)
Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
#147I wasn't interested in the emotional story behind this. But I did resonate with 1 line in particular here: "It doesn’t matter how amazing your product is, or how fast you ship features. The market you’re in will determine most of your growth." This is so true, in my experience. You hit a roadblock in recurring revenue, not because your product doesn't have enough features, or your team sucks, but simply: your market…
Scaling to a billion dollar company in that market was certainly attainable. Patreon started two years after Gumroad and now look where they are. Gumroad had a movers first advantage - so I really disagree with the quote. Had they continued to push feature development and tweak PMF they could have been a billion dollar company. Don't take that as a slight to Gumroad either. Building a profitable business from almost…
Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
#148Don't take VC money before you've built something (anything) and tested it out. You don't want to give away equity to invent your product.
I am aware it was way harder to build something in the payment space back then but still.
Great story and while I definitely am happy Gumroad is doing well it's also great to know that good things can end well with a fizzle rather than a big bang.
Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
#149Earlier quoted context omitted.
Hello Sahil, thanks so much for sharing this. I know it helps a lot of founders out there. One question: You mentioned that you raised ~$8m from investors, but that your liq. preferences used to be $16.5m. Was there a 2x preference in the Series A term sheet?
$1.1M @ 1X $7M @ 1X $2.25M (the bridge I mention) @ 4X
Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company
#150Hey, #1 on Hacker News! I don't think that's happened since...I launched Gumroad back in 2011: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2406614 Thanks HN for being a part of my journey!
Any thoughts on the recent drama on the changes on Patreon and their funding round?